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PREFACE 
The purpose of' Franklin ~o Roosevelt ~~"Negro .!!!. ~ 123Q!J! is 
to attempt to show the relationship between Roosevelt and the Ne~ De&l, 
c:n the one ha~d, and the NegrC!> and his civil rights m.~ement oin the 
other., The time span 19'.30 t¢:li 1940 wa.s chosen because it allow the in.. 
@lusion of the effeets of the Depression on the black man and hi~ in,., 
volvem.ent in the ~am.prlgn and eleetion of 19320 Sin~e the major New Deal 
programs and their immediate effects ha4 be~n experienced by 1940, it 
w.s selected as the final date., Also, from 1940 until Roosevelt 0 s death 
in 1945 the emphasis of the administration was by necessity plaeed on 
diplo:mati~ and military rather th~n on domestic affairso 
Da'.l':1.ng this period of concentrated domestic refol"M, the Negro built 
an important foundation in his civil rights movement for gains that are 
p~rhaps eulminati:ng in the late 1960Wso 81:1.eeess came through eourt de= 
eisi@:rn; in NoAoAoC.,Po=Sp~nsored eases, and through the attainment of po= 
litieal and legislative reeognition, both as a by=produet of specific New 
Deal programs and as a result of the unsettling of soeiety that resu.lted 
from the Depression., Evidences of this success were clearest in the ur= 
ban area.s of the Mortheast and in the Sou.tho 
Roosevelt is largely the unknown factor to be consideredo The 
P:r>esident~s sympathy far exeeeded his limited personal inv~lvement, he 
made no politieal commitment to the black minority8 s eauseo Yet M:r'so 
Roosevelt woirked actively to promote Negro civil rights0 The black move-
ment, however, was secondary to economic issaes dur.i:ng the 19309 s, and 
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Roosevelt needed the Congressional support of' CH.'.ln.serva.tives;;i especially 
the powerful Southern delegationso Therefore he avoided the ra~e fac:tor 
in <eilrder to prevent a damaging political divisiono Unf©rtunately for 
our purposes, RooseveltGs desire or empathy for ~ivil rights ciannot be 
easily measured; only a few messages and phrases imply that laijk of i.:n,., 
volvement was a. political neQessityo Thus Roosevelt, itppe&1red evasive t@ 
the Negroo The President@s laek of involvement ijan be ~redited to sever-
al themeso First, th.e still immattl.l"e civil righti':j m©Jv®mrent did n©t en= 
joy eiontinued national publi((jity and attention., Se((jl0lnd 9 the bla«::lk©s 
movement coiuld not be exp~~ted to develiop ful.ly during @. single de~ade" 
Finally9 RooseveltWs presidential powers, althlOlugh granted or implied by 
lawj were severely limited in reality by the Southern Congressional rep"' 
resent@.tionQ 
The spe~ifi~ areas explored in this thesis incilude the Depression 
as experien@ed by the bla~k American and the Negro@s in~lusion in and 
variant reaiations t(G} the economic f 01'."I'i'mla of the New Dealo Another seG= 
is @oneerned with the political shift of the Negro from the Repub= 
l:foan to the De:moera tiia Party o Finally, the anti=lyniahing legisla. ti ve 
d@b~te is inialuded siniae this issue achieved more Gontinued public ~on,., 
iaern f©r the Negro than any other event during the 193owso 
Sevell"@.1 aiaknowledgments are in ordero I deeply apprecdate the pa.,., 
tiel111t guidance and inte:t'est of my thesis adviser~ Dt>o Theodore L., Agnewo 
I sh©>uld als©> like to acknowledge the ~riticial assistancie of Dr., Norbert 
Mahnk®n for exp~nding the perspeetive of my topico I also want to thank 
the libraries of Oklahoma State University9 espeeially the Inter=Library 
toan Department j and the Um versi ty of Oklahoma for their personal as.= 
sistan~e and the use of their faciilitieso Other assistance for which .I 
am grateful in~lude that of my brother, James Kelly$ who handled campus 
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arrangements while I was living in Oklahoma City; M::r:s:o Noma Mitchell~ 
So~ial Studies Head at Midwest City High Sch©ol 9 and M:i.~so Ray Par~ for 
proof'readingo This thesis is dedicated to m;'f' hu,;;baltlld 1 E'li.ke, and l!l'lY 
parents~ Afton and Mary Kelly, whose fai t,h9 en!Cl@urage11tentSJ aind a~SJis= 
tanoie made its completion a reality~ 
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AN ERA OF CHANGE 
Introdueticm 
Friction between Negro and white citizens ot the United States has 
produced politioal reperoussions from the years of Re~ona:truction to the 
presento In the middle deoades of the nineteenth ~ent'tll"Y, the ra~e issue 
was prominent in domestic affairs, inoreasing politi~al, ee@nomie, and 
social sectiona.lism within the nation; but p~litieal pressure for Negro 
equality gradually sueoumbed to apathy. fosteri:111g the rise of Jim Crow"' 
ismo This enforoed inequality determined the eonduct of race relations 
launcihed and the raee issue was revivedo When the financial crisis of 
1929 becraeathed the na.tiell:n an era of depression. the "New Negro" and the 
! 
Direet aoticn based on the mili= 
J 
tan~y or the Natiol'il.9l. Assoe~ation fo:r the Advanee:ment cf Colored People 
(f@~ded 1910) lv'as the e~re cf the new protest movement, replacing Boo~er 
T0 Washington~s traditional philosophy of aeeo:mmodation and concilia,., 
sed int~ words~-white supremaeyo In. 1932 a No~ther~ university pre,., 
fessor lecturing in the South ~ondoned the racist attitude, stating that 
"if white people ®f' the Se;,uth-ex:er~ise their power of control wisely and 
justly, it ~an be perpetuated until the end of time without protest or 
1 
2 
ous opposition from the bla©k race itselfo ~he truth is there is hardly 
a man of note in the North today, who would take ec"~~y the iadmi tteid rights 
as in their judgment a.re most fit and capable of' exercising it for the 
publi«J goodod This attitude was Gomm.on in thei North:,, and it permeated 
the SOClial thought of the Southj but during the ad:ministration of Pre~i= 
dent Franklin Do Roosevelt portions of this attitude ~utfered atta©k and 
enacted by a Congress strongly influenced by powerful Southern politi~ 
~ianso And b@th. political parties re©@gnized the increasing importanGe 
the Neg~@@s legal prerogatives and p@liti©al potential and were deter= 
mined to make. them mee1J1ingful to the blrwk mtU'llo 2 
Although his v@te continued t@ carry little weigkt in the South, 
lNew ~ Times 9 November 27, 19329 6g2o 
~.yf~rd wganj) B'IMeM!Cle of' Rai.cial Discrimination, 88 World Tomorrow!,) 
X:V {July~ 1932), 2050 
3 
the Negro v0te exercised such influence Hin the nation.al parties @l.M in 
the p(Q)litics of the northern states,, 913 Although he w,.,as traditionally 
linked with the Republi©an party, the Negro now sought to create an inde= 
Southern Dem@cll'!'ats~ a f'2l1ct which ma.de harmon;r d:i:ffi~lt t© maintain in 
the partyo Sin~e the Negro issue c@uld split b©th parti®s!il pali'."tieularly 
the Demoerats j they tended t@ avoid the Negr<0i question :m,i(Jre avidly tha.n 
they had the prohibiti~n issueo 4 
Ameriea p~id for the fitition that a ~table government e:an be ereeted on 
human bondageo., o o Today .[J,93if Am.e:t>ica is :f'aoed w.ith similar fritition., n5 
The Negro radieal 9 WoEoBo DuBois, felt the 1930's were critical to the 
and 'ffll.s made a vie1tim o:f lyne1hings o In addli tion, the Neg?'© also lCllst 
hi~ traditi@t'llal menial jiiibs through technological devellBJpment and econ©= 
mic displaeement to the more skilled whiteo 6 
3Report o~ the PresidentVs Research Committee on Soeial Trendso 
Recent Soe:ial.Trends in the United States (New York8 Mti..,Graw~Hill Book 
~mpany~~~9=:s6~Hereinafier referred to as Recent Social 
~!,~So 
4raogan, "Mena©le of Raelia.l D1serimina tion," 20 5a 
5Thid 0 
6woE.,Bo DuBois, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation, n Current Hist(:l)ry~ 
XLII (June~ 1935), 2650 
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migration to Northern urban centers during and after World War It~ es~ 
cape the discriminatory employment situation of the Southo The Negro 
also sought personal security from the threat of lyn~hing, and desired 
better edu.eati~nal ~pportun:i.tieso The blaek man~s move to imprGve his 
predicament was called the "most speotaeular movement of the population 
within the United States in recent yea.rso"? In 1910 only ?80,000 ~ut of 
the 9,827,763 Negroes in the United States did not reside in the s~utho 
By 1930, however, another million had ma.de their homes in the North a.nd 
and Illinoiso In 1910 Pennsylvania had 193,919 Negroes, but by 1930 
this industrial state had 431,257 black residentso Illinois in 1910 had 
a Negr@ populatiom of 109,049, but by 1930 this had inerea.sed to 
328,9720 8 
The Negro in t~e 1930's 
The Northern urban. centers, however, viewed this migration with apa, 
prehension as black ghettos i~reasingly affeeted most major citieso The 
rank and file of labor organizations also feared the Negro and ex~uded 
the black :man from membershipo In theory, the .American Federation of 
Labor opposed discrimination on the national level, but was unable to 
cont!"ol individual mem.berso Local a~d international um.ems were consti.,,, 
tutionally free to make their own decisions regarding race relations, 
7Reeent Social Ir~, 566e 
8uose Department of Co:mmerce, Bureau of the Census, Population, 
1910@ General Report~ Analysis, Volo II, 126; Abstract of the~ 
teenth Census of the United States, 1930, 801rl 84 .. Recent Social Trends, 
.5660 --
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and twenty-four internationals did not allow Negroes to become memberso9 
The only major labor organization championing the Negro was the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations, founded in 19350 Since the Negro was so 
strongly opposed by organized labor, he wa.s generally rejected by Nor-
thern industry and was forced to accept the lowest occupationso Admit... 
t edly, most Negroes were not trained for industrial t echnolog,J, bt1t Nor-
thern labor also refused to train them since it would increase competi-
tion f or already scarce jobsolO 
The compl exit y of the Negro's labor problems were increased by the 
Great Depressiono The Negro, always the last to be hired, wa.s the first 
to be firedo As a res'Ult, the black man was ~so among the first forced 
11 to accept r eliefo The Negro living conditions were the most critical 
in the South, although food riots in the Harlem section of New York City 
manifested the difficulties in the North. In the South, Negro schools 
were closed first, and when federal relief was distributed, the unelll,,o 
ployed black man was considered only after the unemployed white.12 
The Southern Negro was dependent for a livelihood upon the cotton 
industry~ one of the most depressed during the 1930'so The collapse of 
9DuBois, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation," 265-2660 Recent .§2.-
cial Trends, 5800 ~----
lORecent Social Trends, 5800 Frederick Lewis Allen,~ Big Change; 
Ameriea Transforms I tself, 1900-.lliQ. (New York: Harper and Bi-others, 
1952), 177=1780 Hereinafter referred to as The ' Big Change. 
ll0u.Bois, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation," 265-266.. John Po 
Davis, "What Price National Recovery?" Crisis, XL (December, 1933), 2710 
Harvey Wish, Society and Thought in Modern America: A Social and In-
telleotual History of the AmericanPeople From 1865 (2nd ed.,, New York: 
David MeKay~ompany-;-Ino7, 1962), 514., Hereinafter referred to as .§2.-
ciety ~ Thought !!l Modern Americao 
12DuBoi s, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation," 265-2668 Allen, ~ 
Big Change, 177""1780 
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cotton production was a staggering blow to the Negro sharecropper, and 
Roosevelt's agricultural program gave the black man little assistanceo 
Designed to raise and stabilize farm income by limiting acreages of cash 
crops, the policies of the Agricultural Adjustment Admin:i~tration also 
inadvert ently resulted in a reduced number of sharecroppers, most of 
whom were Negroes in the deep Souths13 Furthermore, most of the small 
percentage of Negro landowners were subsistence farmers , and the de-
creased allotments would not allow them to make a satisfactory incomeo 
These agricultural problems created another surge in the Negro's North-
ward migration0 14 
Poverty was king for the Negro in the Nort h and the Southo In 1931 
the rate of unemployment for the Negro was twice as high as that for the 
white 9 and by 1935 over one-half of Northern Negro families were on re-
liefol5 Economic instability was also detriment al to the Negro 0 s social 
orga.nizationo Lack of family unity was a consistent problem, with de-
sertion, "the poor man's divorce," having a demoralizing effect on the 
16 Negro society.. This problem was amplified in urban areas such as New 
l 'ork Cityo Here the Charity Organization Society estimat ed in 1931 and 
1932 that the number of desertions that occurred in families receiving 
aid was 140 8 percentol7 The Negro's illegitimacy rate also increased; 
in 1917 the rate of illegitimate births was estimated at 120.l per 1,000 
lJaecent Social Trends , 5690 
14:roido, 5660 
15Ibido, 583; Allen, The Big Change, 179; E. Franklin Frazier,~ 
Negro !.!!, ~ United States:liew York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), 599., 




Negro births, and by 1943 the rate had increased to 164.2 per l ,Ooo.18 
The formulation of racial barriers had prevented the Negro's en-
trance into white society, and the Negro's hostility toward segregation 
practices was augmented by the Depressiono The birth of the New Negro, 
the introduction of new ideals, and the rise of new leaders mobilized a 
civil rights movement that developed in the ensuing three decadeso The 
initial growth was plagued with adversity, however, and Negro publics.-
cations expressed their malevolence in resentf'ul writingse 
One of the most vehement critics of the New Deal was WoE.Bo Du.Bois, 
who claimed the program's national rehabilitation plans did not include 
the Negroo DuBois warned Negroes of his fear, stating "Americans know 
the facts of the Negro problem, but the masses remain for the most part 
indifferent and unmovedonl9 lll.Bois contirmed, stating that "the Negro's 
efficiency should be proved to be so valuable that white America's doubts 
of the black man's proficiency would be erased.n20 As a founder of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, DuBois also 
edited the organization's publication,~ Crisis .. DuBois' writings, 
angrily oriented toward Marxist ideology, advocated social justice for 
the working classeso The solution for the rejected Negro, according to 
DuBois, was to form a cooperative state within his own group,, 21 DuBois 
reasoned that a separate state would unite all Negroes, for only through 
internal unity could integration ultimately be accomplishedo 22 The 
18Ibid .. 
l901Bois, "A Negro Nation Wl thin the Nation," 266. 
20Ibido , 2680 
21 Ibido, 269-270., 
22Ibido 
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Negro, claimed fuBois, as predominantly a. poor laborer, should have a 
vested interest in a planned economy where his labors would be rewarded 
according t o "his reasonable need as a citizen and a sharer in civiliza-
tiono1123 
Since the Negro was considered by many to be the Depression's most 
vulnerable victim, the black man was courted by the American Communist 
Party for political favor. Despite persistent efforts, however, the 
party was unable t o win measurable support from Negroeso The black man 
represented a caste seeking integration within total society, not a pro-
letarian class seeking to overthrow the existing economic system. 24 The 
Communist Party0 s strongest attraction for the Negro was the local head-
quarters, known as a "place where every Negro with a grievance can be 
sure of prompt actiono "25 Aid, however, was seldom monetary; instead the 
party tapped wires for t hose who were unable to pay electric bills 9 and 
guarded the furniture of evicted personso 26 The influence of the party 
exceeded its numerical membership, for there were actually few dues-
paying Negro memberso The party gained publicity by becoming involved 
in crises concerning Negroes, as exemplified by the Scottsboro case of 
19310 The counsel for the defense of nine Negro youths accused of mo-
lesting two white women in Alabama was provided by the Communist Partyo 
This case achieved notoriety by the number of retrials ordered by the 
Supreme Courto Since Negroes were barred from jury duty i n Alabama, the 
23WoEoBo DuBois, "Postscript," Crisis, XV (March, 1933 ), 680 
24Allen, ~ Big Change, 180; Logan, "Menace of Racial Discrimina-
tion," 2050 
25stanley High, "Black Omens, " The Saturday Evening~' CCX (June 
4, 1938)9 380 
26Ibid. 
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Court decided that the Negro youths had not had an opportunity for a fair 
tri alo Thus, in the Scottsboro Case, doubts were cast on the whi te jury 
27 system in the South although the practice continued for a long timeo 
The Negro's battle for civil rights stemmed from the Supreme Court8 s 
failure, in the black man's opinion, to implement the Thirteent h, Four~ 
t eenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to solve racial problems. Southern 
stat es had established restriotiv~ suffrage requirement s with l i ttle 
f ear of federal reprisal, and the courts treated Jim Crow oases appre-
hensivel y because they were "political questionson28 The t radi t ional 
fear of encroaching on states' rights exercised a powerful influence on 
the Supreme Court's interpretations, and perpetuat ion of this immunity 
was encouraged by Sout hern Senators and Congressmeno The Court was COii!,,, 
posed of what Roosevelt called th~ "Nine Old Men," because of their age 
and because t hey would not adjust their legal interpret ations t o the na-
tional crises o The Negro was particularly concerned with how the Court 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment since its concept of equal protec-
tion was crucial in ci vil rights oaseso Interpretations of the amendment 
had given it a checkered history, and the Negro wanted t o secure a defi -
nite pattern of posit i ve civi l rights deoisi onso 29 
27Ibido 
28Ibido 
29Although t he Fourteenth Amendment was originally directed toward 
protecting the Negro, i n the late 1800's the term "persons" was extended 
to include busi ness and corporationso Thus property achieved the shel-
t er of due process and equal proteotiono This was expressed in the Santa 
Clara Count y Vo Southern Pacific Railroad Company case in 1886, where 
corporations gai ned "equal protection"; and in the Minneapolis and Sto 
Louis Railroad Company Vo Beckwith in the 1890's where the "due process" 
clause was favorably applied to businesso In 1938, in Connecticut Gen-
eral Life Insurance Company Vo Johnson, Justice Hugo Black was the lone 
dissent er when he claimed that the word "person" should not include cor-
porationso In 1949, Black was joined by Justice William Oo Douglas in 
10 
The most important political issues to the Negro du.ring this era 
were economic discrimination and the problem of lynching. The economic 
issues included fair employment, a just portion of unemployment compen-
sation, a fair share of relief, and equal opportunities for access to 
the training programs of the New Deal. The most controversial issue in., 
volving the Negro, however, was .lynchingo Three major legislative de-
bates on anti-lynching measures were held between 1932 and 1940. Though 
the bills failed in the Senate, national attention was focused on the 
problem, probably causing the sharp decline in the number of lynchings 
which had racial overtoneso 
The New Negro was impatient with the "fiction that lynching would 
continue because nothing can be done about it."30 There was no guarantee 
of personal security in the South, and no certainty of punishment of mem-
bers of lynching parties.31 Traditional attitudes of the federal govern-
ment toward lynching placed responsibility for the protection of lives 
on state officials. Lynchings had increased during the early 1930's, 
and it was feared that it might again approach the average of 84 per 
year of the 30 years before 1920.32 A majority of these victims were 
Southern Negroes. 
the Wheeling Steel Corporation Vo Glander case based on the same theory. 
The decisions from these cases and others paralleled Charles and Mary 
Beard 8 s popularizing of the "conspiracy" thesis of the Fourteenth Amend-
mento The central theme was that business, not the Negro or civil 
rights, had become the chief beneficiary of the amendment. It must be 
mentioned, however, that this thesis has been contested by authorities 
in constitutional law and history. Paul Freund, Arthur Eo Sutherland, 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Ernest Jo Brown, Constitutional Law Cases and other 
Problems (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 1589-1591:--
30Logan, "Menace of Racial Discrimination," 2050 
3libido 
32aecent Social Trends, 591; Logan, "Menace of Racial Discrimina-
tion," 2050 
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The desire for better education also stimulated the Negro's search 
for equalityo Edu.eational facilities were rarely equal for both races, 
particularly in the Southo33 The Negro's literacy rate, however, in-
creased, and the cause for Negro education was strengthened by N~A.A.C0P. 
sponsored cases in the Supreme Court du.ring the 1930 9 s to eliminate ra-
cial barriers in education.34 It was believed the black man8 s future 
depended on education which would make the Negro more demanding of his 
rights and eomplemen~ry education which would enable whites to recog-
nize and accept the black man's rights 0 35 
Advent of Roosevelt, the President 
By the 1930's neither the South nor the North had achieved much 
progress in the area of race relations, and it was claimed that "For 
every instance of progress there is an insta.nce o:t retrogression .. n36 Yet 
an era of change was instigated by the new civil rights drive during 
Franklin Do Roosevelt's administration. The problem is to determine 
Roosevelt~s exact relationship with the civil rights movement., 
Probably the most consistent ohara.cteristic of Roosevelt's position 
on the race problem was sileneeo Traditionally Roosevelt was a social 
reformer, a.nd it would seem logical that a minority group that suffered 
disorimina.tion would be an important beneficiary of his programs. Yet 
Roosevelt rarely expressed a public statement on issues that concerned 
33Loga.n, "Menace of Racial Discrimination," 205. 
34nN .. A.A .. C .. P. Wins Ninth Supreme Court Case," ~ Crisis, XLV (May, 
1938), 159; ibid .. , (November, 1938), 3670 
3.5Logan, "Menace of Racial Discrimination," 205. 
36Ibid .. , 205-2060 
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the Negroe A shroud of mystery surrounds F.DoRo's attitudes in this 
area .. 
The economic crisis motivated F.D.R.•s initiation of reform in all 
aspects of American society, and the Negro received diffused but not di-
rect benefitso A direct relationship between Roosevelt and the assist-
ance dispensed to the Negro was not evident. Herein lies the enigma. 
Dr. Ernest Lyons, former United Stated minister to Liberia and a Negro, 
considered Roosevelt above party polities. Wi~hout Roosevelt, claimed 
t,yons, the Negrows position would be more difficult than anyone could 
imagine; for FoD.R., had enabled the black man to receive "security, jobs, 
and renewed spirit.,n37 A more excoriating attitude, however, was express-
ed by The Crisis, which exclaimed that Roosevelt was no improvement upon 
past presidents on the race issue. ~ Crisis stated, "He too is in the 
class of almost, nearly, well near, not quite and all but., He too, is 
just short of doing what h~ knows to be right and just.,•.38 
Roosevelt possesi;ed an elusive personality, being a. paradox of myth 
and reality never comprehended by those around him., Frances Perkins, 
Roosevelt&s Secretary of Labor, summarized the opinions about F.D.Ro, 
claiming that "Franklin was not a simple manoooo He was the most compli-
cated human being I ever knew.,n39 Roosevelt's son James reiterated this 
view, stating that F.D.R. rarely discussed personal feelings with others; 
"of' what was inside him, of what really drove him, Father talked to no 
37"From the Press, 19 Crisis, XLIII (October, 19:,6), 298 .. "From the 
Press" was a regular monthly feature in The Crisis which presented 
portions or articles and editorials pertinent to the Negro from news-
papers across the nation. 
J811From the Press," Crisis, XLII (December, 1935), :,71., 
'.39Frances Perkins, 1h!. Roosevelt I~ (New York: The Viking Press, 
1946), :; .. 
oneo"40 These opinions are also reinf'oreed by the Perkins' statement 
that history would treat Roosevelt incom~istently, "For no two people 
ever saw the same tld~ in him.n41 
13 
Beliefs concerning Roosevelt's character vacillated. According to 
Secretary Perkins, the essence of F.D.R. was his ability to grow and 
live that "continued to his dying day.n42 Another Roosevelt attribute, 
according to his proponents, was sincerity. Louis Howe stated that upon 
first meeting F.D.R .. it was "his sincerity and earnestness" that was 
most impressiveo43 To Howe, the one characteristic that ins'l:U"ed Roose-
velt success was his interest in people. Roosevelt, believed Howe, was 
concerned with "individuals as human beings, not as members of political 
partiesooo• Over and over again he has stressed the importance of the 
individual. 11144 
Roosevelt's interest in p~ople was also expressed throu.gh his phi-
losophy of government. I!!, !!J! I!!.!s. Times once quoted him as saying 
"The main objective of modern statesmanship, is to make people ha.PP.1•"4.5 
Roosevelt's view as quoted by th, Times ~s that "the purpose of govern,.. 
m.ent is not to see that the legitimate interests of the few are protected 
40James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, .A:t:f'eetionately, l.•12•!•, ! 
Son's st641 of a Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), 2 o °1Iereinatter"l=eferred to as J. Roosevelt, Affeetionatel:y, 
F.D.Ro . 
.._ ~ -
41Perkins, Ib!, Roosevelt!~, '.3. 
42Ibid .. ; !!!! ~ Times, July 29, 1932, 12:8. 
43Quoted in New York Times, July 29, 1932, 12:8; November 27, 1932, 
Pt. IV, '.3:l. - -
44Quoted in New York Times, November 27, 1932, Pt. IV, 3:1; Eleanor 
Roosevelt, ~ !Remember (New Yc,rk: Harper and Brothers, 1949), 201. 
45New York Times, November 13, 1932, Pt. VIII, l:lo --
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but that the welf'are and the rights of the many a,re conservedo..... As I 
see it~ the object of government is the welf'are of the people .. 1146 
Since Roosevelt was such a complex perso~lity9 it was difficult to 
define his pQlitical beliefs., Leland Rose, early biographer of FoDoR .. , 
claimed Roosevelt was "not anti ... Ta:mmaey, but not Ta.mmanyo Not pro-
Republican as far as New York City was oo:n.oerned, but utterly without 
sympathy with corruption in governme:n.t, whether among Republicans or 
Demoorats., 1147 Roosevelt himself' once complained to Louis Howe that his 
mind extended "too many directions at one time to remain long at one 
job.,"48 Specifying that the President was a Democrat, the New~ 
Times continued that he adjusted to the political situation as loosely 
and informally as the "sa.ek suits he wears on all possible oooasions .. "49 
Roosevelt was judged as an individual and a leader wh<:> inspired hope and 
oonfidenoe, not as the politician's mouthpiece .. F .. DoR .. 's independence 
was revealed by his enjoyment in departing from party traditions., Roose-
50 
velt's uniqueness had made him the "sign and symbol" of government .. 
The Presidency, as viewed by Roosevelt, was "not merely an administrative 
effice0000 It is more than an engineering jobooo• It is pre-eminently 
a place of moral leadership ...... a superb opportunity for reapplying, aP-
plying in new conditions the simple rules of human conduct to which we 
always go backo"51 
46New .I2.t! Times, February 16, 1932, Fto VIII, 3:6, 11:lo 
47Ibido, February 16, 1932, 19:80 
48Ibid., November 13, 19329 Ft. VIII, 1:1. 
49 6 6 Ibido, January 2, 193, Pto VII, 5:4. 
50ibid .. ; E. Roosevelt,~! Remember, 1. 
51Quoted in New York Times 9 November 13, 1932, Pt. VIII, 1:4. --------
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Roosevelt's complicated personality and distinct attitudes toward 
the chief executive's office subjected him to much critieismo The Presi-
dent's more disputatious characteristics and actions evolved from his 
versatility and his avoidance of controversy. Raymond Moley once ac-
cused Roosevelt of using half-baked schemes for programs and of being 
careless in their preparation. Also, the New York Times mentioned Roose-·-----
velt's conviction that the masses supported him, with his opposition be-
ing confined to the "autocrats .... 52 As Moley stated, "In defeat there was 
the supreme confidence that 'the people are with me,• and the bitter de-
termination to exterminate poli tica.lly all who had oommi tted the treason 
of disagreement .. n53 It was also noted that Roosevelt intensely disliked 
being disagreeab~e .. In an interview Roosevelt would often nod and say, 
"I see," if the proponent could present his views intelligently. This 
gesture was appreciation for the person's views, but it was often mis-
taken for agree;ment.54 Telling anoedotes or changing the subject was. 
another teohniqu.e utilized by Roosevelt to a.void controversial political 
questions. Only those aware of these tactics could achieve results in 
interviews.,55 
If it is true that it was diffio~t to obtain a definite position 
from F.D0R. on controversial questions, th~n perhaps his association 
with the Negro civil rights movement stems from his wife's involvement. 
Being an "ardent exponent of Negro rights," Eleanor Roosevelt was known 
52Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: ~rper and Brothers, 
1959), 362; ~ I2!:.k Times, January 26, 1936, Pt. VII, 5:4. 
53Moley, After Seven Years, 362. 
54E. Roosevelt,~.! Remember, 2. 
55 
Ibid., 5; Walter White, ! ~ Called White, !h!, Autobiography !!!. 
'Walter White (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), 170. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as White, A~ Called White. 
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as the "conscience or the administration." The role of the liaison was 
one or Mrs. Roosevelt's most significant contributions to the Negro 
movement of this erao56 The in:f'luenoe of the First Lady on the Presi-
dent's opinions and aetions, however, is questionableo Yet Eleanor 
stated that Roosevelt would often use her as a sounding board for other 
people's opinions si~ce her soeial work brought her into contact with so 
many people., FoD.R .. also encouraged her to travel and to make speaking 
tours from which she sampled public opinion to bring back to him at the 
White House. Likely these attitudes included those dealing with the 
problem of the Negro .. 57 
The preceding has attempted to present three introductory aspects 
to be emphasized in this thesis .. These are a survey of the Negro of the 
l930's, discussion of the role of the Negro within the political party 
stl"lleture during this era, and comments on FoD.Ro 0 s relationship with 
botho The writer has attempted to plaee the problem of race relations 
in the proper perspective within :national affairs for this periodo The 
economic problems were paramount, and were exemplified by the Negro's 
situationo There was also the promise of something new: the evolution 
of the "New Negro" am the modern civil rights movemento Progress was 
partially credited to the liberal administration of Roosevelto Since 
the ~hief executive was instigating reforms for social justice, the Ne ... 
gr~ naturally received benefits, though no specific programs were pro~ 
posed for the black mane This observation poses the question of 
56Wllliam Ee Leuchtenburg, Franklin Do Roosevelt and the New Deal 
19'32-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 192. Hereinafter referred 
to as FeDoR. and the New Deale --- ___ .._.._
57White, ! ~ Called White, 170; E. Roosevelt, !.!!!. I Remember, 5s 
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defining precisely what was Roosevelt's role in the process of acquiring 
equal rights for Negroes .. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NEGRO .AND THE NEW DEAL 
Introduotiel'l 
The Depression which prompted the Negro to activism in politics 
also forced him to verbalize his economic needs. The possibilityof' at ... 
taining equality became a. tanta.lizing vision.. Yet the ert:i. was desperate 
for the Negro, since every economic setback suffered by white America 
was intensified for black Amerioao Most Negroes despaired of recovery, 
scarcely dreaming of reformo To the Negro the New Deal work relief pro ... 
grams promised a minimal standard of living, but their execution pain-
fu.lly reminded the black man he had no immunity from discrimination .. 
Therefore, the discrepancy between the real and the ideal often blinded 
the disillusioned Negro to his increased benefits. Although the New Deal 
was a social experiment plagued with glaring fallacies, the Negro would 
ultimately recognize a.nd a.ppreoiate the rewards received from its ef ... 
feotso 
Initially, the Negro was unable to cope with his immediate needs of' 
foodj housing, and work. Sensing the restlessness of their people, Ne-
gro leaders fought for the satisfaction of economic necessities as well 
as for permanent reform. As the Negro vied unsuccessfl,llly with the white 
for jobs, the prejudice long endured silently, violently eru.ptedo Pick-
eting, strikes, and boycotts were used by Negroes in the Northern 
18 
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ghettos, and the Southern Negro dared to include his protestso1 
Since the Negro working force consisted mainly of unskilled domes-
tie and agricultural labor, the bla~k man's economic status depended 
heavily on others. In a depression the black laborer was the first to 
lose his job and the last to be rehired. Reactions of unemployed Ne-
groes varied with the division among their leaders. Advocating the tra-
ditional role 9 some recommended that the Negro move back to the farm .. 
Urban society had discriminated against the Negro by not A.llowing him to 
achieve a definite status in his adopted regiono Government aid, in the 
opinion of this section of the leadership9 should be used to return the 
Negro to his niche in the Southern economic struetureo There the Ne-
gro could develop and preserve his cultureo 2 
Other leaders held that the Negro had been rejected from American 
society, and thus that the black man must prepare for a new world of in-
dustrial workerso In such an association the Negro would become the 
leader when the new order oeeurredo 3 Another lea.dership element claimed 
the Negroes position as the Depression°s most vulnerable victim merited 
special attention from relief and recovery programso One phase of this 
policy included using the Depression to penetrate the previous.solid wall 
of "legal" diseriminationo No leader, however, possessed the solution 
to the Negro's problems, but their attempts gained publicity and some re ... 
wards of substanceo 
The Depression struck both the rural and the urban Negro. The rural 
lArchibald Rutledge, "The Negro and the New Deal," !h!.· South Atlan.., 
.t!2, Quarterly, XXXIX (July, 1940), 281. 
2~!2Ik Times, October 22, 1933, 3:7; June 4, 1933, pt. IV, 4s5. 
3Ibido, May 14, 1933, 25810 
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Negro was particularly handicapped by the laek of agricultural education 
in areas such as farm management and the use of credito Thus the rural 
black man was confined to tenant farming and enslaved to the "country 
store.,"4 The urban Negro's education was also sketch,y 9 and he generally 
was employed as unskilled laboro The ghetto Negro also encountered dis-
crimination from labor unions who feared employment competitiono Since 
this left, for the unemployed Negro, only cha.ri ty and relief as an im-
mediate solution, he developed an intense int~rest in New Deal programso 
As a result, any discrimination that occurred in the administration of 
these relief and recovery programs was particularly irritating to the 
black ma.no In the South particularly the ~pplication of the programs 
proved to be controversial to black and white alikee Writings of South-. . 
ern whites expressed traditional racial attitudes by their resentment of 
New Deal benefits bestowed on the Negroo And Negro literature bitterly 
complained of the discrimination incurred in the federal programs ap.., 
plied to this areaa 
The relationship betwee,n the Negro and the New 'Deal is best pre ... 
i 
sented th:r>ough the government programs that applied to the black man in 
both North and Southo Evidence that the programs did not satisfy all 
Southern factions was reflected in Southern writings that endorsed tra ... 
ditiona.1 racial attitudeso Negro publications, however, bitterly com.. 
plain of treatment in both the North and South.. Since the raee struggle 
held center stage for these groups 9 neither possessed perspective or ob ... 
jeetivityo These qualities are~ on the other hartd 9 usu.ally credited to 
I 
Roosevelt since he considered the economic cr1$is as paramount. 
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The Negro and New Deal Programs· 
Ao In the Beginning 
While Congress's solution for the banking crisis of 1933 essentially 
preserved capitalistic democracy, its attempts to alleviate massive un,., 
employment altered the traditional American way of life. Since the 
States proved financially unable to meet this problem, relief efforts 
were organized on the national levelo In the congressional debates con= 
earning many relief and reform measures, the major discussion concerned 
where to obtain the funds for the programs and how they were to be dis= 
tributedo In the Federal Emergency Relief Act, the solution was to allow 
each state government to appoint a board to administer funds without 
federal interferenoe~5 :Diring discussion of this bill, Southern Con... 
gressional leaders successfully insured state political leaders control 
of the distribution of reliefo This incident convinced the Negro that 
discrimination was involvedo Th~ fears of the black man were not un-
founded, according to the Negro New Deal critic John Davis@ Negroes, 
claimed Davis 9 found it more difficult to obtain work or work relief than 
white persons in certain sections of the Southo The FoEoR.Ao report of 
January of 1937 claimed that 35 percent of the white population in the 
HEastern Cotton Belt" were receiving work relief, but only 18 percent of 
the black population were recipientse Whites supposedly received $13 
per :month while Negroes averaged $7 in ?Peliefo6 Distribution on an equal 
5UoSo 9 Congress, ?2nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, February 20 9 
1933, Congressional. .Record, LXXVI, Pt. 4, 44780 Rexford Guy Tugwell,~ 
Battle !2!:, Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 310-
3llo 
6New ~.~,January 15, 1937, 7g2. 
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basis, however, would have violated the South's social struetureo Al-
though Southern Congressmen were apprehensive of the potential benefits 
for the Negro, they were also te,rful ot the expansion of federal power.7 
The discrimination encountered by the Negro occurred on the local level 
where the personalization of the race issue made it para.mounte 
Since F.E.R.A. was a quick emergency measure providing temporary 
relief, Roosevelt realized that an extensive long-range program would 
have to be enaotedo Negro leaders, holding that the FeE.R.A. wou.ld not 
provide sufficient recovery, requested specific aid in relief and re-
eovery tor their race .. The National Urban League, being unable them-
selves to meet the Negro's needs, strongly campaigned for government as-
sistaneeo Keeping up the morale of' the Negro laborer in industrial een-
ters had been the extent of' the League's sueeess in helping the black 
·a man. Although these requests for specific aid on a racial. basis were 
not fulfilled, the Negro received more benefits from F.D.R.'s ensuing 
relief and recovery measures, d.espite discrimination that occurred. 
B., The Negro and the National Recovery Administration 
One a.ct, eontroversaaJI: to the Negro, created the National Recovery 
Administra.tiono In its enactment and execution converged those persons 
involved in the race question and the diversified forces involved in 
creating Roosevelt's general progra.m.o The NoRoA.•s purpose ~store-
store prosperity to industry and stability to labor by allowing industry 
voluntarily to create codes for fair employment and just prices. It an 
?see Chapter IV, 101, for Sena.tor Josiah Bailey's speech, April 25, 
1935, regarding tne f'ear of' some Southerners of' increasing federal 
powero 
8New York Times, April 9, 1933, pt., IV, 2:1 .. 
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industry should not voluntarily eonstru.ct a code, the President was given 
the power to "encourage" the industry to eooperateo9 Proponents hoped 
that.the codes would raise wages and give th.e consumer pa.rehasi:ng pewer, 
10 restoring the cycles or supply and dema.~d to norm.a.lo 
Accordi:ng to Rexford 'l'tlgwell, Roosev,1t•s administration of the 
NeReAo damaged its effectiveness. In 1934, the N.R.Ao narrowly a.voided 
a Congressional. investigation by disgru.ntled progressive members. At 
that point, Tugwell claims, the program was favoring big business by al-
lowing them too much freedom in creating codes., He also criticized the 
"favoring ot employers as against employees in spite of the writing of 
codes of rights of collective ba.rgaini~.nll FoD.Ro, claimed Tugwell, 
"not only defended N .. RoA .. from criticism but gave the employers their 
way about bargaining with worker51.nl2 Tu~well9 s beliefs concerning the 
lack of strict administration and the abttse or labor under this act was 
also endorsed by the black ma.no 
. . 9ues .. Congress, Senate, !ational Industrial Recovery Aet, Senate 
Doouments Miscellaneoos, Senate Document 76, 43rd Congress, 1st Session, 
1934, 61980 "The President may differentiate aceordi:mg tC!> the experience 
and skill or the employees af'feeted and according to the loeality 0f em-
ployment; but no attempt shall be made to introduce any ~lassification 
aecording to t:he na.ture of the work involved which might tend to set a 
maxinmm.a.s well as a minimum wage .. ". Rexford Guy Tugwell, ll!!, Democratic 
Roosevelt, A Biograry of' Franklin~. Roosevelt (New York: Dollbleday 
and.Company, Inc .. , 957T; 330., Hereinafter referred to as Demoeratie 
Roosevelta Supposedly enough progressives were disillusioned with the 
N0R .. A .. that RoGsevelt could "never againo., .. expect·cengress to pass any 
measure that did not have censervative.appeal.," This development would 
give the Southerners a tremendous legislative advantage. 
l~u.s .. Congress, House, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, February 27, 
19'.33, Congressional Record, LXXVI, Pt.. 5, · 515'.3· 51;4. 
llTagwell, .Democratic Roosevelt, 334 .. 
. 12:t,bid .. , '.340 .. 
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To the Negro, however, it appeared that loopholes tor creating and 
regulating codes had been allowed in the acto 13 Provisions contained in 
the act revealed that Southerners by their political longevity held 
powerf'ul committee positions in Congress and leadership positions in the 
Democratic Partyol4 Also, since the N.RoA. was only one or many pro-
grams desire~, and Roosevelt needed support or the Southern bloc to 
achieve the completion of the New ~al, he possibly ignored minor clauses 
in this early law that could allow discriminationo Attacking the na-
tion11 s economic oondi tion in its entirety was Roosevelt's concern, and 
the President believed the potential benefits of the plan were neededo 
Frustrations evolving from discrimination encountered under the 
NoR.A. were soon expressed by many Negro spokesmen. Although Hugh S. 
Johnson, the program's administrator, claimed race was not a factor in 
the execution or the programs, John Po Davis, Negro journalist, contra-
dieted Johnson, stating "There is a problem or vicious discrimination to 
be faoedo"l5 Theoretically the N.R.A. was integrated, but evidence soon 
appeared, claimed Davis, that. an ".economic Mason-Dixon line" had been 
drawn. against the Negrool6 Minimwn wage.guarantees as a result were not, 
in fact, guaranteed to the Negroo Moreover, claimed Davis, no Negro had 
~een placed in a really responsible position in the National Recovery 
programsol7 Negro protest eventually reached Washington, where 
l'.3David Ho Pierce, "Fascism and the Negro," Crisis, XLII (April, 
1935), 1070 
14New ~ ~es, January 15, 1937, 7:2~ 
15John Po Davis, 19What Price National Recover,-?." Crisis, XL (De-
cember, 1933), 271. 
16Jolm P., Davis, "Blue Eagles and Black Workers," !h!, ,!!! RePJblio, 
LXXIl (November 14, 1934)., 7, 80 
17 New York Times, March 1, 1934, 13:6e 
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administrators admonished the South, but to no avail.18 Despite these 
constant scathing criticisms from Davis, he was considered to be an au-
thority in this area, and several government agencies eonslll.ted him from 
time to timeo 
Sou.thern industry, especially cotton textiles, protested the es ... 
ta.blishment of' codes, claiming labor cost more in the North than in the 
Sou.tho 20 Yet the Negro's only hope for j11stice was in a fair labor 
eodeo More than 20 percent of' the Southern Negro industrial workers 
were unemployed, and those retaining jobs lacked the legal tools to ob-
ject to the long hours and low wages in either the North or the Southo21 
Realizing this fact, the South devised ingenious methods of diserimina. ... 
tiono One provision of the NoR.A. allowed adjustment of' the codes to 
meet the economic criteria or a specific region. Congressional. debates 
concerning wage differentiation revealed how fle:x;ible codes could be and 
showed hew vague specifications were in esome industries. Often there 
was a difference or one dollar a week between the Northern and Southern 
22 wage scales., Southern industry was allowed to pay lower salaries in 
general and even less to oeoupations in textiles as "cleaners, outside 
crews, and yardmen". By- this provision, ten thousand of the fourteen 
thousand Negroes working in Southern textile enterprises were !'Xcluded 
from the codeo The black man b~lieved, claimed Davis, that his omission 
18:rbido, September 24, 1933, P't.o IV, l:3o 
19Editoria.l, "Our Contributors," Crisis, XLII (Ootaber, 1935), 293. 
20New ~ Times, September 24, 1933, Pt. IV, l (3 .. 
21Davis, "Blue Eagles and Black Workers," 7. 
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from the program. was deliberate. 23 
other measares used by the South to control the economic position 
of the Negro included what Davis called "economic grandfather clauses" 
that allowed wage rates in the codes to be based on the 1929 :national. 
wage soaleo Since the Southern regional wage level was lower than the 
:natienal, it was more diffi011lt for the South to meet the minimwn re-
quirements o:t the 1929 scale .. Thus the "grandfather clauses" allowed 
workers who had received in excess of a certain wage in 1929, 10 cents 
an hour more than laborers who had r~ceived less than the same figureG 
.Davis claimed this parity assured Southern whites higher wages since Ne ... 
groes were "certain to have received less than the standard wage in 
1929on24 At one point in September, 1933, the South was warned by Colo ... 
nel Ho N., White, Depllty Administrator or Ptl'blio Works, that the minimwn 
wage was to be paid to both races. SO'Uthern boards protested by claim-
ing that Negro labor could be obtained more quickly and eh.ea.ply than 
white witheut paying the higher wages,. Althftgh these disadvantages in-
curred by the black man thr0ttgh the NoRoAo in the South were considered 
by some te be transitional and eoe:n.omio, it was diffiou.lt ta convince 
NoAoAoCoPo leaders that the a.ct was not being ~sed for perpetuating ra-
cial differences in the South.,25 
Manipulating codes to permit Southern industry to pay a certain 
portiGn of employees 80 percent instead of the required 70 percent or 
the 1929 mi:nimwn wage was another practice that discriminated against 
23Davis, "What Price National Reoevery," 2710 
24na_v:ts, "Blue Eagles and Black Workers," 8. 
25New !2£.k Times, December 11, 193'.3, 16::,; September 24, 1933, ?to 
IV, l:'.3; March 4, 19'.34, 7:4; April 15, 19'.34, Pt. IX, 10:5; July 3, 19'.34, 
l'.3:5o 
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the Negroo Other eodes established would allow workers to receive a 
wage increase over their 1933 pay, but the percentage was carefully ar= 
ranged to benefit the white laborer. The Negro was aware of these dis-
crepancies, but complaints to the local adjustment board usually meant 
an automatic discharge. A job with poor pay was better than no jobo 26 
The Negro's only major weapon was his presso 
To the South, as the Norfolk, Virginia, Pilot stated, equal wages 
for the races would mean job displacement for the unskilled Negro as u:n,,. 
employed whites would be hired first under the existing social system0 
To the Negro, olaimed the Pilot, "The Blue Eagle may be a predatory bird 
instead of a feathered messenger of happinesso"27 Therefore the Presi-
dent would better protect the Negro by allowing the wage differentialso 
Thus, despite admol'l:i tion from the Negro, wage diff erentia tic:m continued 
to prevailo The code debates and conflict over wage differentiation did 
concern Roosevelt, but he carefully avoided person.al involvement. Once 
during his attempts to obtain a compromise in the eonf'liet over the wage 
seales, Roosevelt confessed to an ex-classmate from Harvard that he was 
imrestiga.ting the cotton problem, but wa.s afraid of becoming a government 
dictator.,28 
The South prospered under New Deal programs, but the Negro felt 
benefits went mostly to the whites., The wage diff'e~entia.1 system, 
26 
~ York Times, September 10, 1933, Pto IV, 8:8; Davis, "Blue 
Eagles and Bi'a'ok Workers," Bo 
2'1Editorial, "In Defense of the Humble,"~~ Times, August 19, 
1933, 10:2" 
28Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FoD.Ro, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, 
II ( New York: Duell, Sloan, and-Pearce, 19 50), 31ili.'.,. 
according to the black man, oftel!l increased job displacement. 29 If 
Southern indu.stry had to pay the mi:nimum wages to fill the limited num-
ber of positions, the mores of the section would compel them to hire the 
white laborers before the blacko At least this was the N.A.AoCeP .. •s in-
terpretation of job displacement under the N.R .. A. As a reslllt the Sa-
preme Court decision which later declared the N.R.Ao unconstitutional 
was hailed by some Negro leaders who had despised the discrimination it 
al.lowedo30 
Co The Negro and New Deal. .Agrieul.ture 
Another New Deal program evoking criticism both from Negroes and 
from Southern whites concerned agriculture. The plight of natio:nal ag-
riculture was severe enough, but the situation of Southern farming, es-
pecially for th.e Negro, was even worse. One unique pr~blem to this sec-
tion which specifically affected the Negro was the tenant farming system 
that had evolved following Reconst?"Uction. Now a basic part of the 
SO'llthern economic structure, the tenant farmers consisted of Negroes and 
poorer whites, the lower strata of society. Moreover, Sc!>uthern agri-
cu.lmre was based on a one-crop system, so th.at failure of its staple 
prodaet was detrimenta1 to the total economy. Arui>ther econemio charac-
teristic or the South was the "country store" credit system which f'ereed 
the uneducated Negro and white into a state er economic feudalism. For 
the Negro, th.e problem was intensified by race discriminationo Yet de-
spite the disadvantages of the Negro in the Southern economy, the black 
29New I!!!, Times, March 49 1934, 7:4. 
'.30"From the Press ,of the Nation," Crisis, XLII (Ju.a, 1935), 211. 
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man filled an indispensable positiono31 
Federal acts passed pertaining to agricultural relief' and recovery 
usually implied equ.al treatment. The Farm Credit Administration, f'or 
example, provided easy loans and credit f'or f'armerso Henry Morgenthau., 
Jro, the program's director, attempted to include the blaok man by ap.-
pointing Ho A. Hant, a Negro, to familiarize the Negro farmer with, 
federal government credit f'aoilities .. The attempt to benefit the Negrci, 
was ereditable,·bu.t Hunt singly was unable s'llt.oeessh.lly to change the 
social forces of' the SG'llth in which few Negroes owned land or were eli-
gible for lc,a.ns/32 
Two 0th.er major farm. programs in.elu.ded the Agriou.ltval Adjustment 
Aet and the Ba:mkhead Cotton Act, both vehemently opposed by several 
Southern Congressmen in debates. Realizing the measures wottl.d be passed, 
however, loopholes were created in the 'bills that allowed the Swth to 
discriminate. In tb.eory the bills were non-racial, but in reality they 
rarely helped the Negro farm.er .. 
The A .. A,,A .. limited produ.ction of' several basic crops so that market 
prices we~ld be .forced to rise, and the Bankhead Cotton Act, with simic 
lar intent, eencerned specifically cotton produetiono As white land-
ow:ners wel"'S f'orc,ed to limit crop acreages, they cou.l.d no longer af'f'ord 
te maintain as many tenant farmers. Crop recht~tiom. regulations ma.de it 
illegal to evict tenants, bllt it was sometimes not possible for owners 
also s'ltf'fering from the depression to observe this nle.3'.3 Negroes who 
31Reeent Social Trends, J,67 o 
32New York Times, November 8, 1933, 19:2 .. ---......... 
3'.3Job.n P .. Davis, "A Blaok Inventory of the New Deal," Crisis, nJ:I 
(M.a.y, 1935), 141 .. 
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fought eviction found their protests rejected by local boardse The de= 
gree of discrimination in this program as in the others depended upon 
the degree of local control. By 1934 over a quarter of a million tenant 
farmers, the m.ajGrity of whom were Negr0 in the Deep Sou.th, were u.nem= 
ployed~34 The N0A .. A.,C0Po and critic Davis also claimed the Negro farm 
owner was victimized by loeal boards when allotments were determined and 
major crop reductions were directed toward the Negro when possibleo Al-
though these praetiees were not evi~ent on the national level, the Negro 
leaders claimed the problem existed and that many Negroes were being 
forced to relinquish their farms and to assume a tenant status as a re-
sulto35 Prejudice also prevailed in the institutien of subsistanee 
homestead projeotso Negroes who participated in this program were either 
segregated or9 as in the ease of Arthurdale, West Virginia, not consider-
ed as applioantso36 
In despera.tion the Negr0 used such unprecedented tactics as bi-
ra.eia.l tenant associations in an attempt to regaim his rights. One ex-
a.mple was the Southern Tenant Farmers Union of Arkansaso Ot"ten tenant 
famers ~uld sign government contracts for erG>p reduction, but control 
of the papers remained in the hands Of the plantero The contracts, be-
lieved the tenant farm.er, were then enforced sa as to benefit the white 
farm.ero Although the Tenant Union attempted to remedy this situation, 
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In 1937 a legislative move attempted to aid the tenant farmer when 
the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Aot established the Farm Security Ad-
ministration formerly known as the Resettlement Administration., Through 
the government program, loans were made to tenants and sharecroppers so 
they could purchase or improve their farmso For the displaeedt there 
were resettlement farms established by the gwer:nment., Clubs were or-
ganized and meetings held at wldeh the FoS.A .. supervisors for that area 
W011ld advise farmers and hold demonstrationsa Demonstrations ranged 
from how to cook green beans to how correctly to butcher a ealfe These 
demonstrations were held in "white hemes for white clients, and in the 
colored homes for the colored clients," and were repeated as often as 
necessary or requestedo38 
The Negro was definitely included .in this program .. In Greene 
County, Georgia, one-third of the Rlllral Rehabilitation families of the 
FoS .. Ao in 1937 were black, and the benefits were fairly equitable 
throughout the South except where large plantations were extremely im-
portant to a c:i0I11111U.:nity)9 Millions of dollars were contributed to needy 
Negro farmers, and several projeets were created especially for them on 
good land0 An example of the black tenant and sharecroppers' feelings 
toward. the F0S@Ao was expressed by an elderly Negro who stated, "The 
government do for the colored folks what our white folks couldn't doo"40 
And amother who cemmented, "You know, President Roosevelt in Washington 
38.Arthu.r F .. Raper, Tenants S:, ~ Almighty (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1943), 258, 234, 251, 199, 208 .. ·· · 
39Ibid .. , 197., Arthur Raper a:nd Ira DeA .. Reid, Sharecroppers fil 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. Press, 1941), 1)8., 
40 
Raper, Tenants .2! ~ Almighty, 260. 
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must be aworld.n' along witl'l God, am.d the President must have had some-
body who understood him to bring his plans down here to Greene County and 
work 'em out."41 
Easing conditions tor farmer loans and creating migratory worker 
camps, this agemy was remarkably fair in its execution. In fact, ''At 
the risk or its political life the F.S .. A. was scrupulously fair in its 
42 treatment of Negrees., 11 But th.ere could be no doubt or the powerful 
influence of the Sou.thern Congr~ssmen on this bill .. It was, aceerding 
to Rexf'<!>rd Tllgwell, crippled when the conservatives reduced its appro ... 
pri•tions in 1937 to half of what had been ori~:nal.ly authorizedo The 
debates on this act were, claimed hgwell, a 11strild.:ng illustration of 
Franklin9 s inability to achieve purposes not consented to by the eon-. 
servativeson43 The South wo'l1l.d not allow its class structure to be dis .. 
ru.pted by federal assistance,, Tugwell reveals his discouragement con-
cerning the Southern Congressmen's attitudes, stating that "The share .. 
croppers were abandoned to the a.ncient customs of the landlord system."Jt4 
Th.e F.S.Ao came too late, and F.I;> .. R .. 's inability to overrule the con-
servatives did net allow the program to fulfill its de~nds adequateiy. 45 
Aware of the SGUth's eo:ntlicts, ba.t discreet in pelitieal involve ... 
ment, F.D.Ro believed that the assets or these prograllis 'outweighed the 
discrimination e1!lceuntered in their execu.tion. Roosevelt's political 
41Ibido, 2690 
42teu.chte:nburg, E, .. ~.g .. !E ~ !!!: Deal, 141. 
43Tu.gwell, Democratic Roosevelt, 472. 
44rud. 
prudence regarding potential results of race conflicts on agricultural 
programs was implied in a letter he wrote John Bankhea.d in 1934 col!),.,. 
33 
cerning protests of enforced production outs under the Bankhead Cotton 
Aoto Leading the critics was the influential Sena.ter9 "Cotten Ed" Smith 
of South Carolina, who asked for a suspension of the prohibitive taxo 
Roosevelt9 s advice to Bankhead was "Use your discretion, but do not bring 
me into i to .,46 F oD .. R., wished ·to avoid a conference with Smith, who he 
declared "either orates or talks from all four directions at the same 
time.,n47 Perhaps FoDoRo also wished to avoid a confrontation that might 
have revealed a race issue concerning the effect of the Bankhead Act on 
the Southern white and Negroo F.,D.R. needed Smith's support for New Deal 
programs, so the race problem had to be avoided as much as possibleo 
In another memorandum F .. DoRo claimed that the program was effective 
as it was, but admitted that he could not blame a S®uthern objector for 
his opposition., The South in particul.ar, stated Roosevelt, had received 
benefits from tne New Deal, since this section was unable to raise ade-
quate funds through taxation., The South, he claimed, had gained faster 
than a.'!13' other section mainly because it was "f'arther behind in its se-
~ial development.,n48 Although long interested in Southern progress, 
Roosevelt would not risk the loss of his programs by taking a definite 
stand on ·the ra.eial issue., Perhaps F.D.Ro felt that prosperity would 
propagate its own s@lutiono 
~liott Roosevelt, ed.,, f>DoR.,, ~s Personal Letters, II, 421-
4220 
47Ibid,. 
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D. The Negro and the ToVoA• 
Another program criticized by the Negro was the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. This massive plan, initiated in part during previous a.dmini= 
strations, achieved reality under F.D.R. With vltalization of the "back-
ward" Sou.th as its goal, the economic development of' the Valley area 
wauld be the first stepo The T.VoA. also proposed opportunities for 
economic development through its fair employn1ent policies, electrifica-
tion to relieve the "drudgeries of' the lives of the in.habitants, indus-
trialization, flood-control, and the development of a recreation area."49 
Participation in "equal benefits" was desirable to the NegrG, but the 
administration had omitted the guaranteeo Since the project was located 
in the South and relied en Southern labor', the government was forced to 
abide by Southern white traditionse As Chester M0rgan, one of ToVoAo's 
administrators, told John Po Davis, slow integration was necessary to 
avoid alienating the white people of the Valley areao Morgan claimed 
resentment wuld foster a "more determined attack against Negro adirance-
me:nt under the ToV.,A~ program.,"50 
The most obvious discrimination occurred in labor praetieese Over 
250,000 Negr~es, who nad been promised emplo~ent opportunities accord-
ing to their propol"tion of the population, lived i:n the pr,ojeet area}1 
A fair percentage of Negroes were hired, but according to the blaek man, 
there was a racial discrepancy in the wageso It was estimated that 
49John Po Davis, "The Plight of the Negro in the Tennessee Valley," 
Crisis 9 XLII (October, 1935), 314,. 
50Ibid. J 315,, 
51 Ibido 9 2940 
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blacks received only 9.5 percent of the payroll while constituting 11 
percent of the employeeso In ether words, the "2,069 Negro employees 
then employed received only $86,032080 of the $901,939 total payrollo"52 
Further evidence of discrimination was revealed in the Congressional 
investigation of ToV.Ao in 19380 Although one T.V.Ao authority dis-
credited claims of discrimination by stating that 99There is n0 distinc-
tion in the rates of pay, there is no distinction in the hours of work, 
and there is no distinction in the general job con.di tions," the imresti-
gation offered contradictory evidenceQ53 By June 30, 1938, 11.5 percent 
of the ToVoAo work force was Neg~o, while the race's population in the 
area was o:nly 10 percento Numerical equality was achieved in empl0y-
ment, but was offset by maldistribm.tion of wages.. Since the Negro was 
emplGyed mostly in the low wage, unskilled labor positions, his yield of 
the payroll was only 7 percent.54 One investigator, Gordon Clapp, de-
fended this fact by claiming the sentiment against the black man in this 
area was too strong to concede equal opportunity employment. Negroes 
were rarely oonsidered for skilled jobs, and those who did hold the bet-
ter positions were generally classified as unskilled labor and received 
unskilled payo55 These aousations were further substantiated by an 
NoA.AoCoP. official, Charles Houston, who claimed the Negro received 
62t cents per hour in cement work, while whites drew $lo25 per hour. 
52Ibid., 
53u.so Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation 
G>f. the. Tennessee Valley Authority, Investigation -2! .. the Tennessee Valle! 
Authorl"SY, 76th Congress, 1st Session, April 3, 1939, Doc. 56, pt. 2, 8. 
54rbid .. 
55Editorial, "ToV.A .. Investigates N.,A.A.C.P .. Charges," Crisis, XLV 
(October, 1938), 3340 
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The Negro was a1so intimidated from joining the unions and barred from 
the government-built town of Norris. T. VoAo, stated Houston, "has in-
creased the amount of' segregation in the area instead of decreasing 
it.· .. 56 
In 1934 John P. Davis had a1so protested the project's discrimina-
tiono .Davis claimed Negroes in the perso!l?lel department who were re-
sponsible for hiring Negro labor were allowed to handle only unskilled 
work requisitions. At the Wheeler Dam site, according to Davis's esti ... 
mate, there were 300 white carpenters but no Negroes in this occupa ... 
tiono 57 M:is ... classif'ioation of Negrees was also exposed when Davis 
claimed Negro track drivers would receive 45 cents an hOllr for a job 
that ca1led for 75 centso .Also, a Negro who complained often became a 
Negro without a je:>b.58 Davis asserted Negroes were not admitted on a 
fair basis to the training and vocational schools established by the 
T.VoA • .After mch adversity nine were admitted to the Animal Htlsbandry 
school at Norris, but were not allowed to train for the position of 
foremano SU.oh practices, claimed .Davis, would gradually eliminate the 
Negro from empleyment with T.V.A. because unskilled labor was needed 
mostly in the initial stages.59 Housing provided another example of 
diseriminatio:n.o Segregated Negro hwsing units •re supposedly inferior 
to those or the whites, though T.V.Ae officia1s protested that integrated 
housing W0Uld foment racia1 outbreaks. Davis rejected this defense, 
5~i torial, "Rank Jim Crow in To V.Ao Committee Told," Crisis, XLV 
(September, 1938), 303a 




stating that segregated housing was unconstitutional when Federal funds 
were used tor this pu.rpose.60 
The eftioial imrestigation 0£ T.V.Ao claimed the projeet•s employ-
ment policies opposed discrimination in subst~noe. Departure from 
equality, it was claimed, was "due to prevailing regional attitudes, 
which the Authority cannot disregard, rather than to failure on the part 
or the personnel department to support the policy of diserimina.tion.•61 
That the admil'listrators recognized the sign;iticanoe of race relations in 
labor in the South was further exposed by Clapp, who stated 1'The Allthor-
i ty does not feel that it had any special responsibility for attempting 
to revise or reoonstru.et the attitude or that area with respect to the 
racial question.n62 Leslie White, former Civil Service Commissioner, 
recommended that T.V.A. adhere more strietl.y to the non-discrimination 
policy, sueh as trying to continue to provide "similar and equivalent 
housing and recreational facilities for Negroes."63 The conclusion or 
the investigation was that segregation was regrettable, but accepted as 
inevi tableo 
The report also r•commended that Negroes be trained arid given more 
positions of responsibility. The ToVoA. was further encouraged to adopt 
Dr. ·Robert Weaver's suggestion that a Director or Negro Work be ap., 
pointedo Although the Authority was to strive harder for non-discrimi-




U~ S., Congress, Investiga~on .2!. ~ Tennessee Valley Attthori ty, 
62 Ibid .. , 81., 
63 Ibid., 67. 
that would threaten T.V.A.•s very existence.64 .As David Iiilienthal, a. 
T.Vo.Ao director, stated, Sou.thern Senators could use the race issue to 
destroy T.V.A. if' Roosevelt made it an issueo 65 
Yet the Negro disaffection was also understandable, for Negroes 
while used to segregation and prejuclice hoped that the goals and ideals 
or the New Deal would achieve a. greate~ degree of non-.discriminatione 66 
T.V • .A. benefits were also not e~mpt from racism • .Although cost was 
greatly reduced, electricity "might as well be lightning in the sky" to 
the Negro. 67 Rates were still beyond the.black man's finances, and few 
landlords round it advantageous to wire their Negro tenants• houses .. 
Yet the proprietors were also victims or the depression. 68 
Roosevelt's non-involvement in the T.V.A. race problem again can be 
credited to the necessity of' retaining vital Congressional support. In 
a conference with Iiilienthal Roosevelt once discussed plans to visit 
T.V.A. Joking about Louis Howe's new plans to rebuild whole cities in-
stead of' sections only, F.D.R. suggested that this might be done with 
Nashville .. "What kind of city is that'?" he inquired of Iiilienthal. 
Then, continuing, he stated, "Of course, you ~ve the Negro conflict 
there, don't you.n69 Roosevelt was aware of the race problem, but 
64rbid.,, 56,..58., 
65David E., Lilienthal,~ Journals .2!, David!• Lilienthal, r, l'!'!!. 
T .. V .. -.A. Years, !2J2. ... 1945 (New York: Harper al'ld Row Pu.blishers, 1964), 
e'11.i:.,i1;,, Hereinafter referred to as Lilie111thal, l'.!!, Journals .!! David 
!• Lilienthal. · · 
66Davis, "The Plight or the Negro in the Tennessee Valley," 315. 
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69Lilienthal, .I!! Journals .. !£, David I• Iiilienthal, 41. 
determined not to sacrifice his program by too vigorously supporting 
either the S011thern white or Negro. 
E. Social Security Administration 
39 
Another New Deal program in which discrimination was protested by 
the Negro was the Wagner-Lewis Social Se011rity Act, which excluded many 
black men in certain occu.pations f'rom its benefits. Roosevelt called 
the act "sou.md, needed, and patriotic legislation," but it gave little 
hope to the Negroo70 The bill reserved nmch authority to the states, 
with the most nationalized provisions pertaining to old age pensions. 
Although the other sections were to be approved and enacted by the 
states, there were no mini.mum or equal standards required :for the states. 
Roosevelt in presenting his program stated "except in old age insurance, 
actual management should 'be left to the states subject to the standards 
by the federal government."71 This provision meant the Negro weuld 
probably lose more than he gained from the Social Seeu.rity Act.72 
To the Negro, the Social Seeuri ty Act• s exelusi.on of' agricultural 
and domestic werkers f'rom benefits was covertly related to race dis-
crimination. Congressional de'bates on the bill implied that its main 
concern WOllld be old age pensie:ns. This impression was shaken, however, 
when Senator Huey L., Long of' Louisiana admitted that those who most 
needed relief in Louisiana were obviously Negroes., Bat the Negro :race 
exercised little voting a:m.d governing power in the state, so they could 
70David Epstein, "Social Security Aot," Crisis, n.VII (November, 
1935), 333. 
'llGeorge Ednmnd Haynes, "Lily-White Social Secu.rity," Crisis, n.II 
(March, 1935), 85. · 
72Ibido 
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not expect to receive relief. As Long stated, "I do not want a pension 
system that will be of help only to these who declare themselves paupers 
and prove themselves unable to e•rn a living and eligible to be put on 
the rell.,n73 Long had implied in a Senate debate that the Negro, at 
·least in his State, would probably not receive equal relief. 
The Negro•s greatest concern pertained to the faet that domestic 
and agricultural werkers were excluded from the bill's benefits. Al· 
though defenders claimed that the act was directed toward the industrial 
worker, and stated that the Negro did n0t appreciate the a.dm1nistra-
t1on's problems, the black man did not share this attitudeo The Negro's 
despair regarding the situation was expressed in ~ Crisis: 
Just as Mr~ Roosevelt threw the Negro textile workers to the 
wolves in order to get the Cotton Textile code adopted in 
July ot 1933 by exempting them from its provisions, so he 
and his advisers a.re preparing ta dump overboard the ma-
jority of Negro werkers in his se~ri ty legislation program 
by exempting from pensions and job i:nsurance all farmers, 
domestics, and casual labor.74 
.Althc:m.gh tile Negro continued to appeal for a change in this provision of 
the Social Secm.rity Act, he was not sucoessru1.75 Roosevelt believed 
this reform would reach the forgotten 111$.n, whiolil certainly included the 
Negro., Yet political and econemic expediency made it necessary f'0r 
Roosevelt to accept the bill as presented to him although it excluded 
the Negro's principal occupations. To the Negro the racial implications 
were the most obvios., 
73 U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Congress, lst Session, Ju:n.e 14, 1935, 
L:XXV, Pt. 9, 9267-9268, 9294., 
74nsocial Security--For White Folk," Crisis, XLII (March, 1935), 
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F. The Negro and Housing 
The Negro's greatest gain from a New Deal program was low rent 
housing, where his benefits surpassed those of any other ethnic group. 
The congestion of Negroes in Northern and Southern urbam centers had in-
te:nsif'ied unhealthful slwn conditions daring the depression. Since white 
residents of these cities restricted Negro housing areas to prevent inte-
gration, the black man was forced into small living enclaves. Memphis 
and New Orleans beth had their "Arks," which were two story structures 
housing sixteen or more Negro families on each floor with a common 
privya76 In Fort Lauderdale, moreover, there were only.500 dwelling 
units available for 700 families; and in Macon, Georgia, 90 percent of 
the Negro homes were deemed substa.nda.rd. 
Improving the housing situation was made more difticul t by the sub-
sistence income of ghetto residents. Over one-third of the Negro fami-
lies in Northern cities made less than $1,000 per year~ with 6.6 percent 
making less than $5000 White families in the Northern cities had a 
median income of $1,720 and a mean income of $2,616 in 1938. In the same 
year it was estimated that the median income for a rural Southern white 
w-as $1,100, while for the Negro it was $4800 77 In 1940 Robert Weaver, 
using the Survey of Consumer Incomes in the United States by the National 
Resourees Committee, estimated that more than one-half of Negro non-
relief families in the rural South in 1935 and 1936 made less than $500 
per year, while nine-tenths ma.de unde:r $1,000 per annum. 78 Therefore, it 
76John P. Murchison, "The Negro and Low-Rent Housing," Crisis, XLII-
(July, 1935), 199. 
??Robert C.o. Weaver, "Negroes Need Housing," Crisis, n.VII (May, 
J.940), 138 .. !2!~ Times, September 4, 1935 9 2:5. 
78Ibid 0 
42 
was believed by many blacks that their low earning power was partly ra ... 
cially derived and a major obstacle to improving their living eondi-
tions.79 
Low rent housing assisted slWl'l dwellers unable to move from poverty 
housing by giving them an oppartumty to have decent livi.ng conditions. 
Roosevelt's interest in this prGgr~ was revealed by a private con-
ference with Senator Robert F. Wagner in 1935 to decide how to obtain 
more permanent aspects or slum clearance.BO In 1933, under Title II or 
the N.R.A., a P.W.A. Housing Division had been created for low cost and 
sle clearance housing. The more permanent aspect or this type or re .. 
form was later passed on September 1, 1937 and was known as the Wagner ... 
Steaga11 Housing Act.Bl Thirty percent of the P.W.A. Housing Division 
funds went to the Negro as a result or this law .. 82 The goal was to re .... 
duce the exorbitantly high rent~ls tor the Negro's slovenly housing to 
approximately 25 percent of his yearly income instead ot the usual 60 
pereent.83 The Negroes also received an extra benefit since they were 
employed in the construction or the housing projects. Si:nee municipal 
.f'acilities neh as sanitation and electricity were already located in 
the slum area, the low cost housing was to be built on the same sites. 
Progress was often hindered, .however, by tlile high prices asked fer the 
deteriorated property by proprietors who tried to take advantage or the 
79New ~ Times, June 19, 1935, 8:4., 
8~ott ... Roosevelt. ed.,, F.D.R., His Pers0na.l. Papers, II, 513; 
Tugwell, Democratic Roos;velt, 435.,- - -
81Ibid., 
82Murchison, "The Negro and Low-Rent Hcn1,1ng," 199. 
83 . Ibid., 200., 
gover:mnent•s program.84 The Low Rent Housing projects of the Housing 
.Division or the Public Works Administration .were extensive. By December 
of 1937, 118 of 347 locally approved slum. clearance contracts isstted 
were to be in predominantly Negro areas.85 Thus the Negro had gained 
11111eh in housing. 
While the cities moved ferwa.rd, however, the ru.ral Negro continued 
to s11:f'fer from shantyism. Not u.ntil the housing bill of 1940, which 
provided :tor the construction or low-income farm dwelling uni ts, was the 
rural Negro included in these projects. Recipients of this program were 
to be judged solely by their income without racial oonsiderations. 86 
Thus the Negro received more specific attention and a fairer proportion 
of his housing demands. 
The Negro and the Labor Organizations 
The Negro's employment problem forced him to seek union protection, 
and these organizations were beleaguered by demands to integrate. The 
Negro represented a potential competitor for ¢te laborers, but the 
black man's lack of education and trained skills had prevented this fear 
from being realizedo Segregation in tlle labor organizations was further 
insured by white workers' fears that integration weuld lower their 
status and cripple their job opportunities. Another argument against 
Negr<1> membership was that the black man did not make good union material 
because he weuld not strike. The Negro had been slow to protest these 
84:rbid., 210 .. 
85weaver, "Negroes Need Housing," 1390 
:6New I!£k Times, March 16, 1940, 17:4; Editorial IIPa.ss the He11sing 
Bill, Crisis, XLVII (May, 1940), 1450 
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union practices, but now began to combat this ee&nomie diserimination .. 87 
The leading Negro in the tight for acceptance in the labor unions 
was A. Philip Randolph, head ot the Pl1l.l.man Porters.88 Randolph's com.-
sistent pressure for regoenition in:f'lu.eneed the AF.of L. to create the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and grant it an international char-
ter.. The success of this Negro organization was soon follo·wed by the 
grant of affiliation to the Brotherhood of Dining Car Employees. Both 
societies were the first Negro labor groups to beoome associated with 
89 the A.F. of Le In the early l930's some Negroes suggested the crea-
tion of a Na.tio:nal. Negro Labor Union, but leaders such as Walter Wh1.te 
continued to stress integration, not. segregation, as the solution.; 
White believed labor unions wo~d reject race discrimination because 
white labor could never be truly free while black labor was a victim of 
. 90 prejudice • 
.Although the Brotherhoods of Sleeping Car Porters and Dining·car 
Employees succeeded in uni ting with the A.F. of L. , twenty-one· ne:t:.io~l 
ttnions still discriminated against the Negro. The charters of the or-
ganizations often insured segregationo Some charters specif'ied white 
membership while others placed Negroes in separate divisions under the 
jurisdiction of white locals. The Negro was also supposedly successful 
with the C.I.Oe wbieh encouraged the Negro labor movement a.mo:ng auto-
. '• ... 
mobile and steel workers. According to one writer during the l93©'s, 
. , 87.A:l,.l~a M. Edwards, "The Negro as .a.Factor in the Nation• s Labor 
Force," Jou.rnal ,!£. ~ American Statistical Assoeiatipn, XXXI (Septem-
ber~ 1936), 539; Charles H .. Wesley, 110rganiied Labor's Divided Front," 
Crisis, XLVI (July, 1939), 223. 
88High, "Black Omens," 38w 
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the C.I.O .. had no color . .bars. Endorsement by organized labor was slow, 
but some definite gains had been made in this era.91 
Negro Restlessness 
The tensions and trials or the depression Negro were vividly por-
trayed in New York's Harlem. In a city where nearly sixty-six out of 
every 1,000 inhabitants .were reportedly on relier, Harlem claimed 129 
per 1,000 residents were receiving aid. Whils only 8 percent or work 
relief workers consisted of Negroes, they formed l~ percent of the em-
ployable relief popa.lation.92 In one Harlem block alone 70 percent were 
unemployed, 18 percent were ill, and 60 percent were behind in their 
rent. 93 The Negro businei:Isman also suf'f ered devastating economic loss-
es. Chain stores were gradually replacing the independent Negro re-
tailer as the number or Negro-owned stores declined from 25,707,to 
23,490; and sales decreased by nearly $50,000,000 in the 1930's. The 
estimated yearly loss for the average Negro food store was $3,000 in 
1929, and $2,000 in 1935.94 
While Negro businessmen were beset with problems, the Negro eon-
sumer also endured dif'fieu.l ties. Resentment against white owned and 
operated stores in Negro living areas .fomented many ,.Don't buy where you 
ea.n•t work" campaigns, especially in Harlem and Chicago. A store was 
classified by the black man in relation to the percentage of Negroes 
9lwesley, "Organized Labor's Divided Front," 224. 
92New ,I2.t! Times, June 19, 1935, 8 :4. 
93Ibid., Ma.y 19, 1935, pt. VII, 4; September 4, 1938, 2:5. 
94Albon L. Holsey, "Seventy-five Years of Negro Business," Crisis, 
XLV (July, 1938), 201. 
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hired., 95 Since most store owners :realized their dependency on the Negro 
consumer, Negro picketing of white owned stores in their neighborhood 
was often effective., Such agitating tactics, however, did have one re-
percussion unfavorable to the Negro., When the owners of a shoe store in 
Harlem protested picketing in a case before the New York Supreme Court, 
it was ruled that picketing privileges were for labor and not racial 
conflicts., In this decree, racism had rebounded on the Negro.96 
Discrimination during the depression provided an impetus for vio-
lence as Harlem experienced several riots., In January, 1933, a group of 
jobless Negroes rioted off 23:rd Street in Harlem, and the Relief Bureau 
was stormed~ Unemployed needle workers de~.nded more financial assist-
ance for needy Negroes as 1,500 attacked the relief office" The crowd 
was driven back four times by 150 policemen. Led by Alexander Hoffman, 
the Negroes were finally granted an interview with the Bureau's assist-
ant director, but the mob rushed the office agaim during the meeting. 
When Hoffman was not immediately granted his demands, he denounced the 
Bureau in a tirade., Police again dispersed the crowd only to have the 
Negroes regroup a few blocks away to listen to Hoffman deliver another 
sidewalk harangue that also condemned the police. The mob was finally 
scattered after the final exhortationo97 
A rash of riots again struck Harlem in 1935 with most concerning 
alleged discrimination by the City Emergency Relief Bllreau. The eon-
.t~nued immigration of the rural Negro to a city which could not employ 
him provided the background for the disturbing riots·of March 20th. The 
95High, "Black Omens," 37 .. 
96New ~ Times, November 1, 1934, 12:5. 
97Ibid~, January 13, 1933, 10:5. 
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City Relief Bureau's director, Edward Corsi, revealed that over 60 per-
cent of the relief clients in Harlem were Negroes. Corsi denied the 
discrimination charges, claiming he had offered to staff the Harlem re-
lief office with 100 percent Negroes, but that the black man had re-
fused.98 Maror La Guardia then established a Commission to investigate 
the conditions in Harlem. In its series of meetings the Negro's vehe-
mence was exhibited by his catcalls, rude interruptions, and wild ae-
eusationso The Harlem police, cha.rged the Negro, had abused the black 
mano Breaking into Harlem homes without a search warrant, beating up 
occupants, and officers being drunk on duty were some of the brutalities 
allegedly inflicted on the Negro. Negroes also insinuated that black 
witnesses for the court were intimidated by policemen in a disorderly 
outburst.99 In another meeting, Corsi attempted to defend bis depart-
ment, but his testimol\V' was received with jeers from the belligerent Ne-
gro audience.100 
After the investigation a new director, General Hagh Johnson, was 
appointed for the Relief Bureau. Negroes resented Johnson's appoint-
ment, feeling he had ignored the black man's plight while administrator 
of the N.R.As T. Arnold Hill, acting executive Secretary of the National 
Urban League, accused Johnson of not hiring Negroes for responsible po-
sitions, and of allowing differentiation of benefits of the N.R.A. by 
geographical areasolOl According to the black man, there were 
98Ibid., April 9, 1935, 44:4; April 15, 1935, 20:3. 
99Ibid .. , April 21, 1935, Fto II, 4:4o 
lOOibid., April 28, 1935, 23:1. 
101_ 
-Ibido, June 27, 1935, 7:3. 
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implications of racism in this move. Johnson, however, sta.ted that re-
lief would be distributed according to need, and that there would be no 
discrimination during his administration. Johnson also volunteered to 
appoint a Negro represen,tative to serve on his stafr.102 The Negro's 
apprehension, however, was not eased by the slowness of Harlem's re-
coverya In 1937 the Negro still had a high rate of unemployment, with 
only 206 percent of the emergency relief cases being closed in Harlem 
and over 36,000 Negroes still on home relief.103 
New Deal and Southern Poli tics and Politicians 
To the white South, the New Deal was acceptable if white supremacy 
and states• rights were preserved. And the South's effect on the New 
Deal and the Negro was measured by the power and behavior of its national 
politicianss These included such men as Hu.ey P. Long from Louisiana, 
who implied his support for white supremacy in the Senate debate on the 
Social Security Acto Also included were Pa.t Harrison from Mississippi, 
a.lso an opponent of the Social Security Act, and Hugo Black from Ala-
bamaj who was later appointed Supreme Court Justice despite the protests 
of Negroesa Another influential member of the Southern Senators was 
ttcotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina, who expressed his state's tradition-
al attitudes by walking out of the 1936 National Democratic Convention 
when a Negro minister gave the invocationo There was also Joseph T. 
(for "Terror", according to an N.A~A.C.Po pamphlet) Robinson from Arkan-
sas; Theodore Bilbo from Mississippi, who revealed his racial attitudes 
l02Ibid., July 3, 1935, 5:1. 
lOJib.d 
. 1 .• ' February 14, 1935, Pt. II, 1:6 • 
in several Senate debates, and severa1 other powerf'ul cohorts~104 
- · Usttally the Southern Senators preserved dignity and tole:t•a.nee on. 
the fioors of Congress, but sometimes their racial :feelings would be 
boldly exposed. In a 1938 debate of the P.W.A. loan and grant fund, 
Senator Bilbo offered his solution to the unemployed problem. Bilbo 
proposed in a four hour speech, to use P.W.A. tunds to ship the 
l;,000,000 .American Negroes t~ Af'r!iea .. 10.5 This, he claimed, was inci-
derita1 to the ":mu.eh more important" matter of preserving "raeialpuri-
ty.nl06 The expression of attitudes such as this on the fioor of the 
Senate in 1938 shows how discrimination could occur under New Deal pro-
grams in the South, althou.gh Bilbo himself might not have been an in-
fluential Senatoro 
Many in the South anticipated the end of New Deal programs so that 
the Negro could return to his "position of rustic security.," Programs 
such as the A.A.,A. had caused "these contented and happy and self-
supporting people11 to starve an.d neglect their "thrifty, independent" 
ways.107 Bllt other Southerners, realizing the problems facing their 
section, avoided racist actions. When Eugene Talmadge, governor of 
Georgia, was running for the .Senatorial nomination against incumbent 
Richard Russell, for the 1936 eleotion he charged the New Deal with 
lO~ido, April 19, 1936, 6:2; September 3, 1936, 10:6. 
105 Ibid., May 25, 1938, 112. 
l06Ibido 
107Rutledge, "The Negro and the New Deal, 11 286. New York Times, 
April 9, 1933, Pt. IV, 114 .. Once, when dining with a whitesouthern 
family, a New York 'l'imes reporter was urged not to read racially eon-
troversial~oics"'"'beoause of' their f'alse impressions •. Race relations, 
claimed the hostess, were dif'f'erent f'rom illusions created in these 
books because "Negroes and whites love each other. in'their place.•• 
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"fiaunting social ~quality with. the Negro in the f'aees of the people, 
and most anything oan be expected now.nl08 This attitude, however, wa.s 
resented by many Georgians and had been attacked by the Atlanta Constitu.-
l!!!. publisher, Clark Howell, in April, 1935. H(l)well rebuked Talmadge_., 
whom he had supported in previous el~etions, stating "No state more 
earnestly supported Roosevelt in the primary and general election of 
1932, and Georgia will join with undimini~hed ardor in the ulliversal 
party demand next year for his renomination."109 
Roosevelt and th.e Negro in New Deal Programs 
Roosevelt's personal position on these matters fluctuated, so it is 
difficult to identify a consistent public policy. If the criterion fGr 
evaluating Roosevelt's involvem~nt is whether the Negro benefited, then 
the President must be considered successful. The advantages obtained by 
the Negro trom housing, employment, and relief programs were significant 
in disnpting "status quo" policies .. 110 Many statistics substantiate 
the Negrofls material gain from the New De$.l, although he did not always 
have equal access to the programs.111 
Roosevelt's administrative policies toward th.a Ne~ro, however, are 
not revealed by statisticso The President's National Emergency CC!>U.ncil 
that presented a report on the problems of the South in 1938 might be 
regarded as a progressive step, but the Council consisted of leading 
l08Ibid., July 12, 1936, Pt. IV, 7:6. 
109 . Ibid., April 26, 1935, 7:5. 
llOibido, April 15, 1934, 20:3. 
lllu ... s. Congress, House, ?3rd Congress, 2nd Session, June 15, 1934, 
Congressional Record, LXXVIII, Pt. II, 11849. 
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white Southernerso Their attitudes were reflected by their lengthy re-
port which glaringly omitted race problems. It was inconceivable that 
the Negro was not considered an inheren.t part of the Southern economy, 
but the only statement mentioning the Negro concerned job displacement 
through increased competition tor employment.112 
In another incident Roosevelt, after a conference with Governor 
Talmadge, called Harry Hopkins to Warm Springs to change the F.E.R.A. 
minimum. wage of 30 cents an hour. F.E.R.Ao would then allow wages to be 
adjusted "locally by the prevailing wage scale of the section.~113 
Whether Talmadge influenced FoD.R.'s decision is not known, but some Ne-
groes ominously coupled the two events. Differentiation of minimum wage 
by geography was believed by the black man to be a tool of Southern dis-
criminationo To the white recipient, the wage difference probably repre-
sented geographical discrilrdnation, bu.t the Negro believed it to be also 
racial., 
Yet there were times that Roosevelt did get personally involved. 
Once when governor ot New York F ... D.R. had signed a bill that made possi-
ble the election or two black lawyers to :nmnicipa.l judgeships. '!'he only 
other such judgesl:lip held by a Negro at that time was in the District of 
Columbia .. 114 Immediately after assuming the Presidency, Roosevelt was 
approached for help 'by a Negro farmer, Sylvester Harris·. Harris tele-
phoned Roosevelt from Mississippi seeking to prevent foreclosure on his 
112 New York Times, August 13, 1938, 1:6-8. --
ll3E~itorial, "U.Se Adopts the Georgia Pl.an," Crisis, XIII (January, 
19'.35), 17. . 
114ues_. Congress, .House, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, June 18, 
19'.34, Congressional Record, LXXVIII, Pt. ll, 12609. 
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farm. As a result, Harris obtained a loan that saved bis land.115 In 
another incident, an unemployed Negro ~man preacher, Callis Fancy of 
Little Rock, Arkansas, appealed to Roosevelt for assistance. Although 
the FGE.R.Ao had provided the necessities for living for Mrs. Fancy, she 
could not afford to pl'lrchase false teeth. Through intervention of the 
President's executive secretary Callis Fancy was employed as a dental 
assistant so she could pay for her teeth.116 
Representative Arthur Mitchell, Illinois Democrat and a Negro, once 
claimed that "every instance of race discrimination that has been proper~ 
ly brought to the attention of the President has not only received im-
mediate attention, but has been amazingly adjusted as far as the a~thor-
ity of the executive office oould go. 11117 Roosevelt's interest in the 
Negro was also ex.pressed in bis dedication of the new chemistry btlilding 
at Howard University in October of 1936. In bis address F.D.R. stated, 
"there should be no forgC!>tten men and no forgotten races.nll8 The 
founding of Howard, claimed Roosevelt, "typified America's faith in the 
ability of man to respond to opportunity regardless of race or creed or 
eolor .. "119 Roosevelt apparently believed the Sou,th's position was im-
proving, and perhaps the Negro was included in this upward trend. 
F.D.Re's confidence in this section was again expressed in a letter 
stating that "This Southland has a smile on its race. Ten cent cotton 
ll5Ibid., LXXIX, Pt. 12, 12985. 
116New I2r!, Times, June 24, 1935, 36:50 
ll7 . u.s. Congress, Hou.se, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session., June 18, 
1934, Congressional Record, LXXVIII, Pt. 12, 12986. 
118!!,w ~ Times, Oetober 27, 1936, 14:3. 
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has stopped foreclosures, saved banks, and started people definitely on 
the upgradeo 11120 
Roosevelt9 s interest in the Negro was also revealed in federal apa, 
pointmentso Most of the programs were represented by Negro appointees, 
as FeD.R. included more Negroes in highly responsible -pctsitiQ:ns-than had- -
previous administrations.121 Some of the appointees included \Jililliam T. 
Tompkins, recorder of deeds in the District of Columbia; T.M. Campbell 
of Tuskegee and JoB. Price of Hampton Institute, employed in the Depart... 
ment of Agriculture; Robert Lo Vann, a special Assistant Attorney Gener-
al; Forest Bo Washington, adviser to Harry Hopkins in the FeE~RoA.; and 
William A. Hastie, appointed as an attorney in the Department of the In,., 
terior under Harold Ickes.122 These men held the more significant po-
sitions although many others served in lesser posts. 
Other encouraging breakthroughs against discrimination du.ring 
Roosevelt's terms included the dismissal of Dr. Illo Hern, supervisor of 
the Museum of Natural History in 1936, on charges of discriminating 
against Negroes in employment practicesol23 Moreover, the executive 
Secretary of the Urban League, E0KG Jones, was appointed by Secretary of 
Commeroe Da.niel Co Roper to study Negro problems.124 And when Secretary 
of the Interior Ickes discovered discrimination in his Land Office, he 
announced in a. staff conference that it would not be tolerated. Ickes 
lZOElliott Roosevelt, E,oQeE,., ~ Rersonal Letters, II, 3720 
121New ~ Times, June 22, 1936, 3:2o 
122u-Gs., _ Congress, House, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, June 15, 
1934~ Corrgressional Record 2 LXXVIII, Pto 11, 11849. 
123New ~ Times, February 89 1936, 216. 
12lf.ibide, October 19, 1933, 20:20 
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elaim.ed his department was to be a model for employment integration. If 
his workers, stated Ickes, presumed they oould not work with the Negro, 
then they could resign.125 Small actions such as these punctured tra-
ditional prejudices. Every degree of aooepta.noe carried the potential 
for acquiring more opportunity and more equality for the black man. 
Conclusion 
Perspective is the issue when both the Negro and Roosevelt are as-
soeiated through the New Deal. The Negro's economic position, as a re-
sult of .the depression, was deplorable. As a minority group, Negroes 
discovered that the loss of national economic security only increased 
the discrimination by those opposing him, while it weakened his O'Wl'l fis-
cal ability to combat it., Whem th.e .federal government initiated its 
programs of national relief, the Negro expected a just proportion of the 
bene;fitso P,rejudice, the· black man hoped, W011ld net occur in the ad-
ministration of the Congr~ssiona.l acts. This apprehension by the black 
man made him more sensitive to any opposition to profiting from the New 
Deal, whether in Congressional debates or in the execution of the pro-
grams .. The Negro could view administrative programs only within the 
context of' his own race, and thus his oritioisms o:t both Roosevelt and 
the New Deal, though partially valid, may have had little oence!))tit;,n o:t 
the total national situation. 
To ~ooseveltt aowever,· prio1ity was reserved for the restoration of 
the economy on a national seale; the Negro constituted only a small, 
secondary segment within the total framework. If oooonitn,.ent to a 
. . -· ._ .. .l.25Harold Le Ickes, The Secret ~ of Harold L. Iokes, III, The 
Loweripg Clouds, 1:2.J2.-l941 (New YorkCSiiionand Schuster, 1954). -
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minority, though that minority had suffered discrimination, meant saeri-
fioi:ng programs that could benefit the majority, th.is Roosevelt would 
not do • .Although Roosevelt was aware of' the provisions that would allow 
discrimination, especially in the South, to him that seemed a .small 
price to pay for national recovery. Prejudice could not be removed with 
an economic program, but the program might give the Negro, despite dis-
crimination, an opportunity to combat this attitude more suecesstully. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEGRO IN NEW DEAL POLITICS 
Negro Political Affiliation~ 19:30-1932 
Although by 1938 the distribution of the 12,000,000 Negroes between 
nral and urban areas was ba1a.nced a.bout equally, residential segrega.-
tion in Northern cities concentrated the Negro population into a. signifi-
cant voting bloc.1 This oonoentra.tion of Negro votes now forced politi-
cal parties to consider the import of bl.a.ck politics. With new oonfi-
dance, Northern Negro leaders claimed they now controlled votes for 152 
Congressional distriots.2 The Negro, a.s James Weldon Johnson noted, was 
now a national politica1 issue, not just a. Southern one.3 To the Ne-
gro, the idea. of poll power became a bright hope for the fu.ture, but tor 
politicians it proved to be a source of embarrassment. 
Traditionally, suffrage laws of the South rendered the blaok man's 
ballot impotent in those states, while the Northern Negro's vote was po-
litically committed to the Republican party or Abrah~ Lincoln.4 The 
lttNegroes Swing; Ex.perts Forecast Their Return to the Rep11blican 
Fold in 1940," Newsweek, XIII (April 10, 19:39), 15. Hereinafter re-
f erred to as "Negroes·· Swing~" 
2Ibid .. 
. )James Weldon Johnson, "A NegrQ Looks At Politics," I!!, .American 
Mercury (September, 1929), 88; White, A Man Called White, ll!J.:115. 
4 White, ! ~ Called White, 94; "Negr<!>es Swing," 15. 
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consequence of Negro political awareness in the 1930's was manifested by 
his rejection or the old traditional politics tor an allegiance to the 
Democratic Party.5 The combination of the effects of the depression, 
Hoover's failure to restore prosperity, and Roosevelt's reform promises 
determined the Negro's decision to seek, security with the Demoerats.6 
Considering the composition of the Democratic Party, the Negro's 
alliance must be considered u.niqu.e. The power of the South within the 
Democratic Party restricted Roosevelt's relations with black constitu-
ents, and Negroes knew·that influential Sou.tbern office holders would 
deliberately resist racial e~uality. The Negro had hoped the aura of 
social justice associated with F.D.R. would include the black man, but 
the President's efforts to implement social welfare were hindered by 
white Southern Democrats• convictions.? This situation necessitated 
F.D.R.'s remaining an enigma on issues involving race relations. The 
desire to solicit the Negro vote while retaining the support of the 
Democrats• conservative Southern branch created a precariou.s political 
plight for Roosevelt and his party. 
The interest expressed in the Negro voter in the 1932 election is 
significant when compared to previous elections, but political parties 
had yet to sense the full political impact of the Negro bloc • .Although 
the main issue or the 1932 campaign was economic, both parties at first 
had thought prohibition would receive primary attention. But the threat 
5"Negroes Swing," 15. 
°Ibid. ; White, ! 1 !!!!! Called White, 94; ,High, "Bla.ci!, Omens," 14. 
7David O. Walter,. "Previous Attempts to Pass a Federal Anti-
Lynching Law," ~ Congressional Di.ges~, XIV (June, 1935), 169; Editori-
al, ''Roosevelt's Opportunity," Crisis, XI.III (December, 1936), 369; 
see also Chapter Four of thesis. 
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of internal division led both parties to avoid this topie.8 The Republi-
eans claimed the Depression had been inevitable, and they were antici-
pating that the Democrats' nomination for Vice-President of John Garner, 
a leading member of the Southern bloo, would alienate voters. 
The 1932 Election 
To the Negro the issues of 1932 were relief and.civil rights tran-
sitiono Since the judicial system presented his best opportunity for 
winning these rights, the black man was also especially interested in 
the selection of supreme Court justices.9 When President Hoover had in 
1930 appointed Southern conservative John J. Parker for the Supreme 
Court position vacated by the d~ath of Edward Terry Sanford, the Negro 
leadership was further alienated from the Republican party.lo For the 
first time in the twentieth century, Northern Congressmen felt the pres-
sure of the Negro as a political group.11 As the Senate debated the 
approval issue, there were reports of bribes, and Hoover made no attempt 
to ease the.uncertain political position of the Republican Congressmen.12 
The incident was settled when the Senate rejected Parker's nomination by 
a vote of 41 to 39. The episode served to give the Negro political 
8"The National Campaign of 1932 Begins in Earnest," ~ Congress-
ional Digest, XI (August-September, 1932), 193. · 
9Walter White, "The Negro and the Supreme Court," Harper's Monthly 
Magazine {January, 1931) , 245. ··· · 
lOWhite, ! ~ Called White, 114-115; Richard L. Watson, Jr., "The 
Defeat of Judge Parker: .A Study in Pressure Greups and. Politics," ~ 
M:ississipp; Valley Historical Review, L (September, 1963), 213-234. 
11Wh1te, "The Negro and the Su.preme Court," 238-240. 
12Ibid. 
consciousness and cohesiveness he had previously laeked.13 
The Republicans, threate:aed w.itb. the loss of their Negro voting 
bloc, ma.de new appeals tor the black ma.n's vote. At the 1932 national 
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convention Hoover•s nomination was seconded by a Negro, Roscoe Conkling 
Silllmons, and the black man's interests were included in theplatf'orm.14 
The declaration stated that the G.O ... P. had been the friend of the Negro 
for seventy years, and the ";vindication of the right of the Negro citi-
zen to enjoy the full benefits of life ••• is traditional for the Repub-
lican Party, and our party stands pledged to maintain equal opportunity 
and rights for Negro eitizens.nl5 The Negro's criticism of this claim 
was revealed in a letter to the New York Times which asserted the Re---........... 
publican plank was ,ltvague and blank" on the race isSll.e. The black man 
was eonoened w.ith constitutional rights, not the f'rie:n¢iship of' the Re-
b.,.. 16 pu ,.a...a.eans. 
In October, 1932, 110 Negro voters called on Hoover in Washington 
and demanded in an interview that the President take a stand on Negro 
rights .. F10over evasively replied that the Republican Party would con-
tinue its "traditional duty to~d the American Negro.nl7 But a$ spokes-
man tor the group, Roscoe Conkling Simmons, who had seconded Hoover's 
nomiMtion at the Republican National Convention, ret0rted that the 
black man now believed the Republicans had deserted his cause and asked 
l3White, A Man Called White, 111; White, 11 The Negro and the Supreme 
Court,'.' 238.. - - · · 
14New York Times, October 2, 1932, 32:1. ----
15Ibid .. , June 16, 1932, 15:7. 
l6Ibid.,, June 29, 1932, 20:6. 
l?Ibid., ~tober 2, 1932, 12:1. 
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' 
Hoover to retu.te this idea. Hoover noncommittally claimed that the Ne-
gro•s progress was satisfactory and that the black man had proved to be 
a co-operative worker.18 
Democrats also attempted to recognize the Negro's civil rights 
struggle in the platform.. The chairman of the National Executive Com-
mittee, Joaett Shouse, Senator Robert Wagner, and Al Smith supported 
this move; while a Southerner, C.M. Chambers, mayor of' San Antonio, was 
' 
to present the resolution to the eonvention.19 The plank would allow 
Negr9es to vote in state party primaries. However, the final platform 
conceded to the Southern bloc by failing to mention the black man. 20 
Party competition for the Negro vote was reflected at the 1932 na-
tional convention of' the N.A.A.C.P. Although President Hoover praised 
the Negro in a personal message, the political tone of' the convention 
favored the Demoorats.21 On May 20 1 the second day of the eonf'erenoe, 
Professor John Dewey of Columbia University told conference delegates · 
the Negro should join the laboring class and form. a new party that would 
better represent mis oase. 22 The conference's concluding speaker was 
Republican Senator Robert La Follet;te, now carrying Roosevelt's standard, 
who also claimed the Republican$ had betrayed the· Negro. 2'.3 Swnmarizing · 
the black man9 s resentment against the Republicans, Walter White alleged 
lBrua .. 
19Ibid .. , Ju:r:ie 25, 1932, 5:4. 
20Ibid., July 1, 1932, 15:1. 
21Ibid., May 19, 1932, 23:4. 
22Ibid., May 20, 1932, 2llo 
2'.3 Ibide, May 23, 1932, 33:1. 
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that Hoover's support of Judge Parker, Hoover's refusal to appoint Ne-
groes to public positions, and his failure to relieve unemployed Negroes 
had estranged the blaek man from the Republican Party. 24 It was con-
cluded that "the Negro vote would come into its own thts yearon2.5 
Roosevelt, however, was also oriticized. F.D~Ro had been credited 
with authorship of the June 12, 1918, Haitian eonstitutiG>n written when 
the United States Mariries were stationed there .. Amerioan Negro spekes-
men believed the "black"·. republic had been invaded and governed for the 
'benefit of "American financial powers,."26 But the Negro's most valid 
apprehension was that Roosevelt would eater to the "second and third-
rate politicians" who represented the South in Co:ngress .. 27 
The emergence of intense racial feelings in national polities in 
the 1930's made it difficult for the parties to maintain internal equi-
librium .. To satisfy Negro demands of the Democrats, F.D.R. weuld have 
had to appoint a Negro to the Cabinet, invite a proportional representa-
tion of Negroes to the White House in accordance with the number of white 
guests 11 and force Congress to enact an anti-lynching biJ,l. Granting 
24:rbid., 
25Ibid 0 
26Ibido, Elliott Roosevelt, ed .. , F.DoR., His Personal Letters, 
~1928, 342,. Roosevelt's brief tour and stay in Haiti during the 
restoration of order after U.S. military intervention in 1916 and his 
intense interest in the development of the Caribbean resulted in the 
news media claiming that F.D$R. stated that he wrote the Constitution of 
HaitiQ Elliott, however, claims this was false and was denied by his 
father in his 1920 Viee Presidential campaign when it became an issue. 
He Po Davis, Black DemoCTaa:y, ~ Story.£!. Haiti (New York: Dedge Pub-
lishing Company, 1936)~ Chapter IV discusses the creation and adoption 
of this Constitution, but stresses the influence of President Wilson on 
its content while no mention is made of F.D.R.'s being involved in its 
making. 
27New ~ Times, May 23, 1932, 33:l; Walter White, "An Estimate 0f 
the 193bVote," Crisis, XI.III (February, 1936), 46. 
these concessions would have forced FoD.R. to sacrifice support of the 
"Solid South"; Since it was necessary that RoCl>sevelt give speeial eon-
sideration to Southern Democrats during the earlier years of his admini-
stration, it was impossible :for him to meet these demands .. 28 
The incidents involving Hu~y Long are representative or the eon-
flict between Roosevelt and the Southern Sena.tors~ The significance of 
Long's influence was measured by Elliott Roosevelt, who claimed there was 
a "time when administration leaders in the Senate were more. afraid of the 
disruptive effects of Huey Long9s :filibusters than of the Republican OP-
position.·"29 Long, a spokesman for the rednecks, according to James 
Farley, had to "be handled with glovesi 1130 It was only with the great... 
est difficulty that he was retained in the Democratic camp. The New -
I.2!:k Times asserted that Long had so much influence in Congress that "to 
get a vote before Senator Long's reappearance became a movement of vast 
magnitudei··"3l Long's animosity continued during the first years of the 
Roosevelt administration when he attacked the executive by demanding an. 
investigation of James Farley11 s party activities,, Long's purpose sup.. 
posedly was to :further his 1936 presidential ambi tions·,r Although Roose-
velt realized that these charges were actually directed against him, not 
Farley, he re.fused to confront the Southern Senator in Farley's 
28New York Times, May 23, 1932, 33:1; "Black Game,"Time, XXVIII 
(August 17, 1936), · 10-11. -
29Elliott Roosevelt, ed,., .[G12•!l•, ~ Personal Letters, 1928-1945, 
II, 46b 
~ . . . 
James Ai. Farley,~ Farle:v•s Story, I!!! Roosevelt Years (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948), 15. · 




In the 1932 national convention the Roosevelt forces clashed 'With 
the Southern branch by attempting to abr~gate the two-thirds majority 
ru.le used to select the party's presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates. This rule made the support of the Southern' bloc crucial to any 
successful candidate. Since Roo.sevelt' s proposal would have destroyed 
the South's power, Bourbon delegates defeated Roosevelt's endeavor.33 
By 1936, however, the firmly entrenched Roosevelt succeeded in having 
the Convention change the two-thirds rule to require only a simple ma-
jority. Thus Southern Democratic control over the national Democratic 
party, which had been out of proportion to its population, was broken.34 
The 1932 election was the political turning point :for the twentieth 
century Negroe The black man's stagnant alliance with the Republican 
party was forsaken for the bright promises of economic and social reform 
from the Democrats., The black man hoped the campaign promises o:f F.D.R. 
would assist him in the :fight :for racial equality that had been renewed 
by the Depression. Wha.t Roosevelt represented attracted the Negro vote 
for the Democratic party du.ring his era. 
The 1936 Election 
The election of 1936 was crucial because it reflected the Negro's 
opinion of the value of the Roosevelt reforms to his race. The Congres-
sional elections of 1934 had reflected a continuation of th.e Negro al-
liance 'W'i th the Democratic pa.rty, and the Democrats hoped to guarantee 
32Farley, i!.!. .. Farley's Story, ~ Roosevelt Years, 50. 
33Ibid.,, 15 .. 
34ttFrom the Press of the Nation," Crisis, XI.III (.August, 1936), 149. 
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Negro support in the next campai~n.35 The Repu.blieans hoped to entice 
the Negro 'back to the party f<i>ld, sinoe the Democrats were still plagued 
with internal conflicts between the Negro element and Southern white 
party members. Because Roosevelt did not react directly to the eon-
fiieti:ng demands of either group, he managed to retain the support of 
both. 
Ironically, the greatest opposition to the admimistration•s pro-
grams oceu.rred in the South, which also received the greatest assistance 
from the government. Roosevelt determined to make Southern living stand-
ards comparable to those of the rest of'the nation, yet Southern states-
men consistently contravened F.D.R.'s objectives when it appeared that 
the Negro might receive a greater proportion of benefits than whites.36 
.. Prior to the 1930' s, a Negro• s vote f'or a Democrat, according to 
·N~~~;k, was equated to a Jew voting for·· Hitler.37 The Republicans, by 
the spirit of Lincoln and the use of' spoils, hoped to keep most Negroes 
firmly in the party. Democrats,however, had adopted and improved on 
these tactics by 1936, and the Negro was no longer as receptive to Re-
publican entioements.38 The Democrats penetrated the Repnblieans• Negro 
territory through city organizations such as the Pendergast machine in 
Kansas City, Missouri, and Tammany Hall in New York. The loeal party 
hierarchy made eertain Negroes were given a eut in the bosses• profits 
'.35Pau.l Ward, "Wooing the Negro V0te," !s.!, Nation, CXLIII (July, 
1936), 119-120. 
3~aitorial, "The Crisis," Crisis, XLV (October, 1938), 331~ 
37"Negroes; Jesse Owens Dashes to G.O.P. in Colored ·Vote Race," 
Newsweek, VIII (September 12, 1936), 19. Hereinafter referred to as 
"Negroes; Jesse Owens Dashes to G.O.P." 
38 "A Negro to Negroes on Voting,." lb!, Literaty Digest, CIX (.April 
25, 1931), 24; .I.!! Secret Diary.!! Harold,&. Ickes, II, 3g3. 
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and spoils.39 By 1935 the Democrats controlled 70 percent of the votes 
in Harlem; and in Chicago Mayor Kelly won the support of the South Side 
Negroes. Chicago's black section in 1934 replaced Negro Republican Con-
gressman Oscar DePriest with Arthur Mitchell, a Negro Democrat. 40 In 
other Northern states with an urban concentration of Negroes, blacks 
also east a mu.ch heavier vote in the Democratic primaries as well as in 
the general eleetion. 41 
The reason there was such a political interest in the Negro at this 
time can be illustrated statistically. Nine non-Southern states with a 
large bloc of Negro votes were no longer secure for either party.42 If 
60 percent of the crucially distributed Negro vote of approximately 
7,000,000 would ballot, then the Negro would become an important elec-
toral element .. Although this estimate did not con.sider the effect of 
discriminatory laws on the Southern black ma:n9 s ability to vote, it was 
predicted that an influential portion of Negroes eligible to vote would 
participate in the electionQ43 Five states, usually Republican, with 
1,500,000 Negro voters concentrated in their urban areas, cou.J.d have had 
their electoral vetes determined by black bloc voting. These included 
New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio, whose black popu-
latio:ns had generally endorsed F.,D.R. in 1932, but which were not 
3911 Negroes; Jesse Owens Dashes to G.O.P. ," 19. 
40Ibid.,, 19; Farley, l!}s Farley's Story, The Roosevelt Year~, 49-50; 
Ward, "Wooing the Negro Vote," 119; Henry Lee Moon, "Negro Vote in a 
Close Election,"~~ Times, October 18, 1936, 7:3. · 
41 ... 
~~ Times, October 18, 1936, 7:3& 
42"Black Game," 10-lL 
43Luther A" Huston, "Biggest Election Day May Bring Out 45,000,000," 
~ 12!! Times, November 1, 1936, 4:2. 
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considered to be Democratic states. 44 For example, in 1932 Pennsylvania 
had been carried by Hoover by 157,000 votes. A change of 79,000 of these 
would have given F.D.R. thirty-six electoral votes. Pennsylvania had 
285,000 Negroes of voting age for the 1936 election, just in the offing. 
Other states traditionally Republican who had endorsed F.D.R. in the 
1932 election included Indiana, Missouri, and Kentucky. In these, as 
well as the previously mentioned state's, the Congressional eleetions of' 
1934 had revealed the continuing shift of' the Negro vote to the Democra ... 
tic Party. In Louisville, a Republican city, a Democrat was elected 
mayor and another Congressman. And in Chicago Arthur Mi tohell, Democrat, 
replaced Arthur DePriest, a Republican. Accordillg to the editor of the 
Pittsba.rgh Courier, 1932 was the initial turning point for the Negro 
ballot., Over l,000,000 Negroes had voted Democratic in the election and 
in Detroit, 54 percent of Negr(i)el;I were believed to be·Pemocratic by 
1936, whereas only 25 percent had been before 1932.45 
Although it was predicted the Negro would go Democratic in 1936, 
other interest groups had also shifted their allegiance. F.D.R. faced 
the possible loss of bu.siness support and traditional Democrats who 
feared the.New Deal had become socialistie.46 There was, at the same 
time, a split between the AoF. of' L. and the C.I.O. John L. Lewis was 
trying to unionize workers of the .American Steel and Iron Institute on 
an industrial., not cra.:ft basis. It was Lewis' belief that the best way 
to organize workers in a monolithic 5,000,oeo dollar indttstr:, was through 
44ward, "Wooing the Negro Vote," 119; Moon, "Negro Vote in a Close 
Election," 7:3. . 
45New York Times, Ootober 18, 1936, 7:3; Ward, "Wooing the Negro 
Vote;" ll9 -
46"The National Campaign of 19'.32 Begins in Earnest," 193. 
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monolithic unionism, not eraf't separation. Th.is incident had created 
tension between the A.F. of' L. and the c.r.o. The Social Security 
Act assured Roosevelt of' labor's support although he encounter~q some 
resentment from the leaders at his success at w.inrdng the common work-
ers• loyalty. Yet in 1936 the major unions avoided a split partly to 
help Roosevelt. John L. Le14,s strongly e~dorsed and -supported Roose-
velt and the platform, altho11gh du.ring the latter part of the 1930's 
Lew.is, disillttsioned with Roosevelt's sec&nd term New Deal p0licies, 
deserted the Democrats~,. Roqsevel t• s popul.ari ty with the ra.nk and file, 
however;was so secure at this point that they did n0t join Lew.is in his 
political rejection. of' the Pre~ident. But in 1936 organized labor and 
11nskilled labor, which constituted the majority 0£ Negro employed, was 
supposedly aligned with Roosevelt.47 Som~ opposition to the administra-
tion was also expected from persons working on govermnent projects who 
wanted to be in private work.48 
The key political issues 0£ 1936 f'or conservatives were government 
spending and taxation, bu.t £or the Negro lynching, relief, and employ-
ment were most significant. One 0£ the most publicized and controversial 
debates of the previous Senate session had been the Wagner-Costigan 
·' ... -; .... :"·. 
anti-lynching bill. The increase in lynchings in the early depression 
yea.rs made this crime a national issue.49 The Wagner-Costigan bill had 
47Ibid.; Tagwell, Democratic Roosevelt, 336; Benjamin sto1berg, 
"John L. Lewis, Portrait of' a Realist,•• ~ Nation, CXLIII (August 1, 
1936), 121-122; New York Times, June 23, 193~,.12:5; June 26, 1936, 15: :3. _......_... 
48 
Tu.gwell, Democratic Roosevelt, 336. 
~.s ... Congress., House, ?4th Congress, 1st Session, August 13, 
1935, Copg:ressional Record, LXXIX, 12986-12987; ibid., Senate, April 25, 
1935, ~370-5371. 
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been strangled by a S~thern Demoera.tio filibuster, and lynching 
threatened to divide the Democratic party if it. became a major issue. 
Th.e anti-lynching bill had been proposed by New Deal Democrats, and 
both Re.osevel t and Al.free! Landon, the Republican nominee, h~d denounced 
lynching. Both, however, a.voided controversy when they "sides;tepped 
committing themselves to a .federal law• tor its prevention.50 The 
President's silence on this issue ~s de.fended by other members or his 
administration including Harold Ickes, Secretary or the Interior. Ickes 
stated that "The President of the United States has put the weight ot 
his v0ice and the prestige ot his high office against these evil mani-
festations ..... I am happy to tell you that the present administration 
is oo:nsoiou:s of its responsibility in this regard also.n51 S(l)Uthern op.. 
' . ~ 
position was reneeted by the Baltimore .§!S, which claimed "If the 
Roosevelt control is tightened by the elections, first there will be an 
open administration drive to put through the a;:nti-lynelrl.ng bill. This 
will be followed by legislation .... to put an end to the dii;Jtranehisement 
ot the Negroes in the South ..... n52 
Democrats were so confident of the Negro vote that Tam.ma~Hall ex-
pected a Roosevelt victory im Harlem, where relief' oheok reeipients 
constituted 21 percent of the city's welfare list, although the area 
contained less than 4 percent ef the :pepw.atien. It was estima,ted that 
the majority- of the 84,000 eligible .Harlem Negroes going to the polls 
I . . . 
50Editori~,"'l'he Campaign," Crisis, XLV (October, 1938), 3:37; 
Harold L. Ickes, "The Negro as a Citizen," Crisis, XLIII (August, 1936), 
12. . . 
51Ibid .. 
52"Raoes, Delica.te Aspect," ll!!,, XXIX (September 19, 1938), 12. 
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had benefited from relief in some ma.nner.5'.3 This sita~tion was repeated 
in ChieagCi>, where 40 percent et the legrees received relief, and in St.· 
Louis, where SO percent of the black pepulati<1>n was on relie:r.54 The 
Democrats ma.de sure the urban Ne,ro was receiving his Ml share of re-
lief, especially prior tG the electiQ:n. Delp.oorats sttceessfully enhanced 
their political advantage by telling Negr0es that a vote·for Landon was 
a vote against relief. Republicans countered by el~imi:ng they would re-
lieve Negroes from relief, btltt to .no ava11.55 
ilthe11gh relief' organizations had been established on a national 
level, loeal administration ot this aid made se>me racial cliscrimination 
unavoidable. Since theydid not erase acts 0f prej'lldiee, the programs 
were criticized by the Negro. Landen criticized the New Deal programs 
tor their.government eontrel and prop0sed that a system of state relief 
with assistance fro the federal government be established •. This sug-
gesti<Hl made the Sn.tbern Negro especially apprehensive.. The l?lack: man 
felt a Republican admin:istratien could h$.rdly end embedded Democratic 
diserindnation in the South, particularly if loe&:l central were in-
ereased.56 
In their campaign the Democrats stressed Roosevelt the liluma.n:itar-
ia.n .. F .. D.R .. , claimed the party, was e0ncerned with a man's security re-
gardless of .his celer .. Icke~ state4 that F.1>.R. had given the Negro the 
"chance to which he is entitled" and had made the black man important in 
5'.3New I!t!, Times, October ?8, 1936, 15:2. 
54togan, nMenace ef Racial. Discrimina.tion,n 201.t-206; 11mack .Game," 
10 .. 11 .. 
55New York Times, Octeber 28, 1936, 15:2. ---......... 
5~ditorial, "The Campaign,n 337., 
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national government.57 Democratic programs that encouraged the Negro to 
support the Democratic ticket included the P.W.A. Although tainted 
with prejudice, the Housing Divisien of the pregram provided the lew... 
ineome werkers a decent and ine~n~ive place to livee It was said to 
be actually more beneficial to the Negro than to the whiteo58 The P.W.A. 
also required a certain percentage, usually in proportion to the total 
population of the area, of the labor to be Negro on their projeets.59 
The Negro also benefited f'romthe National Youth Administration, 
which enabled 30,000 formerly illiterate Negroes to learn how to read 
and writeo Thus or the 290,017 students who received N.Y.A. aid for 
added education, more than 10 percent were Negre> .. 6o The black man was 
also included in the Civilian Conservation Corps, which employed 150,000 
young Negro men during its first three years. The government, it was 
estimated, spent over $30,000,000 on Negroes in these eampso6l 
Yet the Democrats• achievements mu.st be viewed realistically. These 
programs were directed for general relief, not for specific minority 
groups .. The gains for the Negro were a matter or course, :for these 
prog:t"ams were supported by Southern Democrats who were a.ware that the 
Negro W0uld benefite These men often included sections in the bills 
which. allowed Southern states greater freedom in administra.tion.62 Yet 
5?"Negroes; Jesse Owens Dashes to G.O.P.," 19; Ickes, "The Negro 
as a Citizen," 12. · 
299 .. 




62see Chapter II for discussion of New Deal programs. 
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the Negro politically decided that the pr0grams' benefits outweighed 
Southern racism. 
For reaching the Northern Negro voter, the Democratic Party de-
pended upon the Colored Committee of the Good Neighbor League~63 In 
October, the C0m.mittee staged the Negro's largest political rally, when 
16,000 gathered in Madison Square Garden fer a nationally broa.doast pro-
gram .. At the climax there was unveiled a painting of Roosevelt some 
twenty .feet high in a scene that resembled Abraham I.d.neoln freeing the 
slaves .. In fa.et, Abraham Lino0ln was included in the background, as 
"was fitting and pr0per in a Democratic Rally .. "64 Yet Roosevelt did not 
attend the meeting, nor did the message he sent reflect any eo?lllldt-
ments.6.5 At the rally Senator Robert Wagner, whe had sponsored the 
anti~lynching bill in Congress, made an unexpected appearance~ In an 
extemporan~ous _speech, Wagner promised that the next Congress would pass 
an anti-lynching bill, and encouraged continued support for Ro0sevelt's 
administration. 66 This Committee was credited with w.i.nning 70 percent 
of the Negro vote for F .. D~R. in 19'.36, 'but they never obtained an audience 
with the Presidento 67 Perhaps Roosevelt felt that personal oentaot would 
breed a political split within the party, whereas silence might bring 
' oritioism, but not a ·loss of support .. 
Another Democratic asset was Mrs .. Reosevelt, whose sympathy.for the 
Negro civil rights movement was well known .. She expressed her interest 
63m.gh, ''Black Omens," 14 .. 
64:rbid.,, 8.5 .. 
6.5New ~ Times 9 September 22, 1936, 4:2. 
66Ibid .. 
67Hi.gh., "Black Om.ens," 14, 86. 
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by inviting Negro groups such as the members of the National Industrial 
Training School for Girls to White House outings.68 Negro organizations 
such as the Good Neighbor League in the Harl~m YoMoCoAo were included on 
her speaking itinerary$69 Mrs. Roosevelt encouraged F.DoR. to appoint 
outstanding Negro leaders to government positions and to use them on 
campaign speaking tours. In 0ne memorandum to F0D.,Ro during the 1936 
campaign, Mrso Roosevelt noted that "it would be well to ask some Negro 
speakers, like Mrso Bethune to speak at ohureh meetings and that type of 
Negro organization. 1170 But in no instance did Mrso Roesevelt politically 
commit the President to the Negro~s oauseo Yet the First Lady won re-
speet from the black man, and this was an asset for President Roosevelt. 
Both parties also used N~gro leaders and idols to gain black SUP-
porto The Republicans won Jesse Owens, Olympic Gold medal winner in 
1936, although his criticism of Roosevelt was mild., FoDoRo was "just 
perfectly swen, 1171 claimed the track star, and "had done s0mething but 
not enaugh to benefit the people of the colored race. tt72 Owens•: vague 
statement endorsing Lando:a was: "Governor Landon dci>es :n:<l>t'promise much, 
but what premises he makes I think he will keep .. n73, In' 1940 the Republi-
cans lGst Owens to the Democrats but gained prize ;fighter J,oe Lewis. ; 
Though Lewis 9 speaking was described as "halting and embarrassed," he 
68ward, "Wooing the Negro Vote," 119., 
69New ~ Times, September 3, 1936, 10: 5. 
70Elliott Roosevelt, ed.,, [_.,~.,J!o, !!:,! Personal Letters, 19'38-1945, 
II, 600., · . ·· 
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73Ibid0 
73 
was adamant in his dislike of F.D.R .. and never failed to rouse enthusiasm 
from his Negro audieneeso74 Louis felt Roosevelt had not kept the prom-
ise to have Congress pass an anti-lynching bill., "Mr .. Roesevelt," 
claimed Lou.is, "was ma.king a let er lazy people out of our people,,., oo 
They sit around waiting for the $15 a week.n75 
Colonel J0Ee Spingarn, president of the N.A.AoC.P. and a life-long 
Republican, supported Roosevelt in his first endorsement of a presiden-
tial candidate since TheodoreRoosevelt .. 76 Spingarn stated: "From 
personal knowledge I say that there is no man in America who is more 
free of race prejudice than Franklin D. Roosevelto•" we must not think 
of the Democratic party, but of Franklin Ro9sevelt. 1177 Under F.D.R. 
Spingarn believed the Negro had been treated with unprecedented fair-
ness.. This attitude was also reflected in .Ih!, Crisis, which stated that 
the Negro had voted for Roosevelt, not because he was a Democrat, but in 
spite of it., While discussing pJrties• attitudes on the race issues, 
~ Crisis asserted that "President Roosevelt had indicated on nu.m.ereus 
occasions his personal differences with the traditional attitudes of his 
party so far as the Negro is concerned."78 To many Negroes Roosevelt 
and the DemGcratic party were two separate ~ntities en the race ques-
tion., The blaek man felt F.,D .. R., could change the traditional racial 
concepts of his partyo 
74Ibido, Nev ember 111 1940, 20 ::3. 
75Ibid.,, New ember 5, 1940, 21:3,. 
76Ibidat October 19, 1936, 2:3 .. 
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Another Negro leader who enqorsed Roos,velt wa.s Democratic Congress-
man Arthur Mitchell. In a House speech which received a standing ova-
tion f'rom some.Democrats and sil~nce f'rGm the Repu.blicans, Mitchell con-
dellll!l.ed the Republican party for its years of' empty promises .. The Negro, 
claimed Mitchell, was now "p0litically emancipated" from the party that 
for years had taken them for granted.?9 Mitchell believed the Presi-
dent shared his opinion on the racial issu.e that "we are approaching the 
day when these things will be settled and's,ttled righto 080 "Mr .. RGose-
velt," according toJ!itchell, 'has appointed more Negroes to responsible 
government positions than the last three Republican administrations taken 
togetheron81 These statements definitely added to the Democratic Negro 
campaign. 
The.Democrats also included the bl,ck man in the n0mi~ting Presi-
dential convention .. The Reverend ~rshall Shepard of' Pennsylvania,, a 
Negro, gave the invocation at one session, and Congressman Mitchell 
seconded Roosevelt's nomi:nation .. 62 This ,egro participation prompted 
· SenatQr ''Cotten Ed" Smith of South Carolina tG walk out of the conven-
tiono The 1936 convention also recognized and seat,d some Negro dele-
gates, though their ree&ption by Southern representatives was somewhat 
coolo83 Tb.is, however, differed f'rom the 1928 Heu$tGn convention, where 
Negre alternates had been separated f'r0m the oth~r members of the · 
?9New Im. Times, April 23, 1936, 2:5. 
80 · Ibido 
Bl Ibid. 
82-wa.rd, "Wooing. the Negro Vote, 0 119. 
83Ibid.,; High, "Black Omens," 14, 86., 
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convention by chicken wireo 84 
The Republicans tried a new approach for the Negro ballot since 
they were trying to regain the black man's support&8.5 The Republicans 
ignored Landon's stand for the anti-lynching bill and capitalized on 
Roosevelt's "silence on racial and eivil liberties issues" and his fail-
u.re to pressure a Democratic Congress te pass the Wagner-Costigan anti-
lynehing bilL 86 These two points were the main advantages of Republi-
eanso The party also criticized Roosevelt's fa.ilure to eradicate dis= 
eriminatio:n that had occurred in New Deal programs¢ In the Republican 
campaign, the Colored Womanhood of New York State Republicans adopted 
resolutions condemning Roosevelt for the discrimination that had oe-
curred under the W.P.A. and in the execution of the Social Security 
Aeto 87 The Seeial Security Act was especially susceptible because it 
excluded agricultural, domestic, and "casual" workers from bene:tits under 
its old age security provisions .. This element of labor constituted a 
majority of the Negro working force, and ov~r 70 percent of the W<!>men of 
this organization were included., 88 
At a state confel"ence of Negro Republicans in New York the charges 
were reiteratedj as the administration wa.s accused alse of discrimination 
a.grlnst d<,mestic and agricm.ltural W(!)l"kers under the A.AoA. and the N.,RoAo 
It was also claimed that Negro homes were blacklisted from receiving 
85Moon, "Negro Vote in a Close Election," 7:8o 
86ward, "Wooing the Negro Vote," 119., 
87New York Times, October 11, 1936, 40:2. -----
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mortgage relief from the Home Owners Loan and Mortgage Corporationo89 
To publicize their charges against the admil!listration's programs and 
leaders to the Negro masses, the Republicans issued pamphletse One at... 
ta.eked Senator Joe To ("Terror" to~ Crisis) Robin.son of Arkansas, 
claiming he had not attempted to help the sharecropper of the South., 
The AoAoAo cotton program, claimed the pamphlet, had f0rced the Southern 
Negro into a more binding economic slavery.90 
Landon appealed to Negro voters by publicly declaring his desire 
for a federal anti-lynching billo9l One phase cf Landon's campaigning 
was sending messages to meetings such as the one for Negr0 leaders held 
in Chicago in Septembere This message stressed the nominee~s promise to 
practice equal rights when elected President. Yet these oommu.nieations 
were vague and almost unfailingly lacked specific promises to the black 
man.,92 
The Democrats of 1936 still lacked int~rnal harmony., Although Ickes 
once stated that the Roosevelt administration had not tried to desegre-
gate the South, many Southerners did not agreee93 The platform remained 
silent on the race issue although ~gro delfgates were present. It was 
also noted that "the President had not made any direct public appeal for 
the Negro voteGn94 And as late as 1938 Jim Farley denied trying to 
89 6 6 Ibid.,, April 19, 193, :2~ 
90Ibid0 
9libido, September 3, 1936, 10:6., The pamphlet claimed that the 
"TH in Senator R0binson@s name stood fer Terrore 
9'.3Ickes, ~ Secret Diary !!, Harold ~ .. Ickes, ll5. 
9~oen, ••Negro Vote in a Close Election," 7:j. 
inf'l.uenoe a Mississippi Demeeratic Senator by letter te bring Negroes 
into the state party, saying "No, I never wr0te such a tool letter.u95 
Thus the Southern influe:nce, tho,;a.g:b. dented, was :not br0ken. 
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Earlier in 1936 the Seuth'~ reaen.tment toward Roosevelt and his New 
Deal had been expressed at a grassroots Democratic convention of'. abeut 
3,500 representatives from seventeen SRthern states ~t Macon, Georgia.96 
The delegates claimed F.D.Re•s programs were •subversive to the interests 
of the free white VGte:rs of' the South."97 These representatives be ... 
lieved Conmm.nists were imposing collectivist programs on America and 
wanted them drlven from Washington., The programs also made the.states 
financially dependent on .the federal gover~ente The New Deal, in their 
opinion, was also wasteful since some people starved while the farmers 
destreyed crops and livestock.to meet the'.A,.Ao.A.. redaction require ... 
ments;9s · 
Yet Roosevelt had issued no political eemmitments on race issues 
cbiring the campaign., A Presidenti~ statement revealing·this.fact was 
the messa~e·that opened the new .Agrieu.ltural. Building at To.skegee Insti-
tute. This address claimed the ~ccess ot Southern agriettlture, in large 
part, depended apen its Negr0 farmers and cQDlll1ended the .Seuth for ereot.. 
ing the stl"lletare .. 99 Roosevelt •lso stat,d ke considered himself an 
95 Editorial, "Mr .. Farley ~nies," Crisis, XLV (Se-ptember, 1938), 
96New I!!:!,. Times, J.anary :,o, 1936, 1:1 .. 
97Ibid~ 
98ibid.,, J~l'J.'IUll'iJ" '.30; 1936, 8:2. 
99sam.el I., Rese:nman, ed., , .l.!!!, Pa.blie Papers !.!,g, Addresses .!!. 
Franklin!!• Roosevelt, IV (New York: Random House, 19'.38), 500~ 
"adopted citizen of the.Sou.th, and that as such he had faith in Tuske-
gee0-nlOO The message or empathy with the Negr~ llepe in the South, 
needless te say, was not a P-tli't;ieal pledge. 
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In a letter i:h December or the same year commemorating the Emanci-
pation Preelamation, Roosevelt stated that "we are pro!Oll:ndly impressed 
by the steady pregress which the Ne~ro race has made since January l, 
1863o"lOl This type of address was typical of th0se :made te Negroes by 
politicians during this era, and Roosevelt was no exception. F .. D.Re 
managed for twelve years to remain remarkably nen..eomittal, yet politi-
cally unscathed, using the~e same tactics .. Thus it is di:f:fieult to dis-
cover Reosevelt's personal views, and c0nclusions must be relative and 
based on statements by- his family, coworkers, and contemporaries .. F.D.Ra 
appears to have been incredibly ol0se-mouthed in th.is area., 
Despite the eonfiiets that arose du.ring the 19:36 campaign, the 
Southern Democrats did not bolt the party, 'but the incidents predicted 
dissention for future eleetiomso The Snth r(;)tained strong influence, 
and Roosevelt, being a wise politician, continued to consider this fact 
during campaigns and when :making policies., This appreaoh enabled him to 
maintain Southern support while not losing Negro blecs. T0 the l\Tegra. 
the Demecratic Party would remain a Southern party, bat Roesevelt's re-
lief and reform had won their voteo 
It was estimated that Negroes could de.te?'llline the electoral votes 
in several impol"tant states in the 1936 election as previously discussed. 
In the election returns more than 700,000 or the potential 1,.500,000 
black votes in these states W9Uld shift fN»m the Republican to the 
lOOibido 
lOlibido , 507 o 
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Democratic Party in 19'.36. In 19~2 the :margin~ of victory and defeat 
were so narrow that a solid ~gro bl0c could laave detel"Dli:n.ed the returns 
ot tllese stateso Al.tb.GUgh the election of 19'.36 proved t0 be an over-
whelming victory fer R0osevelt, the .~ocrats e@U].d not be Sllre of this 
beforeha.ndo Therefore the nwneriea.1 value of the Negro ba.ll0t was not 
as i:nfiuentia.1 as it m.iglat have been, bu.t the Demeorats regarded the 
.continued allegiance of the Negro.tel> their party as high on their in-
ventory of' gains from.the _elE1,tion.102 
):•· The 1940 Election 
_By- 1940 many expected that the Negro would return to the Republican 
Party in that year's election .. .As one Negro leadel" stated, "Oar people 
are growing sour on the New Dea1., It's an everla.stin' betheratio:n. and 
it gets u.s nowb.ere .. -.l.0'.3 Negro dissa:tisfaetion was blamed on the Demo-
era ts• failure to eria.se disG:rim.ina ti0n eecurril'.lg under .. New· .Deal pr0-
grams, and W alleviate viol,tions ··.0f' Negro constitutienal .rights~ · PJ:,o;.. 
grams .. heavily ori ticized were the S0eia.l ~ecuri ty Act, the F .. H.A. , the 
U'_ .. S.,H .. A .. , a.nd the T.V.,AG104 The latter three had not eliminated segre-
g.ation on federal wrk projects., The ,A.~4,.A.,, which had taken seme 
15,000,000 a.ores out of cott0n preduction, al.so hurt th.e Negre farmer, 
b~th in income a.nd loss of employment.,105 The recession in 1938 had 
shaken. co:nf'idenlfle in Roosevelt's New Deal, and the Negro was a part·ef 
102High, "Black. Omens," 14, 86., 
103tawrenoe Sullivan, "The Negro Vote," The Atlantic Monthly, LIX 
(October, 1940), 480., 
lOb...... • -T.rt>id~ ' 481 .. 
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the "general tide against the eeol'lomie merry ... go ... round ot New Dealism ... 106 
The N~gro supposedly now believed that relier was just a "palliative," 
and that voting ror those who gave out the relief was merely endorsing 
a "new form a:r enslavementenl07 This attitude implied that the.Negro 
was becoming politically vulnerable, and Repablicans believed the Negro 
would reaffiliate with tneir party.168 
.Another Republican. asset was the de.teat of the Democrats' attempt 
to pass·the third ant:1:..1ynohing bill in five.years, and te win the right 
to vote for the Negro in the Seth, and to eliminate white primaries. 
To the Negro Roosevelt's record was doubly tainted since the President 
had net endorsed the anti-lynching 'bill and Swthern Democrats still· 
wielded too much power. Despite Negro leaders' sympathy with Roosevelt 
because of problems with Southern Sena.tors," they still claimed that the 
President "has said not a mwnbling word" on the bill, even when public 
opinion appeared to su.pport it.109 
Roosevelt 11 s problems w.tth the DemGoratic Party and theiational. 
Convention were expressed in a letter he wr0te Sena.tor GeQrge Norris in. 
which he cl.aimed th.at the nold line conservative element" .. had "obtained 
.a :mu.eh larger share in the control or the temporary organization of.the. 
Convention tb.anit had a.:r:w right to have.from tb.e point ef view of 
public sentiment." R41>osevelt·alSio elrl•d th.at a "Hater's Clum" had 
been added to the oonsel"Vative camp which ineludecl suoh ~'strange bed-
fellows like Wheeler and ~Carran and Tydings and, C:rlas·s and J 0hn J. 
l06Ibid .. 
107Ibid~ , 482~ 
l08Ibid.,, 479. 
l09Edi torial, "Roosevelt' s Opportul'li ty, :•• .. '.369 ~ 
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0' Connor and some of the wild Irishmen from Boston, et cetera,li" The po-
litieal recession of 1938 haunted Roos~velt as he sta.ted that these con... 
servatives "were greatly heartened by, the 1938 elections and thought 
that this would give them a fighting cha.nee to put the control of' the 
. I 
Democratic Party back where it was in 1922, 1924, and 1928·: 11110 Since 
the conservatives were defeated overwhelmingly on the third-term issue 
they attempted to embarrass Roosevelt on the Vice Presidential nomina-
tion:11lll 
As Roosevelt claimed, 
On the nomination of Wallace they made their final stand.· 
They were sure to be beaten, even by a fairly small margin, 
but their stupidity in maki:ng a violent issue out of Wallace 
will eost the ticket a great many votes this Autumn; 
Wallace is a true liberal--far more so than any of the 
others suggested for.vice President with the possible excep-
tion of Bill Douglaj1who would have been harder to get nomi-
nated than Wallace·t 2 
,M.a:r.w,~outherb Democrats advocated the nomination of South Carolina's 
Senator James Byrnes for Vice Presidentii· Byrnes had helped insure pas-
sage ef New Deal legislation by opposing measures affecting Negros such 
as the a.nti=l-yncbing bilb113 But Walter White, Secretary of the 
NQA0A@C0P0, stated that if the Democrats nominated a Southerner for this 
position, they *'eould kiss the Negro vote good-bye,,nll4 It is possible 
that this opposition of the Negroes to Byrnes's nomination and an 
llOTugwell, Demoe?'atic Roosevelt, 47611 In the general election of 
1938, the House Republicans had increased their seats :Crom 88 to 170r 
This is a good illustration of FQDQR. •s increased Congressiona1 problems·; 
lllElliott Roosevelt, edi·, f.o~Qfi. .. , ~ Personal Letters, 1048·:i 
ll2Ibid~, Chapter 22 of Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, substantiates 
this·~ 
113Whi te, ! ~ Called White, 246 •. 
ll4:rbida , 268.,· 
appreciation of' the Northern voting strength helped Byrnes decide to 
withdraw his candida.ncy.,··ll5 
The Democrats' best weapon was F.D.Ro'S oontim:i.ed interest in the 
Negro as exemplified by his statement that there would be nG forgotten 
races in his administr1;1tionoll6 One Negre summarized his support for 
FoDoRo by stating, 19 No influences can get it away, our people believs 
implicitly in the President and his policies and he has done much for 
u.sot«ll7 F.DoRo 6 s ambiguity had many interpretations, but :'l.t wa.s success= 
ful~ for the Negro did remain with the Pr~sid~nt 11 s partyo 
The Democratsi 1940 campdgn for the Negro vote repeated 1936 tac-
tics except that the Negroes now made bolder demands of their adopted 
pa.rtyo The black man now insisted that the rights of the Northern Negr(:) 
be extended to his Southern brotherol18 When the Democrats p!"epared 
their platform. NegrlCll lea.ders Walter White and Henry Johnson proposed the 
black man°s plankso The proposals called for the end of discrimination 
in the armed forces, endorsed the Wagner=Van Nuys=Gavagan Anti-Lynching 
Bill 9 demanded that poll taxes be aboli~hedj and would outlaw discrimi= 
nation aga.inst the Negro worker :in industry o 119 The Negroes, however, 
won only a generalized endorsement in the final platform: 
Our Negro eitizens have participated actively in the eco ... 
nomi~ and so~ial advances launched by this administration 
in~luding fair· labor standardso" o ~ We have aided more 
than half' a million Negro youth in vocational.training, 
115Ibid0 
ll691Negroes Swing," l.5o 
117New York Times, October 11, 1940, 26g4o -~ 
118Ibido 9 Februa.ry 13, 1940, 1:8., 
ll9Ibido 9 July 14,, 1940, U8., 
education, and employment ••• o We shall continue to strive 
for complete legislative safeguards against the discrimi~ 
nation in government services and benefits, a.nd in the 
national defense forceso We pledge to uphold the process 
and equal protection of the law for every citizen regard~ 
less of :race, creed, or eolor.120 · 
Although it wa.s the Democrats• most extensive race plank to date, the 
Negro~ s specific demands were igriored" Southern Democrats ha.d in-
fluenced the platform statementso 
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The Republican candidate in 1940 was Wendell Wlllkie, whose poli ti-
ea.1 phil0sophy was in many ways similar.to F.D.R. 0 s. In fact~ Willkie 
was the only potential Republican opponent whom Re~s~velt really re-
speeted"l21 Willkie was as non~committal as F.D.R. regarding the Negro 
issuej although the Republican gained some support by stating tha.t any-
one working in his campaign who discriminated aga.inst Negroes would be 
asked to cease his active campa.igning~ But one statement had a reverse 
effect., Willkie had claimed that the tradition of' voting Democratic in 
the South was different because it wa.s necess~ry; ordinarily it was not 
wise to adhere strictly to the party lines The Negroes, however, be-
lieved the purpose of tradi ti~n~l Democr~tic voting by the Southern 
whites was to keep the usually R.~publican. Nt;,gro out of'· Southern poli-
tics.122 Since Southern Democrats continually denied the black man the 
right to vote~ ·the Negreil believ~d that supporting the party only rein-
Ralph Bunche!) Negro sta.tesm,n, assisted the 1940 R$publican campaign 
by surveying Negro voting trends. Bunche's survey contradicted George 
120ib1dot July 18, 1940, 14:7; ibido, September 17, 1940, 25:60 
l21James Roosevelt, .Affeetio:na.tel:r [. .. Q.)! .. 9 324; Editorial, "The 
'Willkie Speeches," Crisis, XLVII ·. ( October 9 1940) , llo 
122EditQrial, "The Willkie Speeches," Crisis, XLVII (October, 1940), 
lL 
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Gallup's by predicting that the NegrG would return to the Republicans, 
because the administration had not givem the Negre premised federal em-
ploymento Negroes appointed to gGVernment pe~itiens, Bttnehe believed, 
(_ ' I 
were "front line• onl.yal23 Bllnche 9 s poll also claimed that FaDaRo's 
failure to su.ppC:>rt the anti-1:ynohing bill had disillusioned Negro sup., 
porters .. 124 One. Negro leader th, Republica~s failed to win was Walter 
., 
White, who was courted by Republ~ean manufacturers. The effect of the 
Southern wing on the Democratic .'party did not alter White's confidence 
in Roosevelt's sincerity and belief in the coimnon ma.no White was ap,-
prehensive of "M:r.,.Willkie or any Gther candidate who could obtain the 
nomination of a party so eommitt,d to the;i:n.te;irest of big business ... 125 
The Republicans ~lso appealed to the Negro in their platform: 
. . . I 
The Negro is to be given a square deal in the economic and 
political life or the nation., Discrimination in the civil 
service, the army and Navy •nd all C1>ther branches of 
government must oeaseose universal suffri!l,ge must be made 
effective for the.Negre eitizense Mob.viole;\'lee shocks ·the 
conscience of the nation ~nd le~islation to curb this 
evil sheuld be enaotedal2 • 
The Republican platform must be eon~idered more representative of the 
Negre 11 s demands than that of the De:meerats, but both were disappeinting 
to Negr0 leadersQ The black man eould eith,r vote for the Republican 
party which he felt had never dene a;n;rthi:ng.for the Negro, e>r for the 
Democratic pal"ty W'hose Southern wing was determined that the Negro would 
not attain equality., The Republicans said little for the N~gro, while 
123"Neg""o· es ~..2 .,. 15 
"" ,.;JW.1.:ng t " 
124rbid., 
12.5white, ! ~ Called 1White, 198~199; New York Times, June 30, 
1940, 2lf3e · • - -
126!!,1! ~ Times, October 12, 1940, l:2e 
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the Democrats said nothingo 
Three events occurred in th, 1940 campaign f0r the Negro vote that 
distinguish that election from the two pr,viouse First was an attempt 
to areuse racial prejudice regarding WenQell Willkie@s German aneest:ryo 
Secondly, the Negro was vocal concerning segregation in the armed for-
ceso Finally9 Roosevelt9 s press secretary, St~phen Early, kicked a Ne-
gre policeman at a railway station immedi~tely,preeeding the electiono 
On Oeteber 12, 1940, the New l!rk Times revealed the existenoe of a 
pamphlet issued by the Demoera tic National Committee which ei ted Will-
kie 8 s Germ.an ancestry and attempted to equate his pcilltieal career to 
that of Hitlero The article also blamed the racist attitude in Willkie~s 
hometown, Elwood, Indiana, on.his "German" father., The statements in ... 
:f"u:riated the Republicans, ancl .Willk:i;.e blast~d it as a "whisper eam-
prlgno ,9127 As the Demoora ts were bombarded with unfav111rable publicity, 
Edward Flynn!I National Democratic Chairman, attempted te repudiate the 
pamphleto Flynn first claimed he had not seen the article, but later 
admitted knewledge of its distributi0no As a rebuttal, Flynn attacked 
l 
the~~ Times, cl~iming that it had di~torted news stories about 
Roosevelt in deferenee to bi~ bu,in~ss interestsol28 The Times defended 
its pQsition by ~laiming that th~ Willlde smear was a page one story be-
eause it attacked the man persona.llyo Most articles, claimed the paper, 
did :tullt defame Roosevelt in the sa.me manner. The Times then published 
a statement that the Wlllkie pamphlet had been stelen from the Democrats' 
Olffice and uno.fficia.lJ.y releasedo 129 
127IbidQ, Oet0ber 17, 1914-0, 21:2; October 19, 1940, 25:1. 
l28Ibid.' October. 17, 1940, 21:20 
129Ibido, October 1.5, 1940, 14:3; Oeteber 19, 1940, 25:lo 
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By October 19 the culprit was exposed as Charles Ray, a Tamm.any 
werkero Both parties condemned the low c~paign tactic, especially the 
Rep11blica.nse Francis Rivers,· director of the Colored Division of the 
Repl.11.blican National Committee, believed using the Negro and the race is-
sue in this manner was an "insult to the Negro race," and the Republicans 
quickly noted that "the President himself had ma.de no attempt to condemn 
such taeties."130 This is yet anether example of Roosevelt's remaining 
aloo:f' from party. organiia.tional polities, especially when it involved the 
controversial race issue. 
By 1940 America's curtain or neutr$.lity could not hide the na.tion°s 
gradual military invelvement in the EurC!)pE;ian eonfllcte · Congress now 
passed the first peace-time draft law, which included Sena.tor Wagner's 
amendment that Negroes would have equal rights f'Gr enlistment. Southern 
statesmen protested, stating that this clause was unneoessa:ryol3l Pre-
vious to the billfls passage, the Negro 11 s role in the arzned forces had 
been limi. ted mainly to menial positions behind the lines. With the 
intredti.etion or the Burke=Wadsworth bill, N,gre leaders sought assurance 
or non,.,disorlmination., The Negro. believed the leaders, should have the 
opportunity t@l train in all "phases or combat servioe".aeoording to their 
proportion of the poptll~tionQ132 Despite the draft law, however, some 
segregation practices remained, a faot whioh made the Negro impatient 
and orltieal .. On 0:ne speaking tour Mrs .. Roosevelt was asked how the 
l30IbidQ 
l'.31see Appendix A, page 126, which ... gives the sections er the eon... 
soription act as presented in the statutes.!! Large that most concerned 
the Negro., · · 
132Editoria.1, "Conscription Bill Gets Amendments on Jim Crew," 
Crisist XLVII (October, 1940), 324; _!!J! ~ Times, August.4, 1940, .5:3;. 
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Negro could remain loyal it the teroes ~re net integratedo The pree 
oarlhs political pe.sition 0f the First Lady was revealed by her state-
ment that. the "danger er disorders" or immediate i:n.t,egration would be 
worse than segregation itself., As tar as ley.alty was concerned, M!os. 
Roosevelt stated that it was difficult to expl~in, but Negrees did have 
it.0133 The Neg~0 wanted promises that :Wegrol!)s ww.ld really be treated 
equally with the whites umder the Bllrke-Wadswerth Act .. 
As the election date approached, it became ne~essary rer Roosevelt 
to make a persona.1 s'Ultement clarifying his position concerning the Ne-
gro in the armed f'eroes .. Otherwise the Negro vete might be lost. One 
of the few Negro commissioned officers, Colon~l B .. O .. Davis, was ape., 
pointed by F .. DQR., as the first member of his race to become a Brigadier 
Genera.1 .. 134 Roosevelt alse su.pperted the non...,disorindnation ola.use c,:f 
the cons~'.k"iption law by stating, "The pl~n as I understand it ... o is that 
Negroes will be put into all branehe.s of th, service, cemba.tant as well 
as supply.,.,.,., Negroes.will be given the same opportunity to qu.alify tor 
of:fieeres o~mmissions as will be given to others •• o. You may.rest as-
5'~l"$d that furth.er developments or p0lioy will be ferthcomi:mg to insure 
that Negr@es are given fair treatment on a nondi~eriminatory basis.ul:35 
F .. D.R., th.en directed Secretary or War Henry L .• · Stimson to place Ne ... 
groes in variotts units according te their proportio~ ef the population. 
The blae2kma.n was not to be restrioted to "labor regiments.ttl'.36 To 
l3'.3Ibid., Oet~ber 26, 1940, 4:5 .. 
134J:ekes ~ ·~ Seo;et D1a17 !! HarGld ~°' !ekes p J2'.3o 
1J5Ibido · 
l'.36New Im Times, OotGber 30, 1940, 16:6; Ickes, .I!!!. Secret Diary 
,!!. Harold ~<? Iok~, '.36lm 3620 
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smooth the road or armed forces ~ntegration, and incidentally ease re-
lations between the Negro civil rights agitators and the administration, 
F.,DaRo then appointed Major Campbell C., Johnson as the Negro assistant 
to the Selective Service Direotor-:i' A practical poll ti.cal gesture, this 
aet could also have been motivated by F~D.R.•s desire to see the Negro 
treated justly·,, This incident repre~ented a :milestone tor Roosevelt, 
since tor the first time the President publicly committed himself on a 
racial is1;1ue"t 
In the.third issue or 1940 Roosevelt remained detached because it 
again invelved organizational polities,,, As F .. D .. R. •s train prepared to 
leave a New York.speaking engagement in the closing days of the cam-
paign, the pressing crowd force~ his campaign :party to become separatedt 
Stephen Early, Roosevelt's press secretary, was one of the laggards;, 
When halted in his attempt to board the train by two or three policemen 
who d:i.d not realize that Early was a member et the o£.fioia1 party, Early 
"gave the knee" to a Negro policeman named Sloan who had blocked his 
RY!' The Republicans wasted little time in exploi ti:ng the racial impli-
ea tions as they published many detailed discussions or the injured po-
liceman which were accompanied by descriptions of·. Early's vicious cal-
lousnessa The Republican~ then sent Joe Leuis to visit the wronged 
polieema- "The visit was arranged w:1. th. · tull publiei ty, " according to 
the!!!~ Tim.es, but tae purpose was defeated ·when Sloan told ·Louis 
that he WGUld still support Rc,osevelt in the ~lecticm,.137 Policeman 
Sl~a.n then issued a. statement that he did not like being a "political 
f'~Gtballo, 11 The Republicans now questioned whether Sloan's statement was 
issued volunta.rily11l'.38 
l37New York Times, October 30 .. 1940, 16:6·,, ---- ~ 
138rud:,, 
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Walter White used the incid~nt for the Negro when the ~mocrats at-
tempted to mitigate the event~ When consulted by party leaders, TrJhite 
stated that either Early could apologize or the President could fire 
bimol39 White then demanded that discrimin,ti~n in the armed f0rces and 
industry be ended, and immediately Judge William Hastie was appointed as 
Civilian Aide to the Secretary of Waro It also was at this time that 
Davis received his appointment a~ Brigadier General and Johnson was ap.., 
pointed as a Special Aide to the Director of Selective Serviceol40 It 
appeared that White was successful in applying pressureo Again, the de-
gree Gf involvement by Roosevelt was obscur~~ Whether the appointments 
reflected pelitical expediency or the Presidentws civil rights attitude 
could not be determinede 
The Republicans had obtained maximun:t publicity for these events in 
their attempt to regain the Negro vote 9 and they had been encouraged by 
the recessi®n Qf Negr® support for Pemecra.ts in the 1938 Congressional 
eleeition, when Republican victories in the key states of Pennsylvania 
and Ohio showed Negro votes were a deciding faetoro Also in Cleveland 
in 1938 Republican Negroes won two alderman positions and a membership 
on the Board ef Educationo141 The ~epubliean efforts, however, were fu~ 
tile, for the Negro tended to remain Democratieo Although the Negro 
vote was sought more intensely by both parties in the 1930's than it had 
been previously,, it was questionable whether the black man's vote was 
the deC1isi ve factor in determining the elect:ii0n resu.1 ts of any single 
stateo The strength of the Negro vote lay in the possibility that he 
139Wh.itej !H!! Called White, 1880 
140Ibid,, 
141Su.llivan9 "Negro Vote," 48le 
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might determine the results or several pivotal states, such as Pennsyl-
·, 
vania, which had 3'.30,000 Negro voters i~ 1940, and minois, which had 
475,000., 142 Their poll ti;al po~r ._s increased by their concentration., 
The vote of the Negro was not really a ~tos~-up" in 1940., The black 
man was supposedly disillusioned with the discrimination that had oc-
curred in New Deal programs. Irritation ha~ been increased by the vo-
cational rehabilitation pro~ra.m~o Although they were not a major part 
or the New Deal, they had assiste,d only 273 Ne~roes in seventeen states 
-that had 3lo5 percent N~groes in their po:pulation. Further, regarding 
farm tenancy, there was not one Negro on a.ny- Southern state er·county 
Advisory Board, which had the power to curb dis~rl.mination.143 Yet these 
programs remained :in.ore beneficiu to the Negro than those enacted under 
previous administrations .. Thus the vote of 1940 patterned itself after 
these of 19'.32 and 1936, ·and the Negro again aligned hims~lf' with the 
Democra tie Party .. 
Politically the l9309 s were a period of inciJ>ient development .for 
the Negro., The political changes for the black man were profound when 
compared to his advance~ sime EiJtaneipation .. Among these changes was 
the recogl'dtion by Democrats and Republican, of' the polit:leal existence 
of the Ne~roo This reeegniticn, of course, was enf'orced by the .physical 
oomentratie.»n Gf the Jeg:ro vote., Each political p~ty, however, eem-
bated preju.diee within the party and froJD. the :p11blic when it sought the 
142New Yo;k Times, June 23, 1941-h;, 18:5; Sullivan, "Negro Vete," 
478 .. 
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Negro's supporta Politicians entered the unfamiliar realm of wooing the 
Negro vote uneasily. 
As parties became aware or the Negro, the black man became cognizant 
or his ballot powers., 4,s a politiea1 neophyte, the Negro was exploited 
by the parties until he gained experienceo The utilization et bis votes 
increased with each election during this era. A.lthough,tl:>.e New Deal and 
the Depression in:fl.uenced the Negro's alliance with the Democratic Party, 
bis leaders sought an independent political identity. After 19'.32 the 
Negre abandoned.the Rep12blicans for the Democrats. In every election 
thereafter the Democrats solidified the black man's S11pport11 but beth 
parties became n,.ore @penly ccm.petitive r,r the "black ballot." By 1940 
the Negro was accepted as a part of the Democratic Party, but the black 
i 
:i:nan"s leaders were learning how to use the party competition for his 
votes te the advantage of his race. The pell tical evolution of the Negro 
in the 19'.30"s contained the seeds of the militant civil rights politics . . 
or the 19609 s .. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LYNCHING ISSUE 
Thl"ot:1.gh legal J)l:"Oeesses the Negro fought for civil rignts cm.ring 
Franklin Roosevelt's administrationo Several successfully conducted ju-
dicial battles in this era established much of the suecesstul pattern 0£ 
winning civil ri~hts of the 1950~s a:n.d 1960's, but legislatively the Ne-
gro failed to be in:tlue:n.tialo Control o:t committees and .the use of' the 
filibuster multiplied the powers of' the Sout~rn Sena.ters and Represent... 
ta.tives and overwhelmed advocates of racial equality. The issue which 
best illustrates these factors is the anti-ly:n.ohing questiont which was 
prominent in nearly every Congressio~ session during the 193o•s. 
The signt:ticamoe ef the lynching issue was not legislative but 
emotio:ul., This crime was the focal point :for the N ..A.A.C.P., battles 
tor the Negro during the decade., In tacit the ergam.zation was criti-
cized for neglecting other important approaches to imtegratio~ :tor the 
lynching issueo But the issue to the N.A.A.C.P., was a symbol of the 
inequalities imposed upon the Negro race thrn,hou.t the country .. l Even 
l'.a!, Crisis admitted the fight ever the amti-ly:n.chimg bill was more im-
portant than the measure itself. To the Negro the proposed legislation 
represented an important step toward reaehing full citizenship, and the 
black ma.n9s talents and resources were directed toward. a cause that 
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became a erusade. 2 Preoccupation with this issue, however, made it 
difficult for the Negro to understand why Roosevelt did not act immedi-
ately to end this injustice. The black :man had sacrificed long-range 
perspective for a C'G.rrent concern of his no.nority group .. 3 
N.AoA.C.P. efforts to have Congress pass the anti-ly:nehing bill 
reaped e:nl;y intangible rewards. Anger, urdt;y, pu.blioity, and a greater 
determination to tight res"lll.ted • .As l'.h!. Crisis editorial .at the end of 
a 47-da;y filibuster tut had killed the 1938 anti-lynching bill stated: 
·~We Lose, Bu.t We Win .. " The Snthern Senators• acceptance of lynching 
for maintaining a "way of life," together with their distorted eoncep.,, 
4 tien of democracy, aad been exposed .. 
.Although anti-lynching bills wel"e historically associated with the 
Negro, the crime really became a national issue in the 1930's when two 
whites were hanged by a mob in San Jose, California, for a confessed 
lddnapping ... rnurder charge,. Following this demenstration of violence, 
lynching retained a :positien or public controversy for the decade., The 
complexities of the issue consistently :placed Roosevelt in an. tu1tenable 
:positiono Although F.,D .. R .. 's lack ef eollllllitment denoted weakness to some, 
te 0thers it demonstrated the superiority of his political :ma.neuverings. 
Neu.trality was perhaps the politician's most difficult position, tor 
many interest groups pressured Roosevelt to exer~ the intl.uen.oe of his 
of:tiee in behalf of the Negroo Tile President generall;y succeeded in 
2"From the Press ot the Nation," Crisis XIV (Feb:raar;y, 1938), 49. 
3see A.ppenQix B, page 128. This p~esents statistics en the n.mber 
of' lynchings in the United states over a: period of years. These statis-
tics were presented in the Co;egressional Record. The increase or lynch-
ings in the earl;y l930's that caused so mch concern in the N ..A .. A.C.P. 
is adequatel;y representea. 
4Edit~al, "We Lose, Bat We Win," "From the Press of tb.e Nation," 
Crisis, :xLV (March, 1938) .. 
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retaining their su.pport, while never committing himself, which was no 
easy task, especially as the veheme~ce of the debate intensified over 
the bills of 19:35, 19'.38, and 1940. For Congressmen, however, the issue 
was sa.fero Assuming that the bill could never become law over the 
South's entrenched opposition, legislators coud take an advanoed po-
sition on the bills without having to sacrifice the endorsement of the 
electorate .. 
The anti-lynching crusade was initiated near the end of Roosevelt's 
first year in office as a· ren.lt of the San Jose incident after the 
lynch mob had been pa.blicly condoned by Califernia Governor ~am.es Rolph, 
Jr .. The national news media exploded, with Rolph vigoroasly condemned 
by the !!!!I!t!s. Timeso.5 Pplitiealgroups s•c:h as the Socialist Party 
pressed Roosevelt to make a "pu.blic appeal against lawlessness am mob 
lynching i:n. an ef'f'ort to stem the 'lynehi:mg wave.'"6 Roeseve1t respended 
with one of the two public statements h.e would make eQncerm.ng lynching 
'' 
during the 19:30's., The President's nationall.y broadcast speech was 
prcmpted not by racial matters but by the approval of the ir.iolentdis-
ru.ption ct law and order by au.eh an imp,rtant official as a state 
governor., 7 In this, his most eJq>lieit statement made during the decade, 
F.,DoR., said: 
This new generation, for example, is not content with 
preachings against that vile form er collective nmrder ... 
lynch law - which has broke:n n.t in our midst anew. We 
know that it is mrder am a deliberate and definite 
disobedie:nee of the CO!lllDilmdmettt 9Thft shµt net kill.' 
5Geerge Copeland, "LynC11hi:ng Is Again a Natiomal Issue," ~ ~ 
Times, December '.3, 19'.33, Pt., VIII, 2:1.. · 
j 
6New I2t! Times, December 1, 193'.3, 4:4 .. 
7Ibid.,, December 7, 193'.3, 1:8., 
We do not exouQe those in the high pla.ees or the low who 
condone lynch law. 
But a thinking America. goes furthero It seeks a 
government of' its own that will be sufficiently strong 
to protect the prisoner and at the same time to orystal.-
lize a public opinion so olear tha.t government of all 
kinds will be compelled to practice a more certain jus= 
ticeo The judicial function of' government is the pro-
tection or the individual a~d of' the community th.rough 
quick and certain justiceo · That function in many places 
has fallen into a sad state or disrep~ir. It must be 
part or our program to re-establish it .. 8 
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This statement wa.s followed by a rash of proposed anti~lynching 
la.ws.9 Roosevelt's speech also revealed the problem of unity within the 
Democratic Party, since the proposed anti-lynching bills, as racial is-
sues, became stumbling blocks to F.D.R.es legislative program. Thus 
from 1934 this was the chief execmtivew s main concern with the lynching 
isSlleo Although passage of the bill may have been important to the 
President personally, politically it would have split the Democratic 
Partyo Loss of the Southern bloc could have had disastrous consequences 
on Roosevelt's legislative and reelection eftortso 
The Democratic Party platform oontin~aJ.ly neglected even to mention 
anti-lynching billso Within Congress the party was faced with division 
threatsj as sectionalism severa1 t~es a.ppeareq to prevail over the na-
tional partyo More than once House and Sen.at~ ~m.oorat~ used the caucus 
to try to resolve the differences between Northern and Southern repre-
sentatives, oo.t the oauc:n:a.ses repeatedly fa.ilede, Northern supporters o:f 
the bill Gould never obtain the quol"W!l necessary to force the Senate to 
vote on the issue; while the Soutbern Democrats, aside from f'ilibllster;ing 
8New York Times, December 7, 1933, 283; White, ! ~ Called White, 
166; Edward P .. Costigan, "Open and Boastful Anarchy'," Crisis, XLV (March, 
1935), 77, 78; I!!!, Congressional Digest, XIV (June-July, 1935), 165., 
9see Appendix c, page l'.31., The text of the 1935 anti-lynching bill 
is repYoesenta.tive of the measures introduced against th.is crim- in the 
19309 so · · 
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against the bills, could never gain enough support to pass an adjourn... 
ment motion which would have termina;ted the debate on .the bill. lo Still 
other conservative Sena.tors who were generally oppesed to the increased 
po1ier of the federal govermment began to adyecate the passage of the 
bill to embarrass the President. To force Roosevelt to commit himself 
o:n the measure, many Senators believed, the President wou.ld lese the in... 
tense popuarlty that he enjoyed in the Democratic South, and this would 
~t the move toward centralizatiemo11 
The spo:nsors. as well as the chief eppone:nts or the anti ... ly'ru,hing 
measves were geod Democrats .. rhe ~viding ·point was geographical, be-
ing most evident in the Senate •. The mest·col'l.$istemt proponent was Robert 
Fo Wagner from Roosevelt's state of New York. A German immigrant and 
the produ.et et the rough-a.nd...twnble political ma.chine age; Wagner ear-.ed 
his position through par:ty service. Throughout his career he tended tt1> 
associate his intereste with the labor class and "underdog" causes. By 
the time R~osevelt captured nati0nal atte:nti0n as a Presidential candi-
date, Wagner had been. recegmzed as a power in the Sema.te .. Thus Roose-
velt had to@ respect Wagner's demands to g$.in his support tor the New 
.Deal., It was Wagner who i;n.trodueed or l:!ltrengly assisted N.I.RoA. and 
Gther important measures through Copgl"essGI Tbel"ef'(!)re, alth~:ugh Roose-
velt might :n~t .agree with.· Wagner on. seme }pills, he would rarely eppose 
them because he was :politieally dependent e• the Semater .. 12 
·'Wa.gneres motives for proposing an anti..,1.ynoh bill were probably' 
lONew ~ Times, May 22, 1936, 4:6; ibido, May 23, 1936, 2714. 
llDndo, November 15, 1937, 1:8 .. 
. ·-12u.,so Congress, Biogra.pbica1 Ji)ireetoty g!_ t~ Amerioan Congress, 
1774,..1961 (Washington, D .. c.: Government Print.i.ng 0£fiae, 1961), 1761 .. 
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only in pal"t idealistieo There was an increasingly large Negro element 
in New York, espe®ial.ly in Harlem, and Wagner wanted te insure the sup,., 
port of his constituents~ Also, the anti-lyn~hing bills were strongly 
endorsed by the C,,IoOo amd ieither labor organi~ati('»ns, and labor was the 
core of Wagner6 s political support., Not the lea.st of his considerations 
was that the intr~duction of the bill would probably help hold the Negro 
element to the Democl"atie Party nationallyol3 
Yet W'a.gner@s consistent support for the anti=lyn~hing cause was not 
as intense as that of @ne or his co=sponsors, Se:na.tpr Edward Costigan 
from Colei!"adoo Senat@r C@stigan was dese:dbed by the !!!: I!!:k .'I¥nes as 
a tena@ious bull-headed progressive, who when endorsing a cause became 
so obsessed with its righteo~sness that he often negle~ted to heed po= 
liti~.tl @©lnsequenoeso14 Not a man to compromise ©Jn his prinCliples, 
Costigan supported the anti=lynehing bill so th~roughly as t~ lead to 
the deU:iri©Jrati@ln of his health .. While under de~tor's orders to be in 
bed, C©Jstigan persisted in debating the bill and opposimg the filibus~ 
terol5 As a result, the Coloradoi Senat@r served only the one term in 
the Sena.te, being for~ed to retire for health reasons; he died shortly 
16 
ther>ea.f'tero Coistigan@s relationship te FoDoRo appears to have been no 
~l©Jser tha~ that of an average Senator© 
The opposition wa@ represemted by such renowmed S0uthern Senators 
&s Huey L«i»ng$ who t~ld R©>y Wilkins in a!! interview that he ciould not 
13Ibido, 17610 
l4New ~ Times, April 17, 1935si 22:5., 
l.5touis To Wright, "The 26th Year of the NQAeAoCQP$," Crisis, XLIII 
(August, 1936), 2440 
16uos$ Congress, Biographical Direetory: !!! ~ Amerioan C0ngress, 
1274ml961, 741, 934j 1748$ 
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support anti,..lynohing legislation, 'because it would ha~, not benefit, 
the Negro., Long's opposition was sig:rrl.:fioa:nt since he was at the zenith 
of his political influence in 1934 and 19350 Also opposed were Senators 
Pat Harrison et Mississippi and Ellison Smith of Sottth Carolina; they 
fought the bill as a threat to white civilization, Southern womallthood, 
and the llemoeratie Party9l7 Senators Carter Glass of Virginia, John H • 
. Bankhead of Alabama, Jesiah W., &.iley of N~rth Carolina, and Theodore 
Bilbo or Mississippi also irascibly rejected t~e anti-lynching remedy.,18 
A rebel Republican a:ntagolrl.stie tewrds the bill was Senator William E. 
Borah of Idaho, who claimed that tkis 'bill and most of the pre>grams of 
the admird.stra tion were unoonsti tuti@naL, In a st.a tement analyzing 
Borah.9 s hostility towards a:nti.,,lynohing bills, .1l!!, Crisis stated that 
"as usual h.e cloaked his opposition in veneration for the Constitu-
tiono019 At no period did these opposing the bill equal the number ot 
the protagonists, blli.t the political pressure of the former was superior 
because of their longer tenure and higher position .. 
In 1934 and 1935 Roosevelt himself brought the ].ynobing issue into 
the national spotlight, although he did not fully realize the political 
problems that wuld evolve .. In bis annual. message te Congress in Janu-
ary, 1935, the President included this statement: "Crimes @f organized 
banditry, eold ... blooded shooti!llg, lyn~hing, and lddn.apping have threatened 
1'7 
"Filibuster Continues on Antia.Lyneh Bill," Crisis, XLII (July, 
1935), 205; "The Fight Has Just Begun," Crisis, XLII (June, 1935), 1750 
18"From. the P.r>ess or the Nation," Crisis, XLV (March, 1938), '.38; 
ibid .. , (May, 1938), 147; "Filibuster Continues on Anti-Lynch Bill," 53, 
560 
l9Lous Lo Redding, "Borah•.., What Does He Stand Fer?" Crisis, XLIII 
(March, 1936), 70; "Filibuster Continues on Anti-Lynch Bill," 53, 56; 
Marian MeKenna,, Borah (Ann Arbor: Umversity er Michigan Press, 1961), 
325 .. 
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our seou.rityen20 The crimes, believed Roosevelt, ~alled for an immedi-
ate aroused public opiniom and for suppressiono 21 Again, in December, 
1935, Roosevelt, speaking at the Attorney General0s Crime C~nf'eremce, 
stressed the imp~rtaiwe of controlling interstate crime" U~til the 
pe0ple were aware ~r the national implications of their responsibility, 
proclaimed FGDoRo, then certain types ot orim~ might persista 22 The 
Crime Conference had been ealled partially in response to the anti-
lynching movement" 
Fu.rthemore A.ttc:>rney General Hom.er So Cummings had been heavily 
criticized for not p?>eventing the widely publieized Claude Neal lynching 
on Ocitober 28, 1934" On the previ~us day a !'!!: I2!k, Times news story 
claimed that a Negr0, Claude Neal.!i) who was being held in Georgia for 
nm.rderil'lg a wbite girl!il was goi:ng t@ be lynehedo The fellow.ing day Neal 
was taken fr®m jail and slaughtered across the b@rder in Floridao Pleas 
for the i:l'ff'okimg ~r the Lindbergh Kidnapping Law against the l~hers 
besieged the Attorney Generalijs of:fieee Alth@ugh the lynching incident 
was teehmeally an inters~te @irime, Cwmnil'lgs attempted to es~ape in.. 
V©llvem.ent, ela.iming the Lindbergh ~w e~uld not be applied unless it spe ... 
cifieally menti~ned l~hi.ll!llg .. Cllillmlings and tne executive ~ffice avoided 
2'.3 commitment in this manmer!il but we:t>e subjeeted to mu.eh eritieism .. 
20uos .. Congress, (Presidential message to joint sessi0n), 74th Con,.. 
gress, 1st Session, January9 1935, Congressional. Ree®rd, LXXXIX, 6023; 
"Congress C~nsiders the Ceistigan..Wagner Anti"'Lynchi:ng Bill," 165 .. 
21."C®ngress Considers the C~stigan..,Wagner Anti-Lynehi:ng Bill," 1650 
22New ~ Times~ Ja~uary l, 1935, 31~2; "Comgress Considers the 
Costigan= Wagneir Anti.,,Lynching Bill 11 " 165., · 
2'.3New York Times, OC1tGber 27, 1934, 32:2; ibido, Oeito'ber 28, 1934, 
li5; Ed!'tirlal, 11MCillbs Are R@u.gher Than W'@me:n, 11 Crisis, XLII (Jamiary, 
1935), 16; Edit~rial, "Still Unfinished," Crisis, XLIII (Ju.ne, 1936), 
177; U .. SQ Congress, Presidential message t~ joint sessien, 74th Congress, 
1st Session, January, 1935, Congressional ReC1ord, LXXIX, 60250 
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An example ~r public concern was th.e pretest fr~m the Writers League 
.Against ~J:dng, telegraphed to the P.resident in Janary, 19350 Citing 
the lynoh ll'Il:.l.rder or Jer~me Wilson or Lo~siana, the writers urged Roose~ 
velt to sup~rt the anti ... lynching bill t~ insure the federal gover:mri.ent~s 
ability to enforoe the la.wQ Su.c:h eminent au.thors as Stephen Vincent 
Benet§l Sin<!ll.air Lewis, Edna St., Vincent Millay, Upton Sinelair, Alfred 
Knopf', and Erskine Caldwell were am<!>:ng the 150 signerso24 
With this ba~kground, Congress in late !prll, 1935, began to eon.a. 
sider what was w be the 'bes't<,,kn~wn anti ... lynehing bill ~:t the era, the 
Wagner=Costigan Billo 25 Subsequent Congressi@nal ~onsideration of the 
lyxwbing issue ~d concern varlations ~n this billo Ir(l)ni.cally, 
lynchings in the later 1930'.s de~reased, partially as a result of the 
furor @ver this billQ But the problem had re~eived :tm:ll.~h attentiGn from 
NeAeAoC .. Po; thus bills c@n<:ierm.ng the isfte continued to be introduced 
latero26 
From Apl"il tbJ:o@ugh May!) 1935, the Senate debated the Wagner"'COlstiga:n. 
" 
J\nti..,L~l:ilhing Bill in what was clearly a filiwstero As a result, bills 
in the President@s program were delayed 9 as the Se:w.ate's legislative 
work rea~hed a stalemateo The antl...,lynohing proposal, stated ~I!tk 
Tim.es edi toritli1?t Arthur :K'ri®ck, "hangs ewer the ealendar and the Presi ... 
27 dentijs program. like a p@ised avalanCilhe with destruCilti~n its promi.seo" 
24New ~ Times 9 July 13ti 1935, 33:6,, 
~ . . -· ,. . ., ... -:-_ U.,Se C©Jmg:f'eS!Sl,91 Senate, An A<!lt t~ Assure t@ Persons Within the 
J~-~ti@n !l, Eveq State theEgiil~e:iteertion!t the~'!!!! l! 
Piudsh- @f'_Lyt«ilhilpg, SGRo 24, 74th C~:ngress, 1st Session, 1935, 
c~. r ~rd, ndex, 3~7e 
26see Appendix c, page 13111 
27New ~ Times, April 17, 19'.35, 22:50 
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The bill8s ~hief proponent and sponsor, Senat®r lilragner, presented 
the issue as racial, claiming that this particular crime was directed 
again.st a single raeeo The bill "uld be <::lonstitu:ti(l)Ml, he held, be-
cause it wuld simply make the F~rteenth .Amendment ef'fe(}ltive in pro= 
vi.ding equal rlghts to the Negr~o28 
The debates became heateda Bailey of N~rth Carolina expressed his 
resentment that Costigan and Wagner should imply his state was unable to 
execm.te "justice w.ith rlghtewsmessa 1129 North. Car~lina, claimed :&.iley11 
did have a law against lynchi:ng, while the sta.tes of the bill's sperm ... 
sors did noto30 Bailey also significantly revealed growing distrust or 
the co~entration of po"Wer in the federal government under Roosevelt: 
This matter transoiends race and it transeends seetionoeoo 
It divides in terms that I ~0111ld almost welc~me, the course 
which has been m@re or less of a mystel'7 character here of 
lateo We will either pres&l"Ve the rights ~f the States, or 
we will gt) ahead and extend the Federal power 9 as has been 
soughtoao until~ have a Federal supervisor over every civil 
a.©ti vi ty in Amerioia .. '.31 
This feat" of eientrilization, alc:mg with s~uthern determioti0n to m.ail'.l,z, 
trln white supremacy, remai:ned the Cll"UX of the opp!i>si ti~n to every anti-
l:fll'llehing bill p::rop~sed during the 1930 9 so 
The Senate realized that the intro~ction of the anti ... lyn<:lhi:ng bill 
wuld arouse animciisityiil and thus several bills such as the Bankhe$.d Farm 
Temn@y Bill ~re used w p~stpl(ii)ne Costigan8 s introduction ~r his meas ... 
ureo The effort, h©iweiverj was abortive, and the bill ~ame betere thl.e 
28uoSo C~ngress, Se~te, ?4th Congress, lst Session, April 29, 19'.35, 
C@ngressi~nal Reeord, LXXIXi Fto 6, 6352Q 




chambero Once Costigan obstinately moved for a vote on the bil1, 
Southern Sena.tors announced their plans for a filibustero The Senate 0 s 
leadership and Seuthemers a.gain attempted to.sidetrack the anti-lynching 
measure by moving for adjournment, bu.t the motion failed by one vote. 
Majority leader Joseph T., Robinson of Arkansas was so angry with the de-
lay that he ealled Saturday meeti:ngso Sena.tor Harrison of Mississippi 
discouraged belligerency among SOl!thern members because he wanted to 
'.32 present a soildier~s b~:rm.s bill to Congress .. 
By April 29th a filibuster had begun and FoDoRo, irritated with the 
delay, ~alled f~r greater speed on his legislative programo Both the 
revised NoRoAQ bill and a Social Seeurity prcposal were blocked from 
legislative aetiono While the leadership of C~ngress promised te co-
operate, die-hard Southern Sena.tors prepared to conduct the filibuster 
indef'ini telyo One who was particularly adamant in his opposi ti.on was 
Hugo ma~k @f i1abama, who claimed that the act should be ea1led a ''Bill 
t!5l Increase the Crlm.e of Lyn@hing .. n'.33 
On May 1, 1935, Roosevelt held a White House Conference for the 
Senate Leadership at which he expressed his displeasure at the delays 
and threatened t@ hold the session int~ the summer to get his program en~ 
actedo F~D.R. e1hided Wagner, Bora.ht and Gerald Nye of North·Dakota for 
their part in the delay and for criticizing his aotionse The conference 
was effective, sin~e the Senate voted for adjour~ent the next day, 
autematie1ally removing the bill from th~ floor, and replacing it with 
Senator Harrison°s@ompro:mi.se soldier's bonus bill.34 Wagner's 
32 . 
~ ~ Times, April 24, 1935, 2:3; April 25, 1935, 1:5; April 
27, 1935, 2:lo 
33Ibido, April 29, 1935, 1:5; April 30, 1935, l:60 
34n,1d., May 1, 1935, 2:5; May 2j 19359 l:60 
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willingness to accept adjournment is not too surprising, since some felt 
he was asld.ng too nmch special class legislation, and the Senator did 
not want to risk .Presidential disapproval$35 
Because Roosevelt never isstted a statement on the anti~lynehing 
bill, his actions were criticized by prominent Negroese IMri:ng the de-
bate en the 1935 bill, Walter W.bite of the N,.A.,A.,C,,P .. , with the assist... 
anoe of Mrso Rcosevelt, had obtained an interview with FoD.Ro White 
noted th.at Roosevelt resorted to aneeqotes t©) avoid discussing the tGpio 
until White forced it imta> the open .. Roosevelt p:resented White with all 
the negative arguments, bttt Mrse Roosevelt had forewarned White er this 
and saw that bis wife and mother were siding with. White, he "roared with 
laughter and confessed defeaton36 White then ree©rds Roosevelt6 s reasons 
for nl.'.llt baeking the bill: 
0 I did not ~ho0se the tools with which I nmst wcrk,' he 
told meo sHad I been permitted to choose th.em I would 
have seleeted quite different oneso But I 9ve got to get 
legislati~n passed by Congress to save .AmericaQ The 
Southerners by reason of the seniority rule in Congress 
a.re chairmen or ~ocupy strategic pla~es on most of the 
Senate and House c~mmitteeso If I come out for the anti.-
lynching bill now, they will bloek every mill I ask Con.. 
gress to pass t@ keep America from collapsingo ~ just 
©an°t take that riske037 
White protested against the President's silence by resigning from the 
Advisory Council to the Government of the Virgin Isl~nds later the same 
38 :m«:mtho 
35I'b.1.do, May 2, 1935, 20:5; April 17, 1935, 22i59 
36Wb.ite, ! ~ Called White, 1650 
'.3'7Ibid.,, 169., 
38"The Flight Ha.s Ju.st Begun," 175 .. 
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Many Negroes c~ld not accept the President's explanatio~o They 
felt tut Roosevelt's failure to speak was especially noticeable sime 
Sou.thern votes were not rmmerica.lly necessary to pass the measure. !!!. 
Crisis reflected Negr0 resentment 'by elaim:i:mg that Roosevelt was willing 
to "spend billiens te keep people from relief' rolls, but is unwilling to 
say one word tc prevent his tellowmen from being nmrd.ered by mobs. u39 
F oDoR., in the minds of many black men, was "afraid" of Sollthern Cen-
40 
gressmen., 
In the 1930's a curiGtts relationship was noted - a decrease ot 
lynchings while an anti ... lyioohing la~ was on the calendar or was being 
debated, f@llowed by an.increase in lynchings with the disposal of the 
iE?SU.eo .As early as June, 193.5, The Crisis noted renewed activity ••at 
. ~ 
the rate of more than one lynching a week," after an anti-lynehing bill 
had been defeated in Cengress., In Novemb,r, 1935, a iexas lynching et a 
Negro f'w.:nd @Olil.nty €i>f'ficials apprcving the aot.iono Appalled, nm.eh pub-
lic interest continaed. ~ be keen., 42 
The isn.e promised to ~feet the election of 19)6, for Senate dis-
cussi@ns @e~rred intermittently f'rcm Jama.ey t.hrcm.gh October .. Demo... 
erati4l) Party o.f'f'id.als and Roos.evelt attempted te preserve unity by ig-
n@ri~ the issue., Other candidates, however, were not in F.D.R.,'s 
39Editorlal, "Pablie Enemy Ntmiber One," Crisis, n.II (Jamary, 
1935), 6; · "Frem the Press 0£ the Nation," Crisis, XI.II (June, 1935), 149; 
Editorial, "Nc:> Check on Mobs," Crisis, Il,l:II (May, 1936), 145; "The 
Flight Has .. Just .. Bepn," 175; Editorial, "Tlie Best of the Anti-Lynching 
Fights,n··cnsis, · XLII (June, 1935), 177; "Congress Considers .the 
Costigan""Wagner Anti-Lyn.ehing Bill, 11 165., 
40p;di terial, "hblic Enemy Number One," 6; "h>em the Press of the 
Nation, 11 149; ~ ~ Times, August 4, 1935, 2 :Si, 
41Ecli tori.al, "h.blic Enemy Nmn'ber One," 6., 
42 -
~ ~ Times, November 14, 1935, ):6; November 15, 193.5, 22:20 
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vu.lnerable position and oould therefore afford to oomment, increasing 
Roosevelt's em.barrassmento Alfred Mo Landon, the Kansas governor and 
th.e eventual RePQbliean nominee, condemned lynehi:ng crimes and ann<>unoecl 
his firm support for the anti-lynching bill pending bef@re Congress .. As 
the .!!!'. !!.m, Tim.es noted, there had been no comment from the President 
on the issue. 43 The question was also particularly adaptable to an inde-
pendent candidate Sl!lCh as Senator William E .. B@raho Yet when asked on 
what platform he woul.d run for President, Borah rejected the proposed 
44 law a,san unconstitutional i:mrasion. of state's rights.. Again, F .. D,.Ro 
said nothing., 
This silence prompted resenthl aotion bJT s<i>me Negroes., In October, 
prior to the election, several Negro women demonstrated their oo:ndemna-
quarters in New York City., Thus F.DaRQ's silence reflected not only on 
' 45 
him, but C!iln his politi~a.l party alsCl>o 
F~ll@wi.ng the 1936 election the disputation issue re~eded in 
prominenee for a year. until it was revived for the Comgressio:nal. elec-
tion year of 19:380 In November, 1937, Representative Ha.mil-ten Fish, a 
Rep1:1.bli«:'Jan f'rl@m New York, requested that Negr<i> minsters demand :f'ram 
their pulpits that R.o~sevelt supp@rt the anti-lyru,hi:ng )>ill. This meas-
ure, elrlmed Fish, wuld pass if the President would e:ndorse it., 46 By 
the :middle of NCllvember, 1937, the Senate had a sh.ort..l:ived filibuster 
43 ° 6 6 Ibid.,, ~tober , 193,, 1:5., 
4"4rbid .. , March 1, 1936, l:4Q 
45Ibid.,, Oewber 27, 1936, 12~6 .. 
46 · Ibid., , November 8, 1937, 3 (3 .. 
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over the anti-lyn~hing billQ The move was led by Texasts Senator Tom Te 
Connal.1.y9 The filibuster was temporarily ended when Southern Democrats 
compromised in erder to oonsider the fa.rm billj) but the threat still 
plagued the Senate at the end of the yearo 47 
As CGngress o~:mrened in Januaryi 1938, Wagner expressed his determi-
na:t:i@n t~ obtain a vote on the anti-lynehing pr@posa.1048 Connallyt in 
turnll informed the pu.blio that the South was prepared to "protest" its 
immediateDbuild-up @f the Navy, although the enabling legislation was 
bel~w the anti-lyn©hing measure on the ealendar~ 49 As the Senate began 
its :filibuster, a showdown between the Demo~rati~ leadership and S®uthern 
members became apparent as the majority leader, Alben Wo Barkley of Ken,., 
tucky, threatened to impose spetldng rules t@ speed a~ti@n on the bill., 
Filibuster t«:JJpicis ranged from tours of Merlcl()) and Peru to armaments, and 
sometimes completely omitted the issue at hand.,50 
By Janua.ry 12 the f'ilibu.ster was a week old, and Southern Senat@rs 
expressed their fear that the issue would split the Democratic Party., 
Se:natGr Jmnes F., Byrnes of S~th Carolina claimed that the South was a 
~nly to ar@use racist feelingso Senators Richard Russell of Georgia and 
47Il::>idoi> N@vember 17j 19:3?, 1~8; Nwember 23 9 1937; 52 .. 
48uQsQ C@ngress, Senate, An Aet .. to sue to Persons Within the 
JW"isdiction.e! Ever· State theEgualho ..!!.2! ~ ~' and !2, 
Pliilmsb ~ Crime .!£, ~ti,.,Lyneh Billt H.,R., 150711. · As Passed 
by the Hl@u.se and The llAs .Am.ended.in The Senate), 7.5th Congress, 3rd 
Session, 19:38, Appendi:x: !!, the Ccngressi(ll)na.l Reeord, 52.Bo 
49New ~ Times,' January 4, 1938, 1:5o ·· 
50Ibido, January 9, 1938, 1:.5; U0SG Congress, Senate, 75th Congress, 
3rd Sessicn, January 6, 1938, CGngressio:nal Record, LXXXIII, pto 1, 77-
970 
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Josiah Bailey et North C,arolina also cited the nm.rde:r ... Clonviotion ratio 
in Chi.cage to support Southern arguments. In Chi~ago, the Senators 
claimed, there were 380 murders between 1923 and 1928 with only ene oen... 
viotion., Therefore the Snth"s record, the Senators believed, was com-
paratively good., Bailey attempted to reinforce his stand by using a 
ReGsevelt speeGh made while the President was still gffernor of New 
York., The President, as quoted by :aailey, stated th.at in regard to 
states' rights, "indeed Washington must never be enellouraged to i:nter-
fereo19 This phrase was used now to support Southern beliefs conoerm.ng 
states9 rightso5l 
The threat to Democratic Party imity was evident in Bailey's state ... 
ment tnat "if you come down to North Carolina and try t~ impose your 
will ci>n us, so help me Ged ycm 9ll get a lesson no political party will 
. ever f'@rget., 1952 At the s~e time New Deal advisors were vging Roose"" 
velt to read the South out of the party., FoDeRo attempted to a.melio-
rate the opptl>sing factions by emphasizing na.tio:nal. over sectional as-
pe~tso "The party," stated the President, "should stand f'ti>r the general 
welfare instead of weighing social,,.,eo<!Ilnomio proposals en geegraphic 
scaleson.53 Roosevelt11 s position, according to !!Ji~ 'l."imes columnist 
Arthlrf' Kr~cik, was Tiilnerable at this mcm.ent because the President was 
5lNew !!m, Times, January 12, 1938, 215; January l'.3, 19'.38, 8:5o 
Perhaps Bailey9s claim beeemes more plausible when the letter written to 
William I., Serevich fl"om li\D.,Ro in 1928 is studied.. In it FoDeRo states 
"I k~~ that you will agree with me in believing that we f'aee in this 
CllW.ntry n~t only the da.Zlgel" ot eonmnmism; 'bmt the equal danger of' the 
ei~mentration Ci)f' all power, economic a:nd politicial, i:n. the hands of what 
the ancient Greeks W'@'i1ld have called an Oligarchy'.,• Roosevelt, ed., 
l, .. lol,o, I!!. Persoml Lett~rs, I, 119., 
52Ibido, January 13, 1938, 8:5., 
.5'.3Arth.v Kreck, "The Poli tica.l Prcblem of the South," !!.!! I!!:k 
Times, Jamiary 14, 1938, 22:5., 
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aware that his p@li tical. popularity had waned ecmsiderably o It was 
Kreek0s opinion that the chief executive vroiuld not press f@r the passage 
of a divisive bill~ but would achieve a vrorkable ~ompr@ndseo The solu= 
tion was f@r the S@uth to grant ~@ncessions ~n the labor standards bill, 
while the N@rth 'Wl@uld relinquish its pGsition on the anti=lynehing 
bill.,54 
By February 8, 1939, the Wagne:r>""'Van Nuys .Ant:i.,.,Lyncihing Bill had 
been filibustered f@r a montho Again Roosevelt had beeome impatient 
with delayo As early as January 24 the President expressed his dis""' 
pleasn1.00.re t~ the Senate leaders,, After a conference wi tlt the <:lhie.:f ex.., 
e~utivey majority leader Barkley revealed the effect of R~~seveltes in-
fluen~e when he ann©uneed that the Senate would consider the col'Jl.f'erence 
reports ©n the housing and cr~p ~©ntrel bills the f©llow.ing weeko55 At 
the end ©f three sweeks several Northern Dem@crats attempted to impose 
the ©l@ture rule ©n the debate~ but it was rejected656 Thus the issue 
~ontinu.ed t© dominate Senate sessi~ns until February 21~ when the Senate 
V©ted t© lay :tt. aside f@r ©ther measures" il th®ugh F" Do Re was irri ta.ted 
with the delay~ he appre~iated the p®litical ram:ificati@ns of the issue 
and h@pe,d t©r a better relationship with Congress at the ~@n~lusien of 
the debates @n the billo The ~@lmrm:ist Krock, believing that Roosevelt 
r~@ relu©tant t© imp~se federal authority while statistics refleeted a 
55New Y@rk Times, January 29 9 1938, 3:6; February 8, 1938, 9:2; 
January 24!1 195s·; 1*8o 
56Ibido 9 Janua~y 27, 1938j 6i6; Jan~ary 28, 1938, 6:3o 
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was itself dispC!>si:ng of the stigma of "Judge Lynch., 1157 
Roosevelt, who had been silent during the debate, now found it po ... 
litically expedient w make a seeo~ public statement .. Late in March of 
1938 the President proposed that s•e type of maehi:nery be established 
to investigate lynchings, althc~gh "he W'l1ld not insist on passage by 
Congress of the pending Anti-Lynching Billon58 FoDoR .. pr~posed two al-
ternatives: first, that the Atterney General imrestigate lynGhings and 
reveal the facts to the pu.blie; second, if th.a first proposal was inef-
fective, th.at Congress establish a. committee to study the problem.,59 
Yet RoGsevelt8 s statement was va~e and non..eommittal, and he was again 
subjected to cri ticiism by Negr~es., T4e President, claimed Ih.El Crisis, 
had issued a declaration but had net proposed or supported legislation 
to p11t it into effecte In fact, Roosevelt had taken no aetion whatever 
eoMerrd.ng the a:n.ti..,lynehing measure.,60 In May, Roosevelt conferred 
briefly with a delegation of Negroes who e)C:J)ressed their disappointment 
a.t the anti..,lyn®hing bill's failure,. F.,D.,R .. reportedly en.enraged the 
b~ 61 
1.J1.ack man to et'llntinue the fight, al though he made :no public stand. 
Rexford Tugwell s'WmTla?'ized Roosevelt9 s pelitieal position at this 
time, ~lrl:ming that the Soo~9 s benefits fr4l>m the New Deal had not 
57Ibid.,, Febl'U.ary 8, 1938, 1:8; January 28, 1938, 20:5. 
58rbid .. , March 23, 1938, 4:2o 
.59New York Times, Mareh 2'.3,1938, 4:2; Editorial, "President Would 
Send G..iei After Lynchers," Crisis, XLV (April, 1938), 118 .. 
6~ditorial, "No Action Yet," Crisis, XLV (May, 1938), 145. 
61Editorial, "President Roosevelt Sees Anti-Iqnch Delegation," 
Crisis, XLV (May, 1938), 1490 
Franklin had watched the fight, but had not intetoYenedo He 
had been urged again and again to exert his leadership, but 
he had turned his baeke More than anything else this had 
emphasized for his supporters his essential helplessness 
vis-a-vis the SGU.thernerso It was from then ~n that the 
eonservative veto over all measures had been reeegnized as 
nearly c~mpleteo And even the wages-and=ho~rs legislation 
had been c~mpromised to their ~atisfaetione62 
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Roosevelt was entrapped in a politieal web fr~m whiClh he ~euld not es-
eapeo The 1938 lynching bill was pr0bably a victim of' this political 
situationo 
The filibuster of 1938 eventually succeeded, ending because the 
Senate desired to study the wages amd hour billo But h©pes ef reintr@-
duci:ng the antimlyncihi:ng measure persisted; ~ Q:ris:;~ repcn:"ted that the 
July lynchings perpetuated the Senate 11 s interesto Als@, Attorney General 
' 
Cummings emphasized his inability to act witheut a federal law c@neerni.ng 
this crimeo6:3 
As the electi®n year of 1940 approaehed, lyn~hi:ng again became a 
national issueo Since the Democrats were Wl:>rried about retaining the 
Negr~ vote, Vice~President JohD Garmer of Texas suggested te Roosevelt 
that an ena@ted anti-lynching bill W©uld insure suecessQ Roosevelt, how-
ever, I"eplied "But down in your state and elsewhere in the South they 
say that the anti=lyn(jlhing bill is unconstitutional, 18 and gave Garner 
only a c@:mment, n~t an answer0 64 The p~lend~ pattern of the 1940 bil1 
62Tllgwell, Demo~ratie R@osevelto 
03Editorial, "Revived Demand for Federal Anti=Lynch Bill," Crisis, 
XLV (September, 1938) ;1 302'; Editorial, "Bl11f':f'ers," Crisis, XLV (July, 
1938), 2210 
64 --~·-··· .Ha.rol.d Iit:llkes 9 The Secret Diary !!, Harold ~" Iokes, II, I!!!. ~ 
~ Struggle, 1936.,.,!2.12, ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 19 54), 107 0 
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repeated previou.s debateso65 The bill, sponsored in the House by Rep,,., 
resentative Joseph Gavagan, Democrat from New York, passed that body by 
252 vetes to 131 in Jamary., The measure was also endorsed by the C.,I.O. 
and by 148 Congressmen who had written the NaA.,A.,C.,Po pledging their 
support of the bil.1.,66 Mrs. Roosevelt also indicated her endorsement., 
Senator Connally again threatened to oondu~t the Senate filibuster, 
claiming that the states could manage the l~ehing prll)blem without any 
interferenee from the federal government.. lh!, Crisis, h@wever, claimed 
that in 99.,2 percent of the lynching oaE;Jes, ne action was taken by the 
state., 67 Majority leader Barkley was al.sG heavily criticized by the 
Negro pu.blieation fti>r bringing pressure to remove the anti,.,lynehing bill 
from the calendar., Barkley was ae011sed of calling the lynching bill a 
"dead horse .. " Since the President was promGting eru.arged national de-
fense appropriations in the increasingly e:ritioal international atmos-
phere~ the lynGhi:ng bill was oonsidered ~ be seeon.d-rate legislationG 
Se:na.t0r W., Warren Barbour, Republican of New Jersey, rebuked this atti-
tude by claiming that lynching legislation had been passed ewer "obvious ... 
ly too ~£ten and al.together ~o long, and should have considerationo"6B 
65u o So Congress, Senate, !!, ~ 12, Assure ~ Persons With.in ]!.!, 
Jurlsdiction~,Every.State-~ Equal Protection!!~~, .!.!!9, .!£, 
2 Crime.~ Lynching, S.,R., 517, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 
II Q_ongressional Rec~rd, I~ex, 660., 
66,mditorlal., "Anti-Lynching Bill Passes House 252-131,"; "Senate 
Hearing Set for February 6," Crlsis, XI.VII (Feb:ruaey, 1940), 55; "Along 
the N0AoA .. C.,Po Battlefront," Crisis, XLVII (January, 1940), 20. 
67Editc,riaJ., "The Best Chance w Check Lynebi:ng," Crisis, XLVII 
(February, 1940), 49.. · 
68E;ditGrial, "Barkley Sounds Death of Anti-Lynching Bill," Crisis, 
XLVII (November, 1940.).., .. 358; Editorial, "Barkley Denies Deal to Kill 
.Anti..,Lynoh Bill," Crisis, nim (O~tober, 1940), 324; Editorial, "Still 
~dging on.Anti-Lynehing Bill," Crisis, n.VII (September, 1940), 2790 
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This rebuke, however, was not heeded, a.nd the final pr0posed anti ... 
lynehing bill for the 1930.,,1940 era was never form.ally ~onsidered be.,, 
ea.use of the :filibuster threat to Senate business~ Yet interest in the 
issue remained intense in the Senate and with the Negroeso Ro0sevelt 
a.gaim remained aloof from the eonfliet among the Senators concerning the 
anti-lyn~hing billo 
It appears that a.s a. whole, the Senate was luke=wam towards the 
lynching question .. Passage ef the anti.,,lynching bill seemed irrelevant 
when ~ompared to me1re pressi:ng issues. TG Gne powerful minority the 
bill p())sed a. sigrdficant threat~ The a.nti=lynching bill thus beeame an 
irritant, the focus or delay, the hindra.noe t!Q) congressional transa.e.,., 
tionsQ Therefore, the Senate was not e@ncerned e~ough; the filubusterers 
always succeededj not for their effective arguments but because of the 
mere important issu.es t@ be con~ideredo 
In analyzing the p@sition of the ohief executive, there was little 
devia:tion fr>om his previws nona,i:nvol vement activities e The further 
troth is that publi@ly F0D0Ro was n~t concerned enough with the Negroe 
Equality and ~ivi.l rights were minor issues when compared to other prob,., 
lems he faoedo Yet a degree @f respect for the political p~tency of the 
entrenched Senators was apparent in Roosevelt's public neutrality re~ 
garding ra~ial legislationo The P.r>esident could indeed have been a~ 
tag®inistic t© Sili!.~h la:wso Yet the Amerioan pablie never really knew 
whe~e Roosevelt stood on ra~e issueso 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Franklin Do Rooseveltts involvement 'W'i.th the Negr®> civil rights 
movement while he was President was probably deter11rined by his relations 
with So~thern Democrati~ Co:ngressmeno These representatives provided 
the m(l)st obvious deterrent tG Rooseveltijs political endorsement of the 
black man@s causeo The im'luenee of these Congressmen was determined 
not by their numeri~al strength, but by their role as a major segment or 
the Democratic party, and by the seml..ority they p@ssessed in Cpngresse 
Ro©sevelt did not kn@w to what extent he had to depend on the votes of 
this bloa to ena~t his program from year to year; therefore, he sought 
s@me political seeurity f©r his New Deal by av@iding open confrontations 
with these meno As he f@llowecl this poli~y Roosevelt had to make small 
c:ompr@mises @!!" disregard "ambiguous" sections of bills that might other-
wise threaten tllese C~ngress:m.eno The white S@uth, altheugh it desper ... 
ately needed New Deal programs and probably derived the greatest propor<S> 
tions.l benefit from themj refused t@ el®mpromis:e its traditional attitude 
t~ward the Negroo 
Rooseveltis dependen~e on the Si@uthern delegation vacillated cm.ring 
the 1930tso In 1932 the two=thirds rule for nominating the Demeeratic 
Presidential eandidate had made Roesevelt0 s selection dependent on 
Southernerso Yet in 1936 R01osevelt9 s f@ll<0wers successfully abrogated 
the rule, supposedly breaking the power 0f the S®uthern section over the 
partye But by 194-0t RooseveltWs political position in the party was 
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again precarious, as conservatives from other geographical sections 
united with the -Southerners to oontest the third term., Thus the decade 
appears to have had a political. cycle whereby Ro@sevelt gained some in,., 
dependence of Southern Democrats~ then evolved to a more dependent stage 
againo If Roosevelt had alienated these Southern representatives over 
the raee issue du.ring.the 1930's, it might have e(i)st the President bis 
re=eleotion and caused an irreparable split in the Party., And the de-
feat of FQDQRQ would have als~ meant the loss of New .Deal benefits de-
rived by the Negro o 
0:ne question a@neer:ni:ng Rooseveltes politi©al dependen~y on the 
Southern Congressmen, heiirwever 9 was raised by his administrative aide, 
Re:x:f'ord Tugwell" A~cording to Tllgwell, FoD .. Ro in the early years of his 
admirdstrati~n could have wielded greater executive power~ But the 
President compromised Gn the administrati9n ©f su.eh acts as the NQR~Ae 
beaause he did not realize the extent of his power and popularity .. When 
the ~@nservatives diseovered this fact, they so solidified their 
stre:t,gth that by the late 193ows, FeDoRo was n~t able to have Congress 
enact maj~r legislation without their supp~rte1 This criticism was e~ 
pressed by several of Ro0seveltWs New Deal advisors, bat they perhaps 
were not as illW©lved in the p@litieal delicacy of the situation as was 
the President" 
Yet Franklin Roosevelt's lack @f imrolvement may not have been ~om-
pletely determined by So~thern Congressmeno Sinee Roosevelt was a mas-
ter of avoiding o@ntroversial commitments, the personal factor must re-
main an enigma~ Nevertheless Roosevelt's wife and many 0f his colleagues 
1 
Tugwell, Demoera.tie Reosevelt9 476. 
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sueh as Harold Ickes were advocates of Negro eivil rights .. Roosevelt, 
however, remained detached. The major eoneern of the President was alle-
viating the pr~blems of the Depression.· It the Negro benefited as a re-
sult of the :national programs the advantage was his, but Ro(l)sevelt did 
not specify direct legislation for the black man's ea.use. 
The Negr0es view of Roosevelt prodaced divergent attitudes eon.., 
cerni:ng lrJ.is benefits to the Negro. Some blacks, regardless of FeDQR. 8 s 
lack of involvement, would endorse him, w:hile others condemned the 
P.residemt for the same res.sou~ Generally, howeve?", the NegrG tended to 
be impatient with Roc,sevelt6 s seemingly slow involvement in seeking S4l>,., 
lutions for raeial pr~blemse The perspective that could come from a 
complete understanding of the prGblems that confronted the President 
during his administration was rarely considered as an aoeeptable answer 
by the Negl"O for his own situati~n., 
While Roosevelt0 s primary goal in the l930's was to restore a 
stable eeonomy, the Negro's central eon.earn was expressed elsewheree 
Sllrvival and increased opportunities for the blaek :man were his para-
mount desires, and sometimes these ideals would eonf'liet with the Presi ... 
dent's0 M~re specific interests of the blaek man included the solving 
ll)f his unempl~ym.emt problem, the devel(l))pment of his politioa.l maturity 
and im'lue:n@e through the parties, and the proteetion of his rights and 
person by legal means s~eh as the preposed anti~lyncb.ing bills. In 
these areas the_.:f'J'.,A~AoC .. P.,, pre>bably the mosteff'e<iltive instrument fGr 
the Negrc::ii during the l930 9 s, directed its activities,, But not a1l re-
wards were tangible; in some battles, suoh as the attempt to pass an 
anti-lynching law, the victory was the Negro's suceessful acquisition of 
national publicity, not the passage of legislation. 
For the Negro to expect ~omplete achievement of his gos.ls in the 
116 
l9j09 s was unrealistic., Although traditional racial attitudes had 
weakened, the full effect or the social changes wr©ught by the Depres-
sion would not be realized in that decade., The ra.ee iss,1e, in ciontrast 
to t0day, was of minor interest tQ the public .. Litt.le national atten-
tion or publicity was given to the black man or his problems., Moreover, 
the considel"ation of the Negro as a voting bloc was important to the 
black man,· but bis political involvement received infrequent and minor 
news coverage$ The Negro simply was not in a political or economic po-
si ti.en in the 1930@ s to demand speeialized major> rel;lloivery legislation., 
Negro gains, however, were tremendous., The pr~blem was nGt whether 
pr~gress was being made, but whether it had come soon enough and was oo-
curring at a pace acceptable to the blacko Impatiexwe and frustration 
resulted f'r<tjim delay, and the Negro was extremely aritieal of any short... 
comings that happened as the idealistic New Deal prr!ilgrams were realisti-
eally appliedo The Negro as a particularly vulnerable victim of the 
Depression was hypersensitive concerning his in:volvement with the govern.. 
ment, and this attitude was reflected in his publications sueh as 1h!, 
On. his list of gains fr@m the New Deal era the black man could in.. 
elude the evolution of a new educated leadership :with a lobbying approach 
i;,('))wa.rd improving civil rights .. In addition, publicity fol" the Negro, 
although scarce, was more fa~o~able and mere frequent than it had been 
in the deeades sinee 1900" The Negro alse gained more newspaper cover-
}f'::::r~\:. 
age for his pr~tests than previouslyQ But the black man was unable to 
win a politi@al ~ommitment from Franklin De Roosevelt~ At no period 
during the 19::,oes was the Depression. removed as an imminent threat to 
the :national administrationo To handle this situation F.DeR., was 
forced t~ meet certain political obligations that prevented his becoming 
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personally involved in the civil rights movement~ The Negro benefited 
from the programs created by F.D.R., but it was only as a part of the 
mass of eomm.Gn men in .Americac F$D.R0 might receive ~redit for these 
gainsj bttt as the creator of the national program, n~t as a benefactor 
to Negro civil rights. 
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APPENDIX A 
SENATE 4164 ..... SEL!Xl,TIVE .TRAINING AND.SERVICE ACT OF 19401 
. . . .1 ' ' . 
SEC. j(a) Exc~pt as otherwise provided in this Act, every male 
citizen of the United States, and every male alien residing in the 
United States, and every male alien residi:n.J in the .tJm.ted States who 
has declared his intention te beceme suoh a oi:tizen, between. the ages or 
twenty-one and thirty-six at the time fixed for his registration, shall 
be liable for training and service in the land er naval torees of the 
United Statese The President is authorized from time to time, whether 
er not a state of war exists, to select and induct inte the land and na ... 
val. forces of the United States tor training a~d service, in the manner 
provided in this A.et, such mllllber ot men as· in bis judgment is required 
for such forces in the national interest: PrGvided, That within the 
li:mi ts or the ,quota determined under sectitHll 4(b) 'for the su.bdi visie>n in 
which he resides, any person, regardless ot race or color, between the 
ages ~r eighteen and thirty-six, shall be afforded an .opportunity to 
volunteer for induction into the land or naval forces of the United 
States for the traimng and sel"Vioe prescribed in su'bseetiGn (b), "but nG 
person who so velunteers shall be inducted fer sttch training and ser-
vice so leng as he is deferred after cla:ssification: Provided further, 
That no man shall. be inducted fer training and service under this Act 
lu .. s .. Congress .. Statutes at ta;e· 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 
LIV, Pt .. 1, September 16, 1940,885, ?. 
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unless and' until he is acceptable to the la.md or naval ferces for such 
training and service and his physical and mental fitness for sueh train-
ing and service has been satisfactorily determined: Provided :f'l!lrther, 
I 
That no men shall be inducted for such training and sel"Vice until ade-
quate provision shall have been made for such shelter, sanitary facili-
ties, water supplies, heating and lighting arrangements, medical care, 
and hospital accommedations, for such men, as may be determined by the 
Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, to be 
essential to pu.blic and personal health: Provided fttrther,, That except 
in time of war there shall not be in active training er service in the 
land forces of the United S~tes at any time under subsection (b) more 
than nine hundred thmi.sand men inducted und~r the provisions of this ActQ 
The men inducted into the land or naval fe>roes f~r training and service 
under this Act shall be assigned to camps or units ef SUGh forces. 
SEC., 3(d) With respeeit te the men imducted for training and service 
under this Act there shall be paid, allowed, and extended the same pay, 
allowances, pensions, disability and death compensation, and other bene-
fits as are provided by law in the case or other enlisted men of like 
grades and length or service of that component or the land or naval for-
ees to which they are assigned, and after transfer to a reserve eompenent 
of the land or naval forces as pre>vided in subsection (e) there shall be 
paid, allGwed, and extended with respect to them the same benefits as are 
provided by law in like eases with respect to otker members or such re-
serve eomponento Men in such training and service a:m.d men who have been 
so transf'el"?"ed to reserve components shall have an opportunity to quality 
for promotion .. 
APPENDIX B 
LYNCHINGS, WHITES AND NEGROES, 1882~1934 
(Revised report, January 7, 1935)1 
Year Whites Negroes T@tal 
1882 64 49 113 
1883 77 53 130 
1884 160 51 2ll 
1885 no 74 184 
1886 64 74 138 
1887 50 70 120 
1888 68 69 137 
1889 76 94 170 
1890 11 85 96 
1891 72 113 185 
1892 69 162 231 
1893 34 117 151 
1894 58 134 192 
1895 66 11'.3 179 
1896 45 78 12'.3 
1897 3.5 12'.3 158 
1898 19 101 120 
lues .. Congress, Senate, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, April, 1936, 
Co:ngressiGnal Record, LXXXIX, Pt. 19, 6370. 
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Appendix B Continued 
Year Whites' Negroes Total 
1899 21 85 106 
1900 9 106 115 
1901 25 105 130 
1902 7 85 92 
1903 15 84 99 
1904 7 76 83 
1905 5 57 62 
1906 3 62 65 
1907 2 58 60 
1908 8 89 97 
1909 13 69 82 
1910 9 67 76 
19ll 7 60 67 
1912 2 · 61 63 
1913 1 .51 52 
1914 3 44 47 
1915 18 57 75 
1916 5 49 54 
1917 3 36 39 
1918 4 60 64 
1919 6 74 80 
1920 7 .53 60 
1921 4 58 62 
1922 6 51 57 
1923 4 29 33 
ljO 
Appendix B Contimted 
Year Whites Negroes Total 
1924 0 16 16 
1925 0 17 17 
1926 .., 2'.3 30 
1927 0 l~ 16 
1928 1 10 11 
1929 3 7 10 
1930 1 20 21 
1931 1 12 13 
1932 2 6 8 
193'.3 4 24 28 
1934 0 15 15 
Total 1,291 3,'.352 4,643 
APPENDIX C 
WAGNER-COSTIGAN ANTI-LYNCHING BILL AS PRESENTED 
TO THE SEN.A.TE IN 19351 
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the 
United States.of America in Congress assembled, That. the phrase "mob or 
riotous assemblage", when used in this .A.ct, shall mean an ~ssemblage 
composed of three or more persons acting in concert, without authority 
of law, for the purpose of killing or injuring any person in the custody 
of any peace officer or suspecteQ of, charged with, or convicted of the 
commission of any crime, with the purpose or consequence of preventing 
the apprehension and/or trial and/or punishment by law of ~eh person or 
otherwise of depriving such person of du.e process of law or the equal 
protection of the laws. 
SECo 2o If any State or governmental s~bdivision thereof fails, 
neglects, or refuses to provide and maintain protection to the life or 
person of any individual within its jurisdiction against a mob or riot-
ous assemblage, whether by way of preventing or punishing the acts 
thereof, such State shall by reascm of such failure, neglect, or refusal 
be deemed to have denied to such person due precess of law and the equal 
protection of the laws of the State, and to the end that the protection 
guaranteed to persons within the jurisdiction of the several States, or 
lUoSe Congress, Senate R,~p~~:tt§, Volo I, Anti-Lynching, Report 340 
on Senate 24~ 24th Congress, 1st Session, Maroh (calendar day, March 18, 
1935) f lao )~' 
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to the citizens of the United States, by the Constitution or the United 
States, may be secured, the previsions or this Aet are enacted. 
SEC. '.3,. (a) Any officer or employee of a:riy State or governmental 
subdivision thereof who is elaarg~d with the duty er who passesses the 
power or authority as such officer or employee to protect the life or 
person o!any individual injured or put to death by aey mob or riotous 
assemblage or any officer or employee of any State or governmental sub-
division there(!)f having any such individual in his custody, who rails, 
( 
neglects, or refuses to make all diligent efforts to protect such indi-
vidual from being so injured or being put to death or aey effieer or em-
ployee or a:ay State or governmental subciivi,.ion thereof charged with the 
duty er apprehending, keeping in cmstody, or pr0secuting a.:ny person 
participating in such mob or riotous assemblage who fails, neglects, or 
refuses t@I make all diligent eff~rts to perform his duty in apprehend-
ing, keeping in custody, or proseeuting to fi~ judgment u.:nder the laws 
of such State all persons so participating, s~l be guilty of a felo:n;r, 
and up@n oonrtction there0f shall be pt1nished by a f'i:n.e not exceeding . 
$5,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by both sueh fine 
and imprisonment .. 
(b) Any officer or employeE\) of any State or governmental sub-
d+vision thereof, acting as such officer ~r employee under authority or 
State law,· having in his custody or control a p~~~mer, who shall con-
spire, combine·, or confederate ¢th ·any person te suffer such prisoner 
tel) be taken 0r obtained from his custody or control to be injured or put 
to death by a mob or ri~t<!>us assemblage shall be guilty of a f'elon;y, and 
those who so coMpire, combine, or eenf'ederate with such officer or em-
pleyee shall likewise be guilty of a f'elo:ny,. On conviction th,e parties 
participating therein shall be punished by imprisonment of' not less than 
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five years nor more than twenty-five yearso 
SECo 4o The District Court of the United States judicial district 
wherein the person is injured or put to death by a mob or riotous as= 
semblage shall have jurisdiction to try and to pu.nish, in aceerdaooe with 
the laws or the State where the injury is inflicted or the homicide is 
committed, any and all persons who participate therein: Provided, That 
it is first made to appear to such court (l) that the officers of the 
State charged with the duty of' apprehendimg, proseeuting, and punishing 
such offenders under the laws of the State shall have failed, neglected 
or refused to apprehend, prosecute, or punish S'lll.ch offenders; or (2) 
that the jur@rs obtainable for service in the State oourt having juris~ 
diction of the offense are so strongly opposed tc sueh punishment that 
there is pr~bability that those guilty o! the offense will not be pun-
ished in such State eeurtG A failure for more than thirty days after 
the commission o:f such an offense to apprehend or to indict the persons 
guilty thereofj or a failure diligently to prosecute such persons, shall 
be sufficient to constitute prim.a facie evioenee of the failure, neg~ 
leet, or refusal. described in the above provisoo 
SEC., 5., Any county in which a person is s.erl.ously i~jured or put 
to death by a mob or riot~us assemblage by Feason of the raot that the 
@fficers or the State charged with the duty or apprehending, proseeit-
ing~ and punishing offenders under the laws of the State shall have 
failed, neglected,®!" refused to perform the duties prescribed in Sec-
tion '.3 of this Act shall be liable te the injured per~on or the legal 
representatives of such persons, er the estate of such deceased person 
f~r a sum or not less than $2,000 nor more than $10,000 as liquidated 
damages, which sum may be recovered in a civil action against such 
county in the United States District Court of the judicial district 
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wherein such person is put to the i:njury or death~ Such aeti~n shall be 
brought and prosecuted by the United States district attorney of the 
district in the United states District·Court fer such distrlcto If such 
amG>llnt awarded be net paid upon recovery ,r a jadgment therefor, such 
eou.rt shall have jurisdiction to enforce payment thereef by levy er 
execution upon an;y property of the ceuty, or may otherwise compel pay ... 
ment thereof by mandamus er other appropriate pr(!)cess; and any officer 
of su.eh en:nty or other person wlllo disobeys er fails to eGmply with any. 
lawful order er the court in the premises shal.1 be liable to punishnlent 
as fer contempt and to any' other penalty pr~ded by law therefor .. The 
amount recovered sh.all be exempt from a11 claims by creditors or such 
injured or deceased person, or the legal representatives er suoh injved 
person er or the estate or such deceased person. The amount recovered 
upon such ju.dgment sh.all be paid to the injured person, .or where death 
resulted, distribated in accordance with tbtit l~ws geverm.ng the distri-
buti(!)n or an intestate decedent's assets then in effect in the State 
therein such death ~c~red~ 
SEC. 6e In the event that any person so injured or put to death 
I 
shall have been trans:ported by S'V?,Ch mob or ricrt;cnts assemblage f'Nm one 
coety to another county or eou.nties ~uri:ng the time intenemng be-
tween his seizure and injury or putting t0 death, the ceu.nty in which he 
is seized and the oeunty in whieh. he is i:njl,J.l"ed or put to death shall be 
' 
jointly and severally liable to pay the rerfeitttre herein previded, and 
action shall be brought and prosecuted by the United States district at-
torney er any district wherein any such county is located .. !.Dy district 
judge or the United states District Court of the judicial district 
wherein amy·su1t er prosecution is instituted under the provisions et 
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this .A.et may by 0rder direct that such sllit or proseo-ation be tried in 
any place in such district as he may designate in suoh order. 
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